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Parakuyo pastoralists today are a small ethnic group scattered across Tanzania
and intermingled with larger agricultural societies. Their identity and history have been
debated for more than a century, especially regarding their precise relation to the better-
known and more populous Maasai pastoralists of East Africa. This study reveals
changing conceptions of Parakuyo identity and history found in Parakuyo and Maasai
oral traditions, records left by European missionaries, colonial accounts, and recent
scholarly writing. The approach taken here reveals that Parakuyo and Maasai once were
part of a larger pastoralist society, known as Loikop, that dominated the Rift Valley
savannas of East Africa in the early nineteenth century. Loikop society was demolished
from within by an aggressive, expanding Maasai faction during the nineteenth century.
Most of the territorial sections of Loikop either were disintegrated or absorbed by the
expanding Maasai system. Parakuyo managed to survive the conflict by scattering into
small groups and then adapting their pastoralist subsistence strategies to ecological niches
not ideally suited to pastoralism. During the late nineteenth century, these scattered
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Parakuyo communities forged links with more than a dozen different, predominately
agricultural ethnic groups in areas across northern Tanzania. This new network of
communities was threatened during the 1920s, when British colonial administrators
attempted to force Parakuyo into a reserve for Maasai pastoralists. Parakuyo successfully
resisted this policy, demonstrating a remarkable ability to move their settlements and
herds between districts when and where they saw fit.
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Introduction
Revisions of Parakuyo Identity and History
All conditioned things are subject to change.
Dhammapada




This study illuminates ways that people have thought about the identity and
history of a relatively small group of people. It traces the outlines and contents of these
diverse combinations of thought. It follows the creative revisions and the contingent
circumstances that have shaped these combinations, and it notes their evolution and
dissolution in time. It points out that the people doing the thinking have been both inside
and outside the small group of people itself, but that these two relative positions have had
their own inner divergences, and that they have interacted in ways that none of the people
involved could have predicted.
This study also aims to shatter complacencies. It presents a straightforward
narrative about the history of one small group of people, but in the process, it calls into
question the accuracy of our conventional views of history and ethnic identity across a
broad region of Africa. It resurrects questions and points of view that scholars felt had
been settled long ago, or that scholars had decided long ago to ignore. It makes the
unsurprising assertion that many non-Africans held inaccurate ideas about the identity
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and history of African societies, but it also makes the impolitic assertion that many ideas
held by African societies about their own identity and history are – historically – wrong.
The contrariness of this project is fitting for its subject. The people in question
have been persistent trouble-makers in scholarly debates, and sometimes trouble-makers
on the ground in East Africa, for more than a century. They live scattered across
Tanzania today, a society of perhaps thirty thousand cattle herders who call themselves
Parakuyo. At least they call themselves Parakuyo when speaking to each other or to
trusted confidants. When interacting with unfamiliar outsiders, they almost always will
identify themselves as Maasai, a practice that Maasai tolerate but do not appreciate.
Maasai and people in other East African societies often refer to Parakuyo as Kwavi,
Loikop or Lumbwa, a practice that Parakuyo do not appreciate.
Parakuyo appear content with a vaguely Maasai identity, perhaps because it
affords them social advantages in several different contexts. Patient conversation reveals
that they don’t quite believe that they are Maasai, but there is little indication that they
spend much time worrying about it. This contentedness has not visited itself on scholars,
who have demanded to know precisely who these people are, where they came from and
why they seem to be not Maasai, and certainly not anything as formal as quasi-Maasai,
but rather sort of Maasai. Unfortunately, these questions have been asked within a sealed
cocoon of assumptions. The most fundamental of these assumptions, that Maasai were
the central group in terms of both ethnicity and history, has had the effect of blinding
scholars to a wealth of evidence readily available to them.
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Curiously, for all the academic chatter on Parakuyo identity, there never has been
a historical study focused on Parakuyo. For almost fifty years, Parakuyo have been the
exclusive domain of anthropologists. Most of them made valiant efforts at historical
interpretation, but these more often than not ended up as collages of ethnographic data
combined with an occasional reference to widely available published works. Conversely,
a number of historians have written studies centered on Maasai. These have made
impressive advances in combining oral and archival sources, but again, they have viewed
Maasai as central and Parakuyo as peripheral. Scholarship combining the insights of
history and anthropology has flourished in recent years. Unfortunately, as far as thinking
about Parakuyo goes, these interdisciplinary efforts have merged the thin historical
evidence of the anthropologists with the Maasai-centered narratives of the historians.
This study fills a gap in the historiography and at the same time questions the complacent
thinking surrounding that gap.
The first chapter of this dissertation argues that Parakuyo and Maasai oral
traditions are not reliable historical sources when referring to events that took place more
than a few generations before the informant’s lifetime. Ideally, then, historians should
seek oral traditions collected decades or even centuries ago. Just as important, historians
should treat with skepticism contemporary claims for ethnic longevity; this holds true
even when skepticism towards a group’s own ideas about its identity and history might
lead to accusations of insensitivity. During the past two hundred years, Parakuyo and
Maasai have revised not only their identities but also their understandings of the past and
its moral lessons. In this view, ethnicity (or more preferably, group identity) and tradition
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are reconstructed by each succeeding generation, a process that moves forward
concurrently at different levels, from individual expression to collective argument and
consensus. Scholarly description of ethnicity and culture must be fleet-footed, because
there are no structural constants. There are only things that have changed quickly and
things that have changed slowly. In the brief overview of Parakuyo society presented
below, attention is devoted to the ways in which fundamental ecological and social
characteristics – the bedrocks of group identity for Parakuyo – have indeed changed over
time. Oral traditions do not escape this process: they, too, change at varying rates over
time. Oral traditions can be interpreted as myth – not in the sense that they are false, but
in the sense that they are manifestations of the basic human behavior of communicating
moral and philosophical lessons as stories. Interpreted as myth, Parakuyo and Maasai
traditions impart two different kinds of lessons for historians: first, they reveal ideas that
East African pastoralists share with most human societies, as well as ideas that are
distinctive; second, the myths themselves display considerable change over time.
Historians writing about pastoralists in East Africa have neglected to pay attention to this
concern, to the point that they have allowed oral traditions collected during the twentieth
century a privileged place above oral traditions collected a hundred years earlier.
Chapter 2 presents evidence for the view that Parakuyo and Maasai were once
sub-groups of Loikop, a widespread society of pastoralists who dominated the Rift Valley
areas of East Africa at the dawn of the nineteenth century. The existence of this earlier
Loikop society is not generally acknowledged by scholars or by Maasai and Parakuyo
themselves. However, it was described in considerable detail by the first European
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residents in East Africa, based on information provided by Loikop informants. Loikop
pastoralists were particularly well documented by Johann Ludwig Krapf, the first
missionary of the Church Missionary Society in East Africa, as well as his colleagues
Johannes Rebmann and Jakob Erhardt.  Their various journals, letters, and published
articles, written during the 1840s and 1850s, are widely recognized as the earliest
documentary evidence for Maasai and Parakuyo history.  But they have often been
neglected, and sometimes deliberately shunned, in favor of later written or oral sources,
perhaps because their views of pastoralist history, including the idea of a pastoralist
Loikop community, seem rather incongruous when compared to those of more recent
vintage. This skepticism was fueled partly by the fact that during the course of the
nineteenth century, Maasai expanded dramatically, demolishing and absorbing other
Loikop sections. By the time of European colonial conquest, the term Loikop carried
negative connotations, and scholars from this point forward had difficulty in seeing any
other valid meaning for the term.
Chapter 3 narrates the decline of Loikop pastoralists during the nineteenth century
and explains how Maasai society emerged from within, and then aggressively dismantled,
Loikop society. Loikop pastoralists were part of the broad stream of Nilotic-speaking
people that have been moving southwards from southern Sudan into the East African Rift
Valley for several centuries. As they migrated through the area west of Lake Turkana and
onto the highland plateaus of Laikipia and Uasin Gishu, Loikop developed a specialized
pastoralist form of subsistence, along with a social system based on age-set organization.
By the nineteenth century, Loikop society had developed into a network of independent
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sections that occupied vast grazing areas as far south as the Maasai Steppe. These
sections practiced a formidable style of raiding warfare, against both other Loikop
sections and their non-Loikop neighbors. Sometime around 1800, a group of Loikop
sections aligned themselves under the religious leadership of Supeet, part of a new line of
prophet-diviners called oloibonok. These sections, who came to be known as Maasai,
refined their age-set organization to provide expanded military capabilities, and under
Supeet’s guidance began to expand dramatically at the expense of their Loikop relatives.
Between c.1825 and 1875, Maasai sections fought and won a series of large-scale
conflicts against other Loikop sections, in the process demolishing any notion of a viable
Loikop society. Defeated Loikop individuals and communities were forced to join the
growing Maasai social structure, seek refuge in agricultural “oasis” communities, or
serve as mercenaries for various non-Loikop military leaders. Only two Loikop sections,
Parakuyo and Sampur, managed to survive the Maasa-Loikop Wars as intact pastoralist
communities. All non-Maasai Loikop, however, would come to be considered socially
inferior sub-sets of the dominant Maasai society.
Chapter 4 describes Parakuyo resilience and adaptation from the 1850s to the end
of the First World War, a period of expanding commerce, ecological disaster, regional
warfare and rapid political change in East Africa. Parakuyo history during these years is
largely a story of displacement, precarious subsistence, and strategic opportunism.
Maasai expansion dislodged Parakuyo, and other Loikop, from their claims to the vital
wells and pastures on the Maasai Steppe and neighboring areas during the mid-1800s.
Small groups of Parakuyo fled in different directions from Maasai attacks: some went
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across the Pangani River to the northeast, hunkering down in secluded valleys and near
trading settlements affiliated with Shambaa leaders; many went south and southeast,
forging new settlements on the peripheries of farming groups such as Zigua, Nguu,
Kaguru, and Gogo; still others went to the west and southwest. Parakuyo raided cattle on
a small scale to offset their losses, but they remained a minor factor in regional warfare.
During the years of German colonial rule, Parakuyo enjoyed a brief advantage against
their Maasai adversaries, but this ended with the disruptions caused by the First World
War. The meaning of Parakuyo identity had been thrown into question with the
overwhelming success of Maasai ethnic expansion, but the continued existence of a
separate Parakuyo prophetic lineage preserved the viability of a distinct, if far-flung,
Parakuyo community.
Chapter 5 examines the various ideas at play in the interactions between British
administrators and Parakuyo pastoralists in Tanganyika after World War I. African and
European thought collided in the early colonial era. Different ideas about knowledge and
identity met head-on, intermingled and went forward together with subtle and sometimes
surprising results. Europeans looked to a growing collection of scientific ideas in laying
the intellectual groundwork for colonial rule, while Africans drew on an equally
formidable set of skills and knowledge gained through centuries of accumulated
experience. Faced with Parakuyo ethnic ambiguity, administrators drew on racial theories
to impose a suitable form of classification, especially by trying to place Parakuyo within
a popular myth of ruling and conquered races. Colonial veterinary officers asserted their
authority by drawing on recent innovations in disease research and range management
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concepts derived from the relatively new science of ecology. Political and veterinary
officers used these ideas to justify a wide range of ambitious plans, but they were kept in
check by the realities of administering vast areas with limited resources. Parakuyo, for
their part, had their own well-developed ideas about political authority – they did not like
it – and range management.
Chapter 6 explains the collision of European and African thinking that played out
between 1922, when British administrators enacted a policy of forcing Parakuyo
pastoralists to settle within the boundaries of the Masai Reserve, and 1926, when
repeated and uncontrollable interdistrict movement by Parakuyo forced the government
to abandon its policy. From the British side, the roots of the policy rested on two
elements: scientific theories of race, ecology, and veterinary control; and the physical
realities of governing a very large territory with limited manpower. From the Parakuyo
side, resistance to the policy rested on an unshakeable insistence on freedom of
movement and identity, combined with a persistent conviction that European methods of
livestock and disease control were unsatisfactory in an East African context. For both
sides, the flashpoint of the conflict rested on the issue of Parakuyo ability to graze their
cattle when and where they saw fit. There were disagreements on both sides: some local
officials sympathized with Parakuyo concerns and spoke out on their behalf, while some
Parakuyo were eager to win the advantages conferred on those who collaborated with
colonial authorities. The reservation policy itself posed a broad threat to Parakuyo
society, as it explicitly aimed to do away with any notion of a separate identity
whatsoever. By 1926, however, Parakuyo had demonstrated their ability to defy
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administrative orders by moving at their own discretion. The demands this movement
placed on the time and energy of local officials prompted the Governor of Tanganyika
Territory to intercede and end the reservation policy. This by no means ended the tension,
as each side still had its sights set on incompatible goals. But the successful assertion of
autonomy by Parakuyo proved to be crucial in preserving their distinctive identity, and
set the stage for their remarkable geographical expansion in later years.
This study focuses squarely on men – regrettably, but with good reason. We
should pause here to consider gender relations in Parakuyo society and their relation to
history. Recent scholarly studies of women in pastoralist societies have tended to de-
emphasize or even argue against the long-held idea that East African pastoralists are
organized along strongly patriarchal lines. Instead, these studies have pointed to colonial
attitudes as the source of condescending and abusive treatment of women. We do not
have space to treat these narratives with the detail they deserve, but there is ample reason
to think that this new line of thought is misguided. For one thing, colonial administrators
did not uniformly look down on women in general. In 1937, for example, a meeting of
the Tanganyika Legislative Council included discussion of the treatment of Maasai
women. One member was alarmed by the “abominations” against young women in
Maasai manyattas, and asked if they could be stopped. The Chief Secretary expressed
sympathy but stated that because no concerns had been raised within the Maasai
community itself, it was not the place for government to interfere. At the same meeting
the Chief Secretary also stated clearly that administrative officers and African authorities
would not be allowed to force women to stay with their husbands against their will.
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Following these guidelines, a district commissioner fifteen years later ruled in favor of a
Parakuyo woman who had been abused by her husband. The husband’s family had filed a
court case demanding her return, but the DC reasoned that “ill-treatment of a wife is good
ground for dissolving a marriage.”1 Colonial officials and missionaries no doubt carried
their own patriarchal baggage, but these attitudes must not be taken as homogenous
influences in daily interactions on the ground.
Regardless of colonial attitudes, however, there is strong evidence that
precolonial, colonial and to a certain extent postcolonial Parakuyo and Maasai societies
were deeply patriarchal by any common understanding of the term. Young women are
expected to “play” with warriors (in the words of one elder Parakuyo woman) until age
15-17, when they are circumcised and married. Because women inherit no property in
patrilineal society, they enter marriage only with their clothes, jewelry and gourds.
Husbands are responsible for providing cattle for their wives to manage. Married
Parakuyo men average two to three wives each, but in practice economic realities often
leave poor men unmarried and wealthier men with upwards of half a dozen wives. The
primary work of a wife is to milk cows early every morning, carefully wash the gourds
used for storing milk, and to care for sick and immature animals. Wives also are
responsible for collecting wood and water, and for building houses, although often this
chore is hired out to non-Parakuyo workers. Wives can do little to improve their standing
other than bearing several children. There are two areas considered women’s domains,
                                                 
1 Kijungu Case No. 22/47 District Commissioner’s Appeal No. 3/52, 29 January 1952,
File 15/2 Vol. III, Tanzania National Archives (hereafter cited as TNA); Minutes of the
Legislative Council, 23, 24 and 26 November and 4, 9 and 10 December 1937,
Secretariat File 13733, TNA.
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however: the house (enkaji) is owned by the wife, while the husband is considered no
more than a frequent guest; and while husbands own all cattle, wives are responsible for
distributing milk and other produce. Parakuyo women also take active roles in selling
jewelry and medicine to outsiders, a practice that might be centuries old. Parakuyo boys
have started attending school regularly only in recent decades, but the idea of schooling
girls still sparks fear that educated women will be difficult to control. As one Parakuyo
woman put it, girls who go to school get “a lot of knowledge” (which is taken as a self-
evident positive opportunity); the unfortunate side effect is that they do not want to take
care of animals anymore, because “it’s too muddy.”2
The unpalatable limitation this places on the historian is that most of the
movements, conflicts, adaptations and political decisions in Parakuyo history – especially
the aspects of Parakuyo history discussed in this dissertation – were monopolized by
men. There may well be unexplored avenues to investigate, particularly regarding the
roles of Parakuyo women in establishing relations of reciprocal exchange between
Parakuyo communities and Bantu-speaking agricultural communities. But these will
require a separate and intensive research project. We should hope that a future study will
set out to do just that.
                                                 
2 Interview with Muhina Kitibi, 12 February 2004; Arvi Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture:
The Structure of Pastoral Parakuyo Society (Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 1984),
19, 114-115, 154-159, 246.
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Chapter 1
In Pursuit of Parakuyo History:
Myth, Oral Tradition and Ethnicity in an East African Pastoralist Society
Parakuyo history can be traced to a widespread society of cattle-keeping peoples
known collectively as Loikop, who were the most prominent inhabitants of the Rift
Valley of East Africa at the dawn of the nineteenth century. Loikop society was made up
of several loose-knit sections that operated more or less independently, sometimes raiding
each other for cattle, although they all shared a common culture and language. One of
these sections, for example, was a group of people called Parakuyo, who lived on the
savanna lands of what is today northern Tanzania. At some point near the start of the
nineteenth century, a small group of Loikop reorganized themselves in an effort to
improve their martial capabilities. Under the ritual leadership of a new diviner, this
insurgent group, which came to be called Maasai, refined and streamlined certain aspects
of Loikop social structure and culture. At the same time, they launched aggressive cattle
raids against other Loikop sections, sometimes to the point of removing a community’s
means of subsistence. During the next few decades the insurgents absorbed, scattered or
obliterated most of the other Loikop sections. In the process they also superseded Loikop
identity, replacing it with the new Maasai identity. Only two Loikop groups managed to
escape Maasai expansion intact as independent social entities: Sampur, who lived in
13
northern Kenya beyond the limits of Maasai expansion; and Parakuyo, who survived in
part by adapting their society and ecology to fit into areas that were not ideal for cattle-
keeping. At the end of the nineteenth century, Parakuyo began to adopt the practice of
identifying themselves to outsiders as Maasai. This practice did not sit well with “real”
Maasai, who saw Parakuyo as social inferiors, and Parakuyo, for their part, continued to
maintain their own distinctive social organization and ritual practices separate from the
Maasai system. This is the story I have constructed using historical methods, with close
attention to primary sources; I believe that it is an accurate account ot “what actually
happened.”
There is one major problem: most Maasai, many Parakuyo and a healthy number
of academic historians today think this story is wrong. They think this because, for at
least the past century, Maasai identity has been viewed as central to the story. Loikop, in
this view, either never existed, or represented a disdained agricultural branch of Maasai.
Parakuyo are seen by Maasai, and not a few scholars, as castoffs from the central Maasai
tradition. There are sound social and cultural justifications for seeing things this way.
During the nineteenth century, Maasai regiments soundly defeated Parakuyo and drove
them away from valuable grazing and water sources on what is now known as the Maasai
Steppe. It may be a cliché, but in this case history was written by the victors. Most
versions of Maasai oral tradition during the past century have centered on the idea of a
Maasai (not Loikop) migration from the north into the Rift Valley. Maasai in Tanzania
outnumber Parakuyo by a wide margin, perhaps as much as ten to one; that margin
doubles if we add Maasai who live in Kenya. Given these historical, demographic and
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cultural realities, Parakuyo society long ago took on a characteristically defensive
posture: on one level adapting its pastoralist ecology to exploit areas not previously
considered pastoralist habitats, and on another level conceding a superficial acceptance of
Maasai concepts of identity while at the same time persistently maintaining a
distinctively Parakuyo social and ritual framework.
This chapter presents the case that Parakuyo and Maasai oral traditions do not
hold up well as historical sources beyond a moving window about four generations in
depth at any given time. Beyond that window, historians should seek oral traditions
collected decades or even centuries ago. The fundamental idea of Maasai primacy and
time-depth, then, must be approached with skepticism rather than accepted uncritically by
scholars; this holds true even when skepticism towards a groups’ own ideas about its
identity and history might lead to accusations of insensitivity. Central to this chapter is
the idea that identity has been continually renegotiated by Parakuyo and Maasai during
the past two hundred years, a process that has included a continual renegotation of
understandings of the past and its moral lessons. In this view, ethnicity (or more
preferably, group identity) and tradition are reconstructed by each succeeding generation
in a process that moves forward concurrently at different levels, from individual
expression to collective argument and consensus. Scholarly description of ethnicity and
culture must be fleet-footed, because there are no structural constants. There are only
things that have changed quickly and things that have changed slowly. In the brief
overview of Parakuyo society presented below, attention is devoted to the ways in which
fundamental ecological and social characteristics – the bedrocks of group identity for
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Parakuyo – have indeed changed over time. Oral traditions do not escape this process:
they, too, change at varying rates over time. Oral traditions can be interpreted as myth –
not in the sense that they are false, but in the sense that they are manifestations of the
basic human behavior of communicating moral and philosophical lessons as stories.
Interpreted as myth, Parakuyo and Maasai traditions impart two different kinds of lessons
for historians: first, they reveal ideas that East African pastoralists share with most human
societies, as well as ideas that are distinctive; second, the myths themselves display
considerable change over time. Historians writing about pastoralists in East Africa have
neglected to pay attention to this concern, to the point that they have allowed oral
traditions collected during the twentieth century a privileged place above oral traditions
collected a hundred years earlier.
We should pause to consider the meaning of ethnicity and its relation to history.
The modern use of the term “ethnicity” has its roots in the 1930s, when scholars began to
question the validity of using biological concepts of race as a framework for
understanding group differences. Anthropologist A. C. Haddon and biologist Julian
Huxley proposed the adoption of “ethnicity” in 1935 in their book We Europeans, an
influential criticism of fascist ideology. Haddon and Huxley labelled race a
pseudoscientific concept, attacked the widespread conflation of race, culture and nation
in scholarly circles, and proposed that the term “race” be replaced with “ethnic group” or
“people.” Despite their noble intentions, Haddon and Huxley unwittingly loosed upon the
world a term that has proven just as vague and malleable as the one they sought to
replace. As Saul Dubow had noted, “ethnicity” is often simply used as a euphemism for a
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wide range of problematic categories, such as race, class, tribe and nation.1 During the
1960s and 1970s, political scientists and policy makers began to use the term as a social
marker in their efforts to understand and manage pluralistic societies. This vision was
called into question during the 1980s, when historians and anthropologists began to argue
that ethnic identity was constructed and contingent. Here, too, uses of the term have
varied. Anthropologists, meanwhile, have tended to see ethnicity as largely a matter of
performance, in which identity is crystallized through ritual or artistic expression. Among
historians of Africa during the 1970s and 1980s, one stream of thought understood
precolonial ethnicity to be intimately connected to subsistence and ecology, while another
argued that colonial rule actually produced ethnicity by creating “tribes” to facilitate
administration. In recent years, historians have struggled to reconcile these disparate
visions of ethnicity, reaching what might now be a tentative consensus that colonial rule
did alter group identity, but at the same time it did not completely erase whatever had
come before.2
In this study we avoid using the term “ethnicity” to describe Parakuyo, in favor of
the more context-specific words “identity” and “society.” This choice is not a comment
on the reality (or not) of ethnicity, but rather an acknowledgment that ethnicity has
limited value when narrating the history of an African society that spans precolonial,
colonial and postcolonial eras, and has adapted continually during that long time. To
begin with, we should heed Pier Larson’s warning that “care should be exercised in
                                                 
1 Saul Dubow, “Ethnic Euphemisms and Racial Echoes,” Journal of Southern African
Studies 20 (1994), 355-357.
2 See Justin Willis, “The Administration of Bonde, 1920-60: A Study of the
Implementation of Indirect Rule in Tanganyika,” African Affairs 92 (1993), 53.
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terming named corporate groups ‘ethnic’ when the consciousness that binds them
together may be of an altogether different nature.”3 This certainly applies to the case of
Parakuyo, who in precolonial years belonged to a loose-knit group of people, Loikop,
who may not have thought of their overall identity in terms more specific than just
“people.” The term Loikop itself, a contraction of loo enkuapi, simply means “people
who live here,” a point that is elaborated in Chapter 2. Further, we should recognize that
groups sometimes employ multiple ethnonyms, and that different groups sometimes lay
claim to the same ethnonym at the same time, with each group contesting the other’s
views and framing its identities in order to pursue specific interests. This certainly has
happened in the case of Parakuyo, whose claims to being Maasai have spurred a series of
opportunistic reactions and negotiations by both Parakuyo and Maasai. Viewed in this
light, group identity becomes exceedingly complex. Scholars often focus on influential
members of societies as the shapers of “ethnicity,” but in reality group identity is shaped
by each individual in a continual process of deciding to accept, reject, adapt and reinvent
specific ideas about who I, we and they are, and what that means. Historians face a
difficult task here. “It is impossible to know completely the circumstances of all the
micro-processes of ethnic change,” Justin Willis has written, “the thousands of events and
discussions through which identity is redefined and negotiated in everyday life … Yet an
attempt must be made to understand at least the circumstances of these negotiations.”4
                                                 
3 Pier M. Larson, “Desperately Seeking ‘the Merina’ (Central Madagascar): Reading
Ethnonyms and Their Semantic Fields in African Identity Histories,” Journal of Southern
African Studies 22 (1996), 541.
4 Justin Willis, “The Makings of a Tribe: Bondei Identities and Histories,” Journal of
African History 33 (1992), 192.
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This study attempts to understand the circumstances of the negotiations that
produce group identity. We make three basic assumptions about identity and its relation
to history. First, that identity involves the reimagination and recreation of ideas and
practices by each generation and each individual, even if some of those recreations
involve repeating what has come before in the name of tradition, or simply to conserve
time and effort. The choice to stay the same, or at least attempt to stay the same, is as
much an act of imagination as the choice to become different. Second, we assume that the
process of shaping identity is not only affected by other members of the same group, but
by unpredictable and uncontrollable outside factors: neighboring societies, warfare and
conquest, variations in economic and ecological circumstances. These contingencies
impose constraints on the development of group identity, but also opportunities for
creative responses and adaptations. Parakuyo pastoralists, for example, have arguably
saved their distinctiveness as a group twice through creative adaptations: once in the late
nineteenth century, when Maasai expansion forced them to find ways to eke out a living
in areas not generally considered amenable to pastoralist societies; and again in 1920-
1926, when Parakuyo opportunism and creativity forced the British colonial government
to abandon a plan intended to eliminate their distinctiveness altogether. Finally, we
assume that in validating their understandings of identity, individuals and groups shape
and reshape their understandings and representations of the past. This also is a continual
process, related to our discussion of myth below, in which people adjust their views of
the past to make better sense of the changing present. In our attempt to understand the
circumstances of the negotiations that produce identity, then, we must constantly think of
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changes on two levels: ideas of identity itself are constantly changing, and at the same
time, ideas about the past, used to justifty the ideas of the present, are constantly
changing as well.5
Cattle, Water and Grass: Parakuyo Pastoralist Subsistence
Parakuyo today are scattered across Tanzania, forming a broad and still-
expanding network of settlements from the northeast to the southwest. The current area of
Parakuyo settlement covers about two dozen different administrative districts. Parakuyo
sometimes also cross into Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique. They do not have a central
area or territory they claim as their own; rather, in each district they form a small
minority among much larger populations. Parakuyo today live intermingled with more
than a dozen different ethnic groups, each speaking a different language. This scattered
demographic pattern is very unusual in East Africa, where ethnic groups tend to
concentrate in particular home areas. As this dissertation demonstrates, Parakuyo
migration and settlement patterns have evolved as creative responses to stressful
circumstances, in particular the circumstance of aggressive Maasai expansion into areas
formerly inhabited by Parakuyo. It is almost impossible to count the total Parakuyo
                                                 
5 For this last point, I am streamlining ideas found in Justin Willis, “The Makings of a
Tribe: Bondei Identities and Histories,” Journal of African History 33 (1992), 191-192.
See also E. Tonkin, M. McDonald and M. Chapman, eds., History and Ethnicity
(London, 1989).
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population with any precision, but estimates made within the past forty years have ranged
from 15,000 to 30,000.6
For at least two hundred years, Parakuyo subsistence has been grounded in the
same basic strategy: transumant pastoralism in semi-arid environments. This strategy
requires the careful manipulation of three key resources: livestock, water and grazing;
these elements apply to any African pastoralist society, from Maasai to Fulani. While the
overall framework is more or less constant, the specific adaptations made by each society
vary across time and space. The same can be said of Parakuyo social organization, which
follows three principles: territorial sections, age-sets and clans. These, too, are common
features of East African pastoralist societies, but they vary between groups and change
over time. Finally, while Parakuyo society is strongly decentralized and does not allow
for chiefs or even the “big men” of anthropological theory, religious authority is
important and vested in prophet-diviners known as laibons. Maasai and other East
African pastoralists have the same or similar ritual leaders, but again, Parakuyo laibons
are distinctive and their roles have changed over time.
Parakuyo subsistence is firmly rooted in pastoralism. While Parakuyo herds
typically are not as large as Maasai herds, they nonetheless dwarf the meager herds of the
farming communities among whom Parakuyo live. This wealth in cattle gives Parakuyo
considerable leverage in their relations with neighboring societies, because their herds are
regarded as a valuable resource for the region as a whole. Like other East African
                                                 
6 Interview with Lazaro Rubeni Wanga, 5 November 2003; Arvi Hurskainen, Cattle and
Culture: The Structure of Pastoral Parakuyo Society (Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society,
1984), 9-12.
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pastoralists, Parakuyo must have access to at least some agricultural products to survive;
they achieve this by living in proximity to farming communities, and sometimes
engaging in agriculture themselves. Parakuyo culture, however, is thoroughly geared
towards the elevation of pastoralism over agriculture. Food, for example, is conceptually
divided into two categories: the most highly valued are animal foods such as milk, blood,
meat, fat and honey; food that is produced by digging in the ground is regarded as
inferior, if sometimes necessary for survival. Like Maasai, Parakuyo disdain agricultural
work – despite the persistent notion that Parakuyo are somehow more agriculturally
inclined themselves. Many Parakuyo do own farms, butthey generally hire neighbors
from Bantu-speaking communities to carry out the labor. Paying for labor was once a
matter of exchanging pastoralist products for services, but payments in recent decades
increasingly have been made in cash. What little agricultural labor is actually performed
by Parakuyo themselves is considered a temporary, last resort, and even then is regarded
as embarrassing. Researcher Arvi Hurskainen reported that Parakuyo did not want him
taking pictures of Parakuyo women pounding maize.7
The centrality of pastoralism to Parakuyo society, economy and ecology is
evident in the cultural and ceremonial value attached to cattle and cattle products. Adult
animals are kept in the settlement’s kraal (cattle enclosure) at night; calves are kept inside
houses or special pens near houses. Parakuyo children grow up with emotional
attachments to their cattle, and adults can identify most of the individual cows in herds of
hundreds. Parakuyo are reluctant to kill livestock for food, but do prepare meat for age-
                                                 
7 Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 9, 89.
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set rituals and other transitions in the life cycle, as well as special occasions such as a
visit by an honored guest. Agricultural produce is never used in these contexts. In
addition, cattle dying of natural causes or disease provide regular contributions of meat to
Parakuyo diets. In contrast to meat, milk is the predominant food obtained from cattle.
Milk production per cow is relatively low, one factor in the need for a high number of
cattle for each family. As one might expect, the Parakuyo language is rich in words for
different kinds of milk. There are separate words for milk that has just been produced,
milk a few hours after it has been produced, milk that has been stored in a calabash for
about twelve hours, for about two days, and for four days. Parakuyo also use milk to
make fat and butter, to make medicine for a variety of ailments from stomach aches to
fever, and for use in rituals such as head shaving. Blood, the third major food obtained
from cattle, is used sparingly, often in a mixture with milk. When needed, blood is taken
from a cow by applying a kind of torniquet to its neck and then shooting a blunt-tipped
arrow into its jugular vein. While it no longer provides a major component of Parkuyo
diets, blood continues to have considerable ritual significance. All of the blood from
slaughtered animals is collected for consumption.8
As pastoralists living in relatively dry environments, Parakuyo must constantly
focus on the search for and disciplined use of water supplies. Henry Fosbrooke noted in a
lecture on Maasai life that the problem of water “is not spectacular, and devoid of ritual
or ceremonial… yet it is more constantly in the minds of the Masai than is any other
                                                 
8 Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 92-96, 159.
23
aspect of their existence.”9 As one might expect, the language of Maasai and Parakuyo
pastoralists is rich in words differentiating between water supplies; for example, there are
different words for freshwater lakes, salt lakes, the swampy area where temporary
streams end, rain ponds, seepage springs, and babbling springs. In general, there are two
types of water supplies for pastoralists in East Africa: permanent (including rivers,
streams and wells) and temporary (including rain ponds and seepage on riverbeds). The
latter type is generally exploited opportunistically when it appears, although there are
ways to conserve temporary sources. Rain ponds can be excavated and “puddled”
through constant use, reducing the amount of water lost to seepage into the earth.
Similarly, moisture that drains off of rocky hills can be exploited by building small dams
from branches, mud, and stones. The dams fill up during the night, and in the morning
water can be run off into a trough using crude sluice gates. This method does lose water
because of the porous material used to build the dams, but any water is better than no
water.10
All pastoralist societies in East Africa must rely on permanent water sources for
continued existence. Rivers and streams are crucial, and pastoralists sometimes improve
them by constructing furrows that can stretch several miles, bringing water to previously
dry areas. But wells are the most important permanent source, especially in the dry steppe
areas of East Africa. The clusters of wells that dot the Maasai Steppe, in fact, served as
flashpoints in the military conflicts of the nineteenth century. During these years, Maasai
                                                 
9 Henry Fosbrooke, “Some Aspects of Masai Life,” unpublished manuscript, Henry
Fosbrooke Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library.
10 Fosbrooke, “Some Aspects of Masai Life.”
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drove Parakuyo away from the wells, forcing Parakuyo to eke out an existence in areas
only marginally amenable to pastoralism. The wells of the Maasai Steppe are ancient,
predating both Maasai and Parakuyo society, and old enough that no one knows who
originally sank them. They are of fine craftsmanship, however, remarkable for their small
diameters (as little as 2.5 feet) and their depth (up to 50 feet), usually in limestone. That
they were sunk in clusters indicates that the original builders were pastoralists, as each
single well easily could have supplied a large farming village. Maasai (and perhaps
Parakuyo before them) adapted these wells by excavating them until one side was
exposed all the way to the bottom, adding an enclosure at the top, chamber at the bottom,
and a trough railing between the two, allowing cattle to move single-file down to the
water itself. Maasai and Parakuyo pastoralists also sink their own wells, usually up to ten
feet deep, trying their luck in areas where water is known to exist. If the wells are
successful, they become the property of the clan (or family) whose members built them.
Pastoralists tend to cluster twenty to thirty wells together, to ease the logistical difficulty
of watering large herds of cattle at a small number of fixed points. Clan and family
ownership of wells is generally relaxed, allowing for shared access to water, but tension
often builds during periods of drought or conflict.11
                                                 
11 Fosbrooke, “Some Aspects of Masai Life.”
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Contours of Identity and Imagination:
Neighborhoods, Age-Sets, Clans and Diviners
Each Parakuyo male is simultaneously a member of three different social groups:
neighborhood, age-set and clan. These distinctions together shape his sense of identity
and place him in relation to his peers, elders and juniors. They also help to set parameters
for exchanges of livestock and potential marriages. Maasai pastoralists share this
framework with Parakuyo, although the details of their systems differ in crucial respects.
Though these elements are the pillars of Parakuyo and Maasai identity – and have been
for at least two hundred years – they have changed in some important ways during that
time. In the descriptions that follow, we will pay close attention to these changes. We will
also introduce the fourth major element of Parakuyo identity, which is their allegiance to
a particular lineage of prophet-diviners.
Territorial groups (iloshon) are the basic political units of which the overall
pastoralist society is composed. Scholars have resorted to varying metaphors to describe
these sections: early observers often called them “tribes” (of a Maasai “nation”), while
some later writers have characterized them as “neighborhoods.” Whatever model one
adopts, it has been demonstrated abundantly in practice that these sections overlap,
expand and contract over time; they merge into super- and split into sub-sections; they
sometimes move to other geographical locations; they eventually disappear completely
and in rare cases even emerge again at a later date. Parakuyo sections are not as important
or complex as their counterparts in Maasai society, partly because of the smaller total
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number of the Parakuyo population. Geographical units do exist, however, and are
constantly adjusted to keep up with expanding settlement patterns. Territorial distinctions
are apparent, for example, when each area elects its own age-set spokesmen, and in the
regional influence wielded by laibons (see below). In general, however, Parakuyo feel
much more kinship with Parakuyo society as a whole than they do with any particular
region of Parakuyo settlement. One of the main points of this dissertation is that
Parakuyo society is a section – of a now defunct society called Loikop. In other words,
historical contingencies and Parakuyo resilience have turned Parakuyo society into a
viable part of a nonexistent whole. Both Parakuyo and Maasai now pretend that Parakuyo
society is in some vague way a section of the larger Maasai society, but they do so with a
tangible lack of commitment. Parakuyo political councils, rituals and religious leaders are
kept entirely separate from those of Maasai. Parakuyo sections (to date, at least) have not
merged or otherwise interacted with Maasai sections, except during periods of conflict,
when Maasai sections collided with Parakuyo like billiard balls.
Parakuyo use age-sets (olaji or oporor) to structure male life cycles and to
provide a sense of cohesion and corporate identity. Males pass through three basic stages
in this progression: child, warrior (olmurrani) and elder. While elders command the most
respect and political authority, by far the most intense symbolic focus is on the years of
warriorhood, and especially on the process of initiation into warriorhood. Initiation into a
named age-set of ilmurran provides Parakuyo youth with a society-wide cohort of age-
mates who will be their compatriots for life. In Parakuyo society, new age-sets have been
initiated roughly every fifteen years for the past two centuries at least. Age-set
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recruitment begins when there is widespread feeling that there are enough young men to
form a new warrior group. Delegations of elders (olamal) from each area (olosho) are
sent to the paramount laibon (oloiboni kitok) to ask for an official statement opening a
new circumcision period. The paramount laibon then performs a public ritual to open the
new age-set for all Parakuyo communities. The delegations then return to their scattered
homes carrying medicine prepared by the paramount laibon for the new initiates.
Distribution of this medicine in each community signals the local start of the
circumcision period. The circumcisions are performed in small ceremonies at the
entrance to family kraals, usually involving only one or two initiates at a time. Initiates
are secluded in their mothers’ houses for about three months of recovery, after which
they emerge to join their new age-mates for their first ritual meat-eating feast (olpul) as
warriors. Meanwhile, at some point during the long process of initiating the new age-set,
the previous warrior group “resigns” in negotiations with the elders and the paramount
laibon, then makes the transition to elderhood through a ritual called olng’eher. About
seven years after the new age-set has been opened, elders from the various communities
negotiate again with the paramount laibon to close the age-set. The paramount laibon
then conducts the eunoto ritual, at which he officially promotes the new set to warrior
status. The paramount laibon, after consulting with elders, gives the new warriors their
official group name, replacing the nicknames which have been used up to this point. The
official name will mark their corporate identity as they move forward in life, and will be
added to the lists of age-sets that form one of the basic elements of oral tradition.12
                                                 
12 Interview with Labani Moreto, 7 February 2004; interview with Kessy Labani, 10
28
Each age-set has two kinds of representatives who provide leadership in
coordinating the groups and in negotiating with elders and laibons. The first kind of
representative is the olaigwenani, an elected age-set spokesman. Each neighborhood
(olosho) of Parakuyo settlement in Tanzania elects an olaigwenani for each age-set. This
position is held for life. The total number is a matter of debate, but there are at least a few
dozen Parakuyo age-set spokesmen across Tanzania. In what may be a recent innovation,
each area also elects a second representative who serves as a kind of “vice-laigwenan” (in
the words of informants). The laigwenan is responsible for speaking on behalf of his age-
mates in any political council or forum. In precolonial times, laigwenan also served as
leaders during cattle raids and other military conflicts. The second kind of representative
is the olaunoni, who is responsible for monitoring the adherence of his age-set to ritual
and tradition. This representative, who also serves for life, is not elected but chosen by
the paramount laibon. In contrast to the many age-set spokesmen, there is only one
olaunoni for each Parakuyo age-set. For example, the olaunoni of the Dwati age-set was
Nakaru Kimakon; the olaunoni of the Merduti age-set was Parirong Tumaina. No one
wants to be chosen for this position, as it carries undesirable characteristics. After the
young candidate is revealed to the paramount laibon in a dream, he is then ritually
kidnapped by his age-mates. He must wear brass coils in his ears, symbolic of married
women, for the rest of his life. He is treated as an elder and not allowed to eat with his
age-mates. The olaunoni is wealthy – his clan members must provide cattle for him, and
                                                                                                                                                  
February 2004; interview with Sipilali Katau, 26 November 2003 and 21 January 2004;
interview with Saitoti Papaa, 11 November 2003; Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 128-
135.
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he may marry as often as he wishes without paying bridewealth – but he is expected to
suffer on behalf of his age-set and die young. The olaunoni is not supposed to engage in
politics, but he is expected to keep a watchful eye on his age-set. In precolonial times, the
olaunoni, along with the laigwenan and the paramount laibon, formed the council that
planned for warfare.13
Parakuyo age-sets should be considered separately from, and compared to, those
of Maasai. The changing historical relationship between the two groups has led many
scholars to confuse the age-set distinctions between them, on top of the fact that the
historical aspects of the systems can be confusing to begin with. For the past two hundred
years – during the entire time that Maasai have existed, in other words – Parakuyo age-
sets have operated independently from Maasai. Among themselves, Parakuyo ridicule the
names that Maasai select for their age-sets, finding them uncreative, funny or just bad;
this derision no doubt works the other way as well. While the two systems today operate,
at least in principle, on parallel timetables, in practice the rituals and logistics of the sets
are planned without consulting the other group. This often leads to lag time between the
groups: for example, Maasai performed the eunoto for their new age-sets in 1978, while
Parakuyo performed theirs in 1979.14
The basic structure of age-set organization also varies over time. Recently, young
Parakuyo men have begun marrying at a much earlier age, partly because there are few
meaningful tasks for warriors in modern Tanzania. This trend has changed the balance
                                                 
13 Interview with Tikwa Moreto and sons, 25 January 2004; interview with Sipilali Katau,
21 January 2004; Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 3-5, 188-190.
14 Interview with Lebau et. al., 10 February 2004; Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 167.
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between alternating age-sets. Theoretically, sons are supposed to be initiated into the
second age-set after their fathers. In Parakuyo society, the link between these once-
removed age-sets serves a fundamental role in ritual and social mediations between elders
and young men. The lower marriage age, however, has resulted in fathers whose sons are
initiated into proximate age-sets. Scholars, then, must keep in mind that ideals of social
organization often do not match realities, and that these incongruities can add up over
time.15
Scholars also have wrestled with the issue of right-hand and left-hand
classifications of age-sets. There are two types of dualism one can see in these structures:
between alternating age-sets, and within the age-sets themselves, between different
groups of initiates. The current Parakuyo style, and the style that seems to have been in
effect among Loikop pastoralists of the early nineteenth century, involves a minimal
amount of right-left distinction. Some Parakuyo elders will simply list age-sets in a
straight line, while others will list them in an alternating left-right fashion, almost as if it
were a mnemonic device. The second kind of dualism is the result of an innovation made
by Maasai in the early ninetenth century. To facilitate the manipulation and coordination
of military units, Maasai began to subdivide each age-set into right- and left-hand groups
(see chapter 4). The period of circimcision for each age-set was firmly set at sixteen
years: eight years for the right-hand, senior group, and eight years for the left-hand,
junior group. Loikop and their present-day descendants, Parakuyo, did not adopt this
refined version of the system. Parakuyo today are adamant that they do not have, and
                                                 
15 Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 136, 147, 239-240.
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never had, left-right distinctions within age-sets. Complicating the issue, though, is the
fact that present-day Tanzanian Maasai have let the more refined system fall away, and
now use a system more like that of Parakuyo. This has led some scholars to see the
refined system as the “Ancient Pastoral Maasai” type, and the current less refined system
as a result of modern pressures against the maintenance of a warrior class. Our view,
based on the available evidence, is that the less refined “Loikop” system predated the
more refined “Maasai” variation.16
Parakuyo use patrilineal clans (enkishomi) to trace descent groups. Clan
identification is not typically at the forefront of Parakuyo public life, but it is nonetheless
a fundamental part of individual identity. Even Parakuyo children know what clan they
belong to. Parakuyo clans are grouped into two moieties: the Loorokiteng (“those of the
black ox”) and Loodomong’i (“those of the red ox”). Each moiety currently includes
eight clans. Parakuyo clans are not geographically centered, in part because of the
mobility of individuals and families; in any given community one usually finds members
of several different clans. However, certain clans tend to predominate in certain areas.
Taking the clans that produce laibons as examples, Warakishu are plentiful in Tanga and
Coast regions, while Kiringishu are numerous in Iringa and Mbeya. These areas of
concentration are partly a result of migration patterns, and partly a result of differences in
economic power between members of different clans. The Warakishu clan, for example,
is disproportionately wealthy because it is the lineage of the most prominent Parakuyo
diviners, who wield tremendous influence and amass very large herds of cattle. This in
                                                 
16 Interview with Seperua Kashu, 6 September 2003; interview with Sipilali Katau, 26
November 2003; Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 140-142.
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turn allows Warakishu men to produce more offspring than members of other Parakuyo
clans.17
Parakuyo clans must continually be subdivided to compensate for variability in
the rate of reproduction. This is especially true of the laibon clans, Warakishu and
Kiringishu, which produce many children. There are three loosely defined “levels” of
clan organization: proper clans (enkishomi), subclans (olgilata) and informal subgroups.
Subgroups often consist of only a few adult males. These three levels are subject to
continual revision as circumstances dictate. In the late 1970s, the Warakishu clan
consisted of subgroups called Loibonok, Tilian, Ljorelai, Kindet, Masingani and Kushon.
In 1979 it was decided that these subgroups should now be formally recognized as
subclans, meaning that intermarriage between them was now acceptable. This may have
been unusually formal; the line between clans and subclans is often blurred, and
Parakuyo sometimes don’t really know whether a particular group belongs to one or the
other category, especially when discussing smaller clan groups.18
Parakuyo describe their clan organization as a reflection of primeval family and
settlement structure. The word for “clan,” enkishomi, is the same as the word for “cattle
gate.” In Parakuyo and Maasai homesteads, the gate of the kraal (cattle enclosure) divides
the settlement into two halves: people who live on the side of the right gate post, and
people who live on the side of the left gate post. Wives in polygamous families build
their houses on alternating sides of the gate, starting with the senior wife, who builds her
                                                 
17 Interview with Tikwa Moreto and sons, 25 January 2004; interview with Sipilali Katau,
21 January 2004; interview with Kessy Labani, 10 February 2004; Hurskainen, Cattle
and Culture, 149, 151-153.
18 Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 151-154.
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house next to the gate on the right side. As younger wives build houses, the senior wives
move their houses further from the gate to accommodate the new ones, but they remain
on the same side. Maasai traditions recorded by Henry Fosbrooke in the 1940s stated that
the division between clan moieties could be traced to their mythical progenitor,
Maasinda; his two gate posts, in this view, gave rise to the left-hand and right-hand
division of clans. Parakuyo do not see themselves as descendants of Maasinda (and
neither do many Maasai today), although most do subscribe to a vague notion that the
division of clans has something to do with sons born to a particular parent.19 Based on the
evidence for Loikop pastoralists presented in other sections of the dissertation, it seems
likely that in the early nineteenth century, this left-right division would have been traced
to Naiterukop, a mythical figure who fathered Loikop pastoralists. However, there is an
alternate version of the origin of Parakuyo clans, as told by the paramount laibon and his
family:
There was a war, and the laibon tried to convince the Parakuyo to go and fight in
it. The people were in disagreement – one group wanted to fight and another
group didn’t. So the laibon took two oxen, one black and one red, and asked the
two groups to choose one each. The group that wanted to go to war took the black
ox, and became known as Loorokiteng, “those of the black ox.” The other group
                                                 
19 Interview with Sipilali Katau, 21 January 2004; Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 154;
H. A. Fosbrooke, “An Administrative Survey of the Masai Social System,” Tanganyika
Notes and Records 26 (1948), 40-41.
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took the red ox and became known by the name Loodomungi, “those of the red
ox.” The Loodomungi clans went to war, and the Loorokiteng clans didn’t.20
Note the difference between the Maasai version of clan origins – with its appeal to the
culture hero Maasinda – and the Parakuyo version, with its less strident tale of doves and
hawks. We will have more to say about these differences when we examine the
relationships between myth, oral tradition and history.
Parakuyo look for ritual and spiritual guidance to diviners known as ilaibonok (we
will refer to them as “laibons”). There are many competing laibons at any given time, but
there is one paramount laibon (olaiboni kitok) who is followed by all Parakuyo. The
paramount laibon is responsible for coordinating age-set ceremonies on a society-wide
scale: he decides when a new circumcision period is officially opened or closed, and he
gives each age-set its official name. Parakuyo from all over the country – as far as
Kondoa in the west and Mbeya in the south – send delegations to him for guidance.
Several Parakuyo informants referred to the paramount laibon as “like our president,”
although it is worth noting that this is likely a very recent comparison. For at least the
past 150 years, the position of paramount laibon has been controlled by one lineage
within the Warakishu clan. Currently the paramount laibon is Tikwa Moreto, who lives in
a village south of Chalinze, a junction town on the highway between Dar es Salaam and
Morogoro. The position of paramount laibon is ideally handed from father to son,
although in some cases it seems clear that nephews were substituted, and in recent years
the position has been handed from elder brother to younger brother twice. It is worth
                                                 
20 Interview with Tikwa Moreto and sons, 25 January 2004.
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noting that in keeping with the high level of mobility in Parakuyo society, paramount
laibons rarely reside in the same location as their predecessors; the center of ritual
authority often shifts to different locales when the position is transferred from one laibon
to the next. Tikwa’s ancestry, and the succession of paramount laibons, can be traced
back to the mid-1800s, although there is some uncertainty about more remote eras
stemming from conflicting oral traditions and unresolved succession disputes.
After the paramount laibon, there is another who clearly holds “second place.”
Sometimes called the southern laibon, this diviner is followed by Parakuyo living in
Morogoro, Iringa, Dodoma and Mbeya. For all matters that do not require the advice of
the paramount laibon, Parakuyo in these regions consult the southern laibon. Currently
the southern laibon is Simanga Pololeti Kipondo, who lives near Kilosa, a town west of
Morogoro. For some time now, the southern laibon appears to have been chosen from a
single lineage within the Kiringishu clan. The southern laibon lineage does not
necessarily accept subordination to the paramount laibon. The two centers of ritual
authority might well have been entirely independent of each other until this century, and
it was only within the past half century that an agreement was reached on which lineage
had paramount authority.21
                                                 
21 Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 129, 186.
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Table 1.1. Parakuyo Age-Sets (1900-2000).22
Name Nickname(s) Opened Closed
   – Korianga 2000    –
Kisaruni Landesi 1985 1994
Makaa Kipone / Dareto 1970 1979
Medoti Tobola / Masokile 1955 1964
Kidotu Merisho 1941 1949
Seta Twati 1927 1935
Kijaro Metumpot 1912 1921
Siapai Parisho / Tapali 1896 1911
• • •










                                                 
22 Interview with Tikwa Moreto and sons, 25 January 2004; interview with Seperua
Kashu, 6 September 2003; interview with Sipilali Katau, 12 November 2003; T. O.
Beidelman, “The Baraguyu,” Tanganyika Notes and Records 55 (1960), 262; Hurskainen,
Cattle and Culture, 130.
23 Interview with Tikwa Moreto and sons, 25 January 2004.
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Table 1.3. Parakuyo Paramount Laibons (c.1815-2005).24
Name Years in Office
Tilian (possibly mythical)
     |
Lengunat c.1815-c.1840
     |
Mtango c.1840-c.1870
          /              \
Kirigong (Konke?) c.1870-c.1890
           /
Maitei c.1890-1932
     |
Moreto 1932-1969
          /      | \
Mutari      |        \ 1969-c.1990
Labani     \ c.1990-2000
Tikwa 2000-present
• • •
Table 1.4. Parakuyo Southern Laibons.25
Name Years in office Residence
Madumba [?] [?]
      |
Kipondo [?]-1967 near Iringa
      |
Pololeti 1967-[?] near Kilosa
      |
Simanga [?]-present near Kilosa
                                                 
24 Beidelman, “The Baraguyu,” 264-265; Justin Lemenye, “The Life of Justin: An
African Autobiography,” Tanganyika Notes and Records 41 (1956), 52; Hurskainen,
Cattle and Culture, 184; “Extract: Genealogy of Kwavi Laibon Family,” n.d., Same
(Pare) District Book, I, mf 11, TNA. Note that Konke is said to be Maitei’s father, but
there is disagreement as to whether Konke ever was recognized as paramount laibon.
25 Field notes; Beidelman, “The Baraguyu,” 264-265; Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture,
186.
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In addition to the paramount laibon and the southern laibon, there are perhaps a
dozen lesser but still influential laibons who attract followers in their home regions. In
the Mbeya region of southern Tanzania, the most influential laibon is Seperua Kashu,
who lives in the village of Mwanawala on the Usangu Flats. Likewise other mid-level
laibons wield influence in their own regions: Sairamba in Iringa; Moreto Marurui in
Kondoa (and to a lesser extent in Singida and Tabora); Mdabash Munyi in Kiteto; and
Masaine Kamunyu in Mnazi. Regardless of their home areas, all Parakuyo laibons appear
to come from two clans, and there seems to be a regional division of influence between
the two. The laibons in the north and east are from the Warakishu clan, while those in the
west and south are Kiringishu. All Warakishu males, and presumably all Kiringishu
males, are considered to have the magical and medicinal skills of laibons, whether or not
they practice these skills.26
Origins and Heroes: Mythical Thinking among Parakuyo and Maasai
Mythical storytelling is central to the human experience and is as close to a
universal characteristic of human expression as any we should ever hope to find. This
holds true whether the stories are told in the village or the metroplex. In thinking about
myth, for our purposes, we will lean toward the positive sense of the term, seeing it as an
expression of social ideals and concerns, rather than the currently widespread negative
sense, which equates myth with popular delusions. Even in its positive form, of course,
                                                 
26 Interview with Kessy Labani, 10 February 2004.
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myth is generally seen as the opposite of history. This binary contrast was already well-
established in classical Greece, for example, where philosophers differentiated between
mythos (authoritative declarations) and logos (demonstrable truths). Historians profess an
intent to remove mythos from their narratives, while mythologists often see historical
narratives, logos, as lacking the explanatory power of mythical ones. Since the
Enlightenment, rational-minded historians have won the intellectual high ground in their
crusade to separate myth from “what really happened,” or history proper. The problem, as
many historians will attest, is that mythical thinking suffuses our attempts to narrate the
past, no matter how well they are grounded in evidence. We give meaning to events,
people and places by shaping them into stories that are – that must be – comprehensible
to us today. The recognition of this limitation is at least partly responsible for the retreat
of historians from professing “Truth” in their histories – grand schemes of human
progress or the unfolding of divine plans – and our retrenchment in the solace of small
“truths.” Most of us remain convinced that our small truths are demonstrably more
accurate than mythical storytelling. At the same time, we must recognize that we are
swimming upstream in our insistence on reason and evidence when telling stories about
the past intended to be true.27
Scholars of East Africa have not yet done justice to the mythical thinking of
Parakuyo and Maasai pastoralists. When they have discussed myth at all, the paucity of
available data has led them to throw Parakuyo myths together with those of Maasai and
                                                 
27 For useful discussions of these ideas, see Peter Heehs, “Myth, History, and Theory,”
History and Theory 33 (1994), 1-4; and William H. McNeill, “Mythistory, or Truth,
Myth, History and Historians,” American Historical Review 91 (1986).
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Arusha. Further, scholars have tended to lump together stories collected decades or even
centuries apart. These jumbled stories are then analyzed as if they could reveal clues to
“Maasai” society in general.28 This approach, needless to say, reinforces the predominant
Maasai-centric view that this dissertation argues against. We should be mindful of the
ways that myth changes over time as it is adjusted to reflect changing social and political
realities. In the following passages, we will take a closer look at two kinds of myths that
are common to all human societies: creation stories and hero stories. We will look at
examples of these stories from both Parakuyo and Maasai informants, noting the ways
that they differ and the ways that they point to changes in social and political contexts.29
Changes in origin myths between Loikop and Maasai are evident in varying
representations of Naiterukop, a mystical semi-divine figure. Johann Ludwig Krapf
recorded an origin story told by his Loikop informant, Lemasegnot, during the early
1840s. In the beginning, a strange man named Naiterukop lived on Oldoinio Eibor
(Mount Kenya). Naiterukop existed in some mediating space between man and Enkai
(God). One day Naiterukop was visited by a man named Enjemasi Enauner and his wife,
who came from Oldoinio Sambu, an area southwest of Mount Kenya. Named for the
sharpened stick he carried, Enjemasi could make holes in the ground wherever he
touched with the stick. While visiting Oldoinio Eibor, Enjemasi was taught by
Naiterukop how to practice cattle-keeping; Naiterukop also impregnated Enjemasi’s wife.
Enjemasi then returned home with his new skills and progeny. Loikop pastoralists
                                                 
28 See, for example, Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 172-175.
29 For a summary of the approach to myth followed here, see David Leeming, Myth: A
Biography of Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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continued to make pilgrimages to Oldoinio Eibor to pray to Naiterukop for intercession in
bringing rain, cattle and health from Enkai.30
By the end of the nineteenth century, with Maasai military and cultural expansion
sweeping aside Loikop sections and identities, there was now ample opportunity, and
need, for modifications to the Naiterukop myth. Henry Fosbrooke, working with Maasai
informants during the 1940s, recorded a different version of the story. In this version, a
woman named Naiterukop came down from heaven and gave birth to two sons: Maasinda
and ol Meek (a derogatory term for Bantu-speaking farmers). Maasinda then became the
ancestor of all Maasai as well as the leader of their migrations. He is credited with
building a ladder by which Maasai scaled an escarpment that led to the rich highland
grazing of the central Rift Valley.31
Taking these stories as separate expressions at distinct points in time, they clearly
point to the differing outlooks and concerns of the (earlier) Loikop and (later) Maasai
societies. Several scholars have confused the issue by refusing to separate these two
stories, attempting instead to find coherent, multi-layered meanings in the various forms
that Naiterukop assumes in the different versions. To make matters worse, the Loikop
version of the story is often taken to be derivative of the Maasai version, rather than the
opposite.32 The stories may well have intricate meanings, but that is no excuse for failing
                                                 
30 Krapf, Vocabulary, 8-10; see also Krapf, Travels, 360; Krapf, journal entry, 30 August
1853, CA5/O16, Church Missionary Society, Records, 1803-1914 (Kodak Ltd., Recordak
Division, 1960), microfilm copy of the CMS archives courtesy of the Center for Research
Libraries (documents from the Church Missionary Society archives are hereafter cited
with the abbreviation CMS); Krapf to Venn, 10 January 1854, CA5/O16, CMS.
31 Fosbrooke, “Administrative Survey,” 3.
32 For a particularly confusing example, see Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 176.
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to distinguish between them. In the Loikop version, Naiterukop is a male semi-deity who
fathers Loikop and teaches them pastoralism. Loikop pastoralists of the early nineteenth
century, then, saw themselves as descendants of Naiterukop.33 The magic, hole-digging
stick carried by Enjemasi might well be an indication that Loikop realized their debt to
their vaguely remembered but technologically proficient predecessors, who constructed
the numerous priceless wells of the dry steppe areas.
In the Maasai version, Naiterukop is a woman who gives birth to the father figure,
Maasinda, who already is a skilled pastoralist. Maasai pastoralists of the early twentieth
century saw themselves as descendants of Maasinda, whose six sons became the founders
of the six “core” Maasai clans.34 Further, in keeping with the heightened Maasai claim to
preeminence in pastoralism and veneration of cultural symbolism associated with cattle,
the new story adds the division between Maasinda and ol Meek, a stark reminder of
Maasai distinctiveness and superiority.
The cultural message in the new version is clear: victorious Maasai pastoralists
consciously subsumed the older Loikop stories in their newer versions. The revered male
ancestor of the Loikop was deliberately feminized in the new version and replaced with a
new male ancestor for the victors. The tactic of feminizing valued aspects of the defeated
Loikop society also was used by Maasai to belittle Loikop prophet-diviners and Loikop
ethnonyms, including the word “Parakuyo” itself (see chapter 4).
                                                 
33 Jakob Erhardt says this explicitly. Jakob Erhardt, Vocabulary of the Enguduk Iloigob,
as Spoken by the Masai-Tribes in East Africa (Ludwigsburg: Ferdinand Riehm), 57.
34 Fosbrooke, “Administrative Survey,” 7.
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We should note that in the early twentieth century, these messages have faded in
turn, replaced by modern concerns. Some Maasai elders today have never even heard of
Maasinda. They have, however, constructed a new myth that fits well with the expansive
outlook and globalizing contexts of their modern lives, and adds a new spin on the
scholarly classification of Maasai as “Nilotic” people. In this new version, Maasai trace
their roots to Cairo, which they interpret as a word in the Maasai (Maa) language
meaning “should I say.” Ancient Maasai, they claim, migrated from Cairo along the Nile
to Khartoum, which is taken to be a Maa word meaning “can I get.” Finally they came to
Nairobi (which really was named for a Maa word – “cold”) and then to Arusha in
Tanzania.35
Close study of Parakuyo and Maasai hero myths also provides illumination of
changing historical contexts. We will take an unusual approach here, in seeing laibons as
heroes in the Parakuyo and Maasai imagination. Some explanation is required before we
proceed. To mythologists, stories about heroes reflect cultural (and to a certain degree,
universal human) values. “Our heroes reflect our priorities,” as David Leeming has
written; “they are metaphorical representatives in myth of our popular cultural values.”36
Heroes accomplish superhuman tasks on behalf of the greater good. They don’t just stand
for the status quo; they overcome personal, historical or social limitations to move society
forward in some way. As metaphorical reflections, heroes must be different somehow:
they are divinely born, they are kings, they are foreigners or they are outsiders.37 In many
                                                 
35 Interview with Lazaro Rubeni Wanga, 4 November 2003.
36 Leeming, Myth, 117.
37 Leeming, Myth, 117-118, 124.
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ways, Parakuyo and Maasai laibons – prophets and diviners with magical powers – fill
this purpose. This is not to say that laibons are not real people with everyday concerns,
nor to fall in line with scholars who argue that laibons played only symbolic roles in the
wars of the nineteenth century. Rather, we will see that in an acephalous society such as
Parakuyo, laibons are easily identified characters who can be used in the same ways that
other societies use heroic figures: to explain society and morality.
Many of the stories told about laibons clearly fit the pattern of heroic myth.
Laibon lineages are almost always considered to have originated from outside society.
The Parakuyo laibon lineage, for example, is said to have begun with Tilian at some
indeterminate date in the past. According to one version of the story, Parakuyo were
without ritual leadership after they left behind their previous laibon, Shava, when they
migrated from north of Naivasha south to Kaputiei, Laitokitok and eventually the
Pangani River. Tilian, a prophet from the neighboring Mbugu society, is said to have
predicted that on a raid against the Giriama, Parakuyo warriors would discover a black
sheep with a white head who had given birth to a white lamb with a black head. When
this prophesy came true, Tilian was invited to live among the Parakuyo. Maasai, in
characteristic fashion, make grander claims about their first laibon, Kedongoi: he was a
“heaven-born child” found wandering on the Ngong Hills. When he demonstrated
prophetic powers, he was adopted as their laibon. Tilian and Kedongoi most likely are
45
entirely mythical figures, created after the establishment of their respective lineages to
solidify claims to authority.38
Historical laibons also are remembered in mythic terms. Mtango, and possibly his
predecessor Lengunat, were in office during the intense fighting that saw Parakuyo lose
control of grazing and water resources on the steppe to advancing Maasai. Richard
Waller has noted that in oral tradition the conflicts between Maasai and Loikop groups
are often portrayed as a series of magical contests between rival laibons. This is evident
in Maasai traditions that explain the escape and continued independence of Parakuyo; the
Parakuyo laibon, they say, closed a pass with a magic spell, preventing the Maasai
warriors from pursuing their enemies. Some Parakuyo informants remember Mtango as a
martyr who was murdered and skinned by Maasai. A fountain of fresh water sprang forth
at the spot where his blood hit the ground, making the surrounding land fertile. The
victorious Maasai did not hesitate to belittle the continued independence of non-Maasai
prophetic lineages. Typically, they did this by claiming that other laibons were the
offspring of unions between non-Maasai men and the female relatives of Maasai laibons.
For example, Maasai at the turn of the century told German officer Moritz Merker that
Mtango was actually a sister of the Maasai laibon Sitonik, who married a “Kwavi” man
and bore a son whom the Kwavi adopted as their own laibon.39
                                                 
38 “Extract: Genealogy of Kwavi Laibon Family,” n.d., Same (Pare) District Book, v. 1,
mf. 11, TNA; Fosbrooke, “Administrative,” 3; Richard Waller, “The Lords of East
Africa: The Masai in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (c1840-c1885),” Ph. D. Thesis, Darwin
College, Cambridge, 1978, 198, 204.
39 Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 185; M. Merker, Die Masai by Merker (An English
Translation), private circulation, 2; Waller, “Lords of East Africa,” 224. Waller cites the
46
Our interpretation of oral tradition as myth can be carried a few more steps if we
consider the diversity and development of traditions surrounding the Maasai-Loikop wars
of the nineteenth century. In these conflicts, Maasai forcibly evicted Parakuyo from their
settlements around the best water and grazing sources on the savannas of north-central
Tanzania. Parakuyo oral traditions include very specific place names for areas they
formerly held: Kiteto, Londergess, Loiborserret, Naberera, Engasemet, Lolkisale. The
area encompassing these place-names – many of them the sites of crucial clusters of wells
– coincides almost perfectly with the area held by Maasai by the end of the nineteenth
century.40 The Maasai-Parakuyo battles were part of a broader series of wars in which
Maasai disintegrated Loikop sections across a broad expanse of East Africa. Parakuyo
were among the fortunate ones, in that they managed to survive with an intact,
autonomous society. Parakuyo and Maasai have developed a range of oral traditions
explaining the roots of the conflict.
By the end of the nineteenth century, Maasai stories about the disintegration of
Loikop groups already demonstrated considerable imagination. A medical missionary
visiting Maasai during the early 1880s was intrigued that they showed such hatred
towards the “Wa-baragui,” and asked them why this was so. His Maasai hosts replied that
“the Wa-baragui when living with them used to steal their cattle until they could stand it
                                                                                                                                                  
Maasai revision of Mtango’s identity as an example of “fictional agnation” and
“genealogical imperialism.”
40 Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 79.
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no longer and so they drove them away.”41 Joseph Thomson, travelling near the crater
lake of Chala in 1884, was told by Maasai that a “Kwavi” village once existed near the
lake, but it had been “blown into the air by a terrible convulsion. With a strain of poetry
they tell you how you may still hear the lowing of cattle, the barking of dogs, and other
characteristic sounds of village life.”42 Maasai informants told Merker at the turn of the
century that the Loikop Wars had begun when the Maasai laibon’s sister, Mtango, bore a
son by a “Kwavi” man. The son was adopted as laibon by the “Kwavi,” who withdrew
their allegiance to the Maasai laibon and thus started the wars.43 European scholars also
inquired about the “Maasai farming” groups, known as Lumbwa, which were composed
of defeated Loikop who had been forced temporarily to give up pastoralism. One Maasai
explanation for the existence of these groups was recorded by A. C. Hollis in 1905:
There is a cave near the River Athi ... It is believed that when Naiterukop
brought the Masai in olden days from the district round about Kenya, and they
arrived at Donyo Sabuk, some of them saw this cave and entered it. They
journeyed for ten days and eventually reached a salt lake, where they came out
of the earth again and settled. These people are the Lumbwa, who in appearance
are like the Masai, but they till the earth.44
                                                 
41 Comments by Dr. Baxter, appended to J. T. Last, “A Visit to the Masai People Living
Beyond the Borders of the Nguru Country,” Proceedings of the Royal Geographical
Society 5 (1883), 539.
42 Joseph Thomson, “Through the Masai Country to the Victoria Nyanza,” Proceedings
of the Royal Geographical Society 6 (1884), 693.
43 Merker, English Translation, 2.
44 A. C. Hollis, The Masai: Their Language and Folklore (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1905), 281.
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The common thread in these disparate explanations, of course, is the careful
avoidance of blame by Maasai for any unfair aggression on their part.
These stories have been reimagined and revised a thousand times in their
telling during the past century. The common theme is that Maasai still see Loikop as
the trouble-makers and peace-breakers. This view simply does not fit with the
available historical evidence, but as Richard Waller has noted, that is not the point
as far as Maasai are concerned. To them, the stories are an “extended parable” about
the consequences of disrupting good relations (osotua). The Maasai attitude towards
and stories about Loikop are similar to those relating the disappearance of the
Sirikwa, a pre-Maasai group in northwestern Kenya.45 They also relate to a common
story that has been in use for at least two hundred years in East Africa: that of the
man with three sons, one of whom tricks or mistreats the others for selfish reasons.
One version of this story, recorded by Johann Ludwig Krapf in 1848 and Richard
Burton in 1872, recounted the origin of the bitter hatred between Loikop, Oromo
and Mijikenda in eastern Kenya. Another version of the three-sons story, related by
Parakuyo elders in 2004, offered a humorous explanation for how wazungu
(Europeans and Americans) acquired their advanced technology. The key feature of
these stories is their malleability and their application to present-day concerns.46
We might expect to find that Parakuyo stories contested the Maasai versions, and
we would be right if we looked only at sources from the late nineteenth century. Since
                                                 
45 Waller, “Lords of East Africa,” 122-123.
46 Krapf, journal entry, 16 November 1848, CA5/O16, CMS; see also Krapf, Travels,
199; Richard Burton, Zanzibar: City, Island, and Coast (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1872)
II, 63-64.
49
then, however, Parakuyo have had an interest in playing down the issue of blame,
because Parakuyo themselves have adopted the strategy of calling themselves Maasai.
Parakuyo today stress their common origin with Maasai. They are quick to tell visitors
that they and Maasai share one father, or to tell the story about how in “ancient times”
they walked south from Kerio into the Rift Valley arm in arm with Maasai. Parakuyo
today, then, must of necessity (and likely, at this point, because they simply don’t know)
keep their stories vague. Different people will offer different explanations. There was a
bad drought, for example, which Maasai survived in better shape than Parakuyo, who
scattered to look for other pastures. Another version recounts a quarrel over a spotted bull
found in a shallow river. Parakuyo and Maasai, who at the time were one people but lived
on opposite banks of the river, both claimed possession of the bull. The dispute escalated
into an all-out war which saw the groups become separate people. Some informants do
state that the old fighting had something to do with valuable wells at Naberera and other
places, but that this happened so long ago that it doesn’t matter now. And of course, to
them, it doesn’t.47
                                                 
47 Interview with Saitoti Papaa, 11 November 2003; interview with Lazaro Rubeni
Wanga; Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 76-77, 82. Hurskainen records one tradition that
says on the way south from Kerio, one or two groups related to Parakuyo turned back to
the north; this may be taken as an attempt to explain the geographical distance between
surviving Loikop groups (Hurskainen, Cattle and Culture, 76-77).
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Conclusion
Two lessons can be drawn from this study of myth and oral tradition. First, we
must admit that reliable, contemporary documentary evidence outweighs oral traditions
collected decades and centuries later. In the case of Parakuyo and Maasai, there is a silver
lining to this cloud. Historians favoring their own collections of oral tradition have
ignored a good deal of older documentary evidence that draws on oral informants.
Essentially, modern scholars of Maasai and Parakuyo have claimed that oral traditions
they collected in the late twentieth century are better at explaining the nineteenth century
than oral sources collected during the nineteenth century. This point is taken up in more
detail in the next chapter. Second, we have seen in this chapter the remarkable capacity
for reinvention and social imagination displayed by Parakuyo and Maasai during the past
two hundred years. This kind of oral evidence is priceless for historians, not because it
provides concrete or specific historical details, but precisely because it demonstrates
change over time. In other words, it is the changes in myth over time that matter most,
not the details that these myths offer about the past.
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Chapter 2
They Called Themselves Loikop: Evidence for the Importance of a Neglected
Ethnonym in Early Nineteenth-Century East Africa
This chapter presents evidence for the view that Parakuyo and Maasai were once
sub-groups of Loikop, a widespread society of pastoralists who dominated the Rift Valley
areas of East Africa at the dawn of the nineteenth century. The existence of this earlier
Loikop society is not generally acknowledged by scholars or by Maasai and Parakuyo
themselves. However, it was described in considerable detail by the first European
residents in East Africa, based on information provided by Loikop informants. Loikop
pastoralists were particularly well documented by Johann Ludwig Krapf, the first
missionary of the Church Missionary Society in East Africa, as well as his colleagues
Johannes Rebmann and Jakob Erhardt.  Their various journals, letters, and published
articles, written during the 1840s and 1850s, are widely recognized as the earliest
documentary evidence for Maasai and Parakuyo history.  But they have often been
neglected, and sometimes deliberately shunned, in favor of later written or oral sources,
perhaps because their views of pastoralist history, including the idea of a pastoralist
Loikop community, seem rather incongruous when compared to those of more recent
vintage. This skepticism was fueled partly by the fact that during the course of the
nineteenth century, Maasai expanded dramatically, demolishing and absorbing other
Loikop sections. By the time of European colonial conquest, the term Loikop carried
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negative connotations, and scholars from this point forward had difficulty in seeing any
other valid meaning for the term.
In keeping with the maxim that extraordinary claims demand extraordinary
evidence, this chapter will be devoted to making the case for restoring the idea of Loikop
pastoralists in our narratives of East African history. First, we will introduce the early
missionaries and the context of their research on Loikop pastoralists, paying close
attention to their informants and the types of records they created. Next, we will follow
the development of later scholarly opinions of the early missionary sources, tracing the
generally negative attitudes that held sway from the 1870s until the tentative revival of
interest after 1980. Finally, we will examine the meaning and history of the word Loikop
from a comparative perspective, noting its uses and evolution over time. The argument in
this chapter is that while skepticism is to be encouraged in evaluating all historical
sources, Krapf and his contemporaries nonetheless provided a coherent and convincing
picture of Loikop pastoralists during the mid-nineteenth century, one that can be
supported in many of its essentials by comparison with other forms of evidence.  We
conclude that the evidence suggests that Loikop pastoralists were the dominant Rift
Valley society of the early nineteenth century, and that both Parakuyo and Maasai were
segments of this broader community.
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Missionary Labors: Krapf, His Colleagues and Their Records
After a frustrating missionary residence in Ethiopia from 1837 to 1842, Johann
Ludwig Krapf sought another route to his intended Oromo (“Galla”) converts, and soon
found his way to Mombasa on the Swahili coast. By January 1844, only a month after he
had landed in East Africa, Krapf learned of “a very wild people” called “Okooafee” or
“Quapee.”1 By 1845, Krapf also had learned that “Wakuafi” (the standard spelling he
adopted) were pastoralists who subsisted on milk and meat, and that they made “distant
depredatory expeditions, to intercept the herds of other tribes.” 2 While Krapf was not the
first person to record the existence of Wakwavi, he was the first to write of “a tribe called
Maasai,” in February 1846.3  The following year, Krapf wrote that the Maasai language
was identical to that of Wakwavi, “of whom they are, in fact, only a division,” and he
added that Maasai had recently defeated Wakwavi near Chagga, making the Maasai the
most powerful group “strolling about in the plains.”4 In 1852, Krapf began to note
consistently that both Wakwavi and Maasai referred to themselves by the name Loikop, a
fact he and his colleagues would state dozens of times in both published and unpublished
documents over the next few decades.5 During his time in East Africa, Krapf was
                                                 
1 Johann Ludwig Krapf, journal entry, 4 January 1844, CA5/O16, Church Missionary
Society, Records, 1803-1914 (Kodak Ltd., Recordak Division, 1960), microfilm copy of
the CMS archives courtesy of the Center for Research Libraries. Documents from the
Church Missionary Society archives are hereafter cited with the abbreviation CMS.
2 Krapf to Coates, 22 January 1845, CA5/O16, CMS.
3 Krapf to Coates, 25 February 1846, CA5/O16, CMS.
4 Krapf, journal entry, 11 October 1847, CA5/O16, CMS.
5 Although Krapf and the other early missionaries noted that the proper term for these
pastoralists was Loikop, they continued to use the term “Wakuafi” in their
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occupied with several kinds of work, both missionary and academic, but he remained
interested in Loikop peoples and kept an eye open for any new information about them.
In 1853 Krapf met Lemasegnot, an Loikop slave, who had been kidnapped as a child,
transported to the coast, and sold in Mombasa. Lemasegnot’s owner gave permission for
him to reside at Krapf’s cottage in Rabai, a small village outside of town. Lemasegnot
was an extraordinary informant, indeed the best Loikop historical source until the
employment of Justin Lemenye in research work nearly fifty years later.6 Krapf
enthusiastically organized the information supplied by Lemasegnot and combined it with
information he had collected from Swahili caravan traders. The information supplied by
Lemasegnot formed the basis of Krapf’s book, Vocabulary of the Engutuk Eloikob,
published in 1854, and an essay titled “Short Description of the Masai and Wakuafi
Tribes of East Africa,” published in the German-language journal Ausland in 1857.7
The numerous and diverse records left by Krapf have long been recognized as an
invaluable source for East African history, but too often, they have been consulted in a
less than rigorous manner. Krapf’s records exist in several different versions, involving
revision, translation, and abridgement.8 His daily journals and letters from 1844 to 1855,
                                                                                                                                                  
correspondence and journals, because it was the conventional term used on the coast
(“Wakuafi” or Wakwavi is simply the Swahili derivation of Loikop).
6 Krapf, journal entry, 30 August 1853, CA5/O16, CMS; Johann Ludwig Krapf,
Vocabulary of the Engutuk Eloikob or of the Wakuafi-Nation in the Interior of Equatorial
Africa (Tubingen:  Lud. Fried. Fues., 1854), 3-6, 11, 25-26.
7 Johann Ludwig Krapf, “Kurze Beschreibung der Masai- und Wakuafi-Stämme im
Südöstlichen Afrika,” Ausland 30 (1857), 437-442, 461-466.
8 I am grateful to Thomas Spear, whose published comments on my first attempt at
examining the early missionary sources helped to clarify priorities regarding Krapf’s
records. See Thomas Spear, “Section Introduction: Documentary Sources,” in Sources
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kept at the archives of the Church Missionary Society, must be considered the most
authoritative. The Ausland essay of 1857 is just as important, but regrettably, has been
ignored by most modern scholars, perhaps because it was printed in a difficult-to-read
German script. Despite its obscurity, Krapf himself obviously saw the Ausland essay as
his definitive statement on Loikop and Maasai. It is inarguably the result of a systematic
effort on Krapf’s part to shape the information supplied by Lemasegnot into a coherent
statement. The introduction to Krapf’s Vocabulary of 1854, which has been treated with
skepticism by many researchers, is in fact merely a less detailed version of the Ausland
essay, despite its earlier publication date. Next, there is the 1858 Reisen in Ostafrika,
which was published in two volumes, and its English-language abridgement, Travels,
Researches, and Missionary Labours, which unfortunately is both the least authoritative
and most widely distributed of Krapf’s works. Krapf himself seemed to be aware of this
problem: he included a note in Travels suggesting that interested readers refer to the
Ausland essay for a more thorough description of Loikop and Maasai.9 For the purposes
of this chapter and the one that follows, we will make reference as often as possible to
Krapf’s journals and letters, as well as the Ausland essay. The amount of ethnographic
and historical detail found in these sources alone rivals that of a doctoral dissertation, and
provides a more than solid basis for comparison with other sources of evidence.
Krapf’s fellow missionary Jakob Erhardt also acquired most of his information
directly from a native speaker, in this case a Maasai slave who had been captured in war
                                                                                                                                                  
and Methods in African History: Spoken, Written, Unearthed, edited by Toyin Falola and
Christian Jennings (University of Rochester Press, 2003).
9 Johann Ludwig Krapf, Travels, Researches, and Missionary Labours, During an
Eighteen Years’ Residence in Eastern Africa (London: Trübner and Co., 1860), 366.
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by another section of Loikop and sold to the coast.  This informant’s name was
apparently never recorded, but his input, combined with that of the “Masai traders” (i.e.
Swahili caravan leaders) interviewed by Erhardt at Tanga, provides a solid source with
which to compare and contrast the information gathered by Krapf.  Erhardt was
particularly impressed by the fact that “Kikuafi” and “Kimasai” were identical languages,
and by the thoroughness which which the Loikop language had filtered even to the
coastal areas of East Africa.  “The Masai traders and my Masai,” he noted, “have not the
least difficulty in conversing with the Wakuafi slaves who are very numerous at
Tanga.”10  Erhardt’s Vocabulary of the Enguduk Iloigob of 1857, when compared with
Krapf’s earlier publication, completes a surprisingly well-rounded investigation into the
Loikop pastoralists, since each approached the subject from an opposite angle.  That the
information they collected agrees in its particulars to such a degree of consistency, as
demonstrated below, is compelling reason to give credence to the comprehensive view of
Loikop society and history contained in their writings.
Johannes Rebmann, whose time of service in East Africa overlapped with that of
Krapf and Erhardt, also left valuable records on Maasai and Loikop.  Rebmann made the
first substantial journeys inland, travelling to Chagga in 1848 and again in 1849 under the
guidance of Bana Kheri, who also guided Krapf to Usambara in 1848.  Rebmann
collected some useful information during his travels inland, but his closest and most
dramatic experience with Maasai occurred during their large-scale attacks on Mombasa
and its hinterland in 1855 and 1857.  Rebmann kept himself out of harm’s way during the
                                                 
10 Jakob Erhardt to Venn, 27 October 1854, CA5/O16, CMS.
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fighting; after all, as he wrote to the home office, “I need scarcely say that I do not
consider it our duty to brave danger in which the great question is only about cattle.”11
But he nonetheless took great care to get as many eyewitness accounts as possible,
checking them against each other for accuracy, and his information agrees with the
account left by the explorer Richard Burton, who actually dashed off to Rabai with his
companion John Speke to protect Rebmann before the three decided to retreat to
Mombasa.  In sum, then, the records left by Krapf, Erhardt, and Rebmann constitute a
body of material that must be taken seriously by historians of East Africa.
For the purposes of this chapter, we are concerned merely with establishing the
credibility of these early missionary sources, and making the case for the existence of an
overarching Loikop society in the early nineteenth century. These sources, of course, also
provide a wealth of detailed description on Loikop society and history, as well as the
Maasai expansion, and will be revisited in the following chapters. But in its essentials,
the view of Krapf and his colleagues regarding East African pastoralists can be summed
up in two ideas, which they stated clearly, consistently, and repeatedly in their written
records (which, as noted above, were compiled from independent sources). First, they
agreed that Loikop were the most widespread and dominant East African pastoralists of
the early nineteenth century.12 Second, they agreed that in recent years, Maasai, a sub-
                                                 
11Johannes Rebmann to Venn, 18 April 1855, CA5/O24, CMS.
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group of Loikop, had emerged to become a formidable and expanding society in their
own right, driven by a potent military system. It is worth noting that aside from the fact
that Maasai, at this time, still called themselves Loikop, the missionaries also pointed out
explicitly that Maasai constituted one (among many) sections of Loikop: Krapf reported
that Maasai were “in fact, only a division” of Wakuafi, while Rebmann noted that Maasai
were “a tribe of Wakuafi.” 13 Regardless of the veracity of these ideas, then, we must at
the least conclude that Krapf, Rebmann, and Erhardt stated their views clearly and
consistently, and that they agreed with each other on these points.
Modern researchers have not done well in acknowledging these clear-cut
statements by Krapf and his colleagues, usually burying the issue in footnotes. On the
rare occasions when they have included the offending statements in their essays, later
writers have often treated them as an embarrassment to be brushed aside. “Krapf and
Erhardt stated that all the Maa-speaking peoples called themselves Loikop,” John
Berntsen has written. “If so, Krapf’s and Erhardt’s evidence is the last independent
testimony of that practice.” 14 Berntsen neatly avoids the issue here: there is no later
evidence of Maasai calling themselves Loikop, because they stopped doing so – in fact, it
is possible that they were beginning to abandon this self-designation even as Krapf and
his colleagues were resident in East Africa. But modern scholars rarely admit, or perhaps
even realize, that several later observers came independently to the same, or very similar,
ideas about the existence of a once-widespread pastoralist society called Loikop, which
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included Maasai and other sections. This does not include European visitors who came
into contact with Krapf, Rebmann, or Erhardt, from whom they might have received
these ideas. For example, the French missionary Leon de Avanchers, who borrowed
material from the Church Missionary Intelligencer, wrote in 1859, “They call themselves
Eloigob (free men), and are subdivided into two large tribes: the Massai and the Kuafi;
the former is the terror of all the peaceful tribes of the coast.”15  Charles New, another
missionary, wrote in 1873 that the Maasai and Wakuafi “call themselves ‘Orloikob’
(possessors of the soil).”16 As Berntsen has rightly noted, these sources, while valuable,
cannot be treated as independent observers.
Even after discarding sources that might have been “tainted” by association with
the early missionaries, there remains a thin but persistent strand of writing that has
continually re-introduced ideas similar to those of Krapf and his colleagues. This
remained true even after the onset of colonial rule in East Africa, when the combined
weight of Maasai self-perception and Maasai-centric scholarship made it difficult even to
contemplate these seemingly upside-down notions. J. R. L. Macdonald, who led an
expedition to Uganda, wrote in 1899 that the Maasai, Wakuafi, and Samburu “are three
divisions of the one tribe, the Eloegop, and speak what may be considered one language
with slight dialectic differences.”  Throughout his article, Macdonald refers to Maasai
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simply as Eloegop.17 Colonial administrator F. J. Bagshawe, after making “a scrutiny of
the combined oral traditions,” concluded in 1924 that northern Tanganyika had once been
occupied by “the forerunners of the present Masai, the O’Oikop or ‘Lumbwa,’ soon to be
scattered and almost exterminated by their successors, the ferocious Masai proper.”18
Bagshawe noted that the “Oikop” were now “found only as remnants, known as
Wakwavi or Lumbwa, round the fringe of Masailand.” 19 Fellow administrator Henry
Fosbrooke, conducting his own research into oral traditions during the 1930s, noted that
“the Kwavi, also called Lumbwa, Loigop or Baraguyu, are the less numerous forerunners
of the true Masai, who, in adversity took to agriculture,” and that in early times the
Maasai and Wakwavi “were indistinguishable, merely two-subtribes of a pastoral tribe.”
20 Gillian Solly, in her 1953 textbook on Kenyan history, stated crisply that the Maasai
“were from a Nilo-hamitic people known as Il Loikop.”21
Clearly, then, the ideas of Krapf and his colleagues have been echoed by later,
independent observers. As recently as 1985, anthropologist John Galaty, in an
unpublished paper, flirted with the idea that all of the Maa-speaking peoples had once
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19 F. J. Bagshawe, “Extract from the Fourth Report of the Land Development
Commissioner Relating to the Interests of the Masai in the Highlands above the Rift
Wall,” 20 November 1930, Secretariat Early Series, Tanzania National Archives
[hereafter abbreviated TNA].
20 H. A. Fosbrooke, “The Masai Age-Group System as a Guide to Tribal Chronogy,”
African Studies 15 (1956), 191; H. A. Fosbrooke, “An Administrative Survey of the
Masai Social System,” Tanganyika Notes and Records 26 (1948), 4-5.
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been known as Loikop, and that the Maasai emerged from this Loikop milieu.22 Galaty
apparently abandoned this idea, and his more recent publications have gone in a more
orthodox direction. But we should have no problem admitting that it appears to be, at the
very least, a sensible interpretation among other sensible interpretations.  I argue,
however, that it is in fact more sensible than other interpretations.  With this in mind, the
task at hand is to explain why the prevailing assumption among scholars, for at least the
past hundred years, has been that this interpretation is less sensible than others, and why
this prevailing assumption is misguided.
“A Much Debated Non-Issue”? Later Responses to the Early Missionary Sources
Since 1880, academic writing on Maasai and related groups has moved steadily
away from the ideas of the early missionaries. In one sense, this was probably to be
expected. As Berntsen has pointed out, Krapf and the other Church Missionary Society
representatives formed the only European community living permanently on the East
African mainland between roughly 1840 and 1880.23 Other European visitors to the
mainland were usually hosted by the missionaries at some point, and contemporary
writers such as Guillain and Des Avanchers borrowed heavily from notes taken by the
missionaries. The missionaries had a virtual monopoly on certain kinds of information
about the interior (among “reliable” European sources), and visitors often relayed this
                                                 
22 John Galaty, “‘Since We Came Up’: A History of the Emergence of Maasai Society
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23 Berntsen, “The Enemy is Us,” 6.
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information back to Europe with little modification. We should be careful not to discount
sources merely because they may have compared notes with the missionaries. For
example, the missionaries hosted Richard Burton, and he was present when Mombasa
was attacked by Maasai in 1857. “A few years ago the Wakwafi … were the terror of this
part of the coast,” Burton wrote, echoing the missionaries; “now they have been almost
exterminated by their Southern and S. Western neighbours, the Wamasai, a tribe of
congeners, formerly friends, and speaking the same dialect.”24 Once Europeans began to
live and travel in East Africa in greater numbers, however, the opportunities for
independent research and perspectives would naturally increase. It seems only reasonable
to expect debate on any issue when there are several independent observers at work.
However, orthodox views regarding Maasai and Loikop history have shifted so
dramatically away from the early missionaries since the late nineteenth century that
special explanation is required.
Through the 1870s and early 1880s, missionaries and explorers who visited
Maasailand often reported details similar to those found in the missionary reports.
Thomas Wakefield, stationed at Mombasa, wrote that the “poor Wakwavi … having long
since been robbed of their cattle by the Masai, were compelled to turn their attention to
agricultural pursuits,” but also noted that “the Wakwavi of Ndara Serian” continued to
raid Lumbwa (Kipsigis) for cattle.25  Likewise in 1873, Charles New agreed with his
predecessors that both Maasai and “Wakuavi” called themselves Orloikob, which he
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translated as “possessors of the soil,” and that both groups were pastoralists.26  James
Last, stationed at Mamboia in central Tanzania during the early 1880s, concluded, as
Krapf had done earlier, that “Humba” was an equivalent term for “Kwavi,” and agreed
with earlier observers that both the “Kwavi” and Maasai “live on ox flesh and milk, and
neglect the cultivation of vegetable food.”27  The German explorer G.A. Fischer, who
crossed Maasailand in 1882, found that “the Wa-kuavi, a pastoral and nomadic race like
the Masai, formerly possessed the greatest part of the land inhabited by the Masai, but
were gradually driven back by the latter . . . [and now] have settled and pursue
agriculture.”28 Perhaps a sign of things to come, however, was James Christie’s Cholera
Epidemics in East Africa, which included material on Maasai. Christie, a doctor stationed
at Zanzibar in the late 1860s, relied substantially on information copied directly from
Burton’s writing on Maasai.29
At this point, two crucial modifications enter the record. First, there was the new
idea that defeated Loikop sections were actually sub-groups of Maasai society, rather
than vice versa. Joseph Thomson, a Scotsman who advanced his own expedition directly
on the heels of Fischer, was apparently the first to make this subtle departure from
previous observers, stating that the “Kwafi” were “one among many septs” of Maasai,
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rather than the opposite.30  This inversion of the order laid out by Krapf and Rebmann
would become the standard interpretation in years to come, perhaps influenced by the fact
that the Maasai had indeed reduced the larger Loikop society to mere scatterlings, and
had subsumed earlier concepts of Loikop identity within a new Maasai cultural system.
Second, there was the new and influential notion that the “Kwafi” communties were not
really pastoralists, but farmers. J.P. Farler, the archdeacon of Magila in Usambara,
interviewed Swahili traders who had recently journeyed along the newly reopened routes
from Pangani to the interior.  Farler’s informants led him to introduce a new distinction
between the “Kwavi” and Maasai, one that would have been unthinkable to Krapf and his
colleagues.  The “Wakwafi,” Farler wrote, “seem to be an agricultural branch of the
Masai people, [who] are found scattered over four degrees,” and who spoke a mere
“dialectical variety” of the Maasai language.31  This new interpretation led Farler to make
several confused statements in the itinerary of caravan routes published by Royal
Geographical Society.  For example, Farler believed that the “regular dynasty” and
“settled government” of Mbatian at Kisongo (the very heart of Maasai society), was in
fact an achievement of the agriculturalist “Wakwafi,” who had “reached a much higher
stage of civilisation” than their pastoralist Maasai relatives.32  Thus, added to the
inversion of social standing which somehow made “Kwavi” a mere subgroup of Maasai,
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there would now be a persistent notion that the “Kwavi” were essentially farmers, while
their “pure” Maasai relatives were essentially cattle herders of the open plains.
Harry Johnston, a botanist and explorer who began his expedition to Kilimanjaro
just as Joseph Thomson returned from his own, travelled along the Usambara chain to
Kilimanjaro and back, meeting briefly with Parakuyo along the Pangani River, and with
Maasai at Moshi.  Johnston’s popular book, published in 1886, reinforced the image of
the agricultural “Kwavi” versus the pastoralist Maasai.  After acknowledging that both
Maasai and “Kwavi” referred to themselves as Loikop, for example, Johnston went on to
define the term as “people of the soil,” and ventured that it was “more especially affected
by the latter [i.e. “Kwavi”], as it implies a settled residence.”33  Johnston’s interpretation
of the Loikop Wars imagined them as conflicts between pastoralists and agriculturalists,
but his attempt to narrate their history was so vague as to be nearly unintelligible.34  The
precocious Johnston, who fancied himself an expert in any academic discipline, was
perhaps the first to dismiss as useless the writings of the early missionaries. Johnston
declared Erhardt’s and Krapf’s published vocabularies to be of poor linguistic quality,
and inexplicably declared that “neither [Krapf nor Erhardt] seemed to be aware that they
were studying the same language.”35  This statement is demonstrably false, as even a
casual glance at the two Vocabularies will attest. In a letter to the CMS secretary, Erhardt
wrote, “That the Kimasai and Kikuafi are but one and the same language … I have
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ascertained beyond doubt.”36 Johnston’s casual and mistaken dismissal of Erhardt and
Krapf predated that of several later writers who would also neglect to give the early
missionary sources more than a superficial glance.
By the turn of the century, then, a contradictory pattern had developed in writers’
views of “Kwavi” and Maasai identity.  On one hand, most missionaries and explorers
who conducted detailed interviews and tried to learn the history of Loikop and Maasai
pastoralists found that their research confirmed the views of the early missionaries.
Ludwig von Hohnel, for example, who accompanied Count Teleki on his 1887 journey to
Lake Rudolf, learned at Njemps that “according to their own traditions, they [i.e. the
“Wakwafi” of Njemps] too were once herdsmen leading a nomad life in nearly the same
districts as the Masai of today,” and that they had lost their cattle and been dispersed as a
result of wars with the Maasai.37  But on the other hand, the notion that the “Kwavi” were
and always had been a farming subgroup of Maasai gained prominence quickly (abetted
by the fact that many non-Maasai Loikop communities had indeed been forced to take up
farming by the 1880s), and became entrenched as the standard interpretation of Maasai
history. German explorer Oskar Baumann actually referred to Wakwavi as “a sub-tribe of
Mbugu,” providing an indication of just how low an opinion many now held towards
defeated Loikop groups.38
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Most of the colonial writers on Maasai and Loikop adopted the agricultural-
pastoral distinction uncritically; some even made further speculative advances. As
Berntsen has noted, colonial writing on Maasai and Kwavi reflected both administrative
concerns and the racist view of evolution then in fashion. “In this revised version,”
Bernsten wrote, “all the Maa-speaking groups who had been referred to as ‘Loikop’ or
‘Kwavi’ [in recent years] … became agriculturalists by definition, despite the evidence of
earlier writers and the oral traditions of the people themselves.”39  A.C. Hollis wrote in
1905 that there were two divisions of Maasai:  the pastoralists, who called themselves Il-
Maasae and lived in British territory, and the agriculturalists, who were called ’L-Oikop
or Il-Lumbwa and lived in German East Africa.40  Charles Eliot, in his introduction to the
Hollis book, speculated that “the difference between the two is evidently not ancient,”
and it was “quite probable that there was a large agricultural settlement on the Uasin
Gishu plateau from which the more adventurous warriors detached themselves.”41 On the
German side of the border, colonial officer Meritz Merker speculated in 1910 that there
had actually been three waves of “Maasai” pastoralist migrants into East Africa -- the Asa
(Dorobo), the “El kuafi,” and the Maasai -- each displacing the previous one and forcing
it to give up pastoralism.42  Merker’s theory was interesting if sketchy, but he neglected it
in order to devote more pages to the question of whether or not the Maasai were in fact
one of the lost tribes of Israel.  G.R. Sandford’s 1919 paper on the history of the Maasai,
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written for the colonial record books, advanced the view that “the Masai tribe originally
consisted of both pastoral and agricultural sections, of which the latter was almost
annihilated by the former.”43  The ’L-Oikop were settled agriculturalists, Sandford wrote,
while the nomadic Maasai pastoralists never practiced agriculture. The influence of
pseudo-scientific racism on colonial administrators played a significant part in the history
of Parakuyo, and will be discussed further in Chapter Four.
Henry Fosbrooke, who began work as a colonial administrator in Tanganyika’s
Masai District in 1935, published his account of Maasai history and society as a lengthy
essay in the 1948 volume of Tanganyika Notes and Records.  Fosbrooke had conducted
interviews with Maasai, and felt that his information did not agree with that of his earlier
colleagues.  Fosbrooke’s informants told him repeatedly that they shared a common
pastoralist origin with the “Lumbwa,” who they told him had only recently taken up
agriculture.  Further, these Maasai had specific traditions about when and how they had
taken each of the areas they now inhabited from their previous pastoralist Loikop
occupants.  Fosbrooke reviewed the literature on Maasai, and found much to agree with
in Krapf and Thomson, especially their convictions that Maasai and “Kwavi” (or
“Lumbwa”) sections were essentially part of one broadly defined pastoralist community.
He also dismissed the idea that there was a long-standing, traditional division between
pastoralist and agriculturalist sections, and he rejected Eliot’s suggestion that pastoralism
had been a recent innovation in Maasailand.44  Fosbrooke’s oral and archaeological
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investigations match up quite well with the early missionary sources, and could be used
to construct a chronology of Maasai expansion in the 19th century.
Alan Jacobs revived the debate over 19th-century Maasai and Loikop with his
1965 doctoral thesis, combining his own research in oral history with selected
contemporary written accounts.  Jacobs concluded that not only were Maa-speaking
peoples divided into “purely pastoral” Ilmaasai and “semi-pastoral” Loikop sections, and
that the Loikop Wars were conflicts between these two groups, but that the “semi-
pastoral” Loikop were actually the “more militant” warriors of that era, while the Maasai
did not even have a powerful military system.45  As one might expect, Jacobs
intentionally disregarded much of the Krapf-Rebmann-Erhardt material in order to reach
his conclusions.  Jacobs felt that these early missionaries had “failed to give an adequate
picture” of 19th-century Maasailand.46 Earlier, Jacobs had presented a paper at a 1959
seminar that readily indicated the level of attention he was devoting to the early
missionary sources as he prepared for his dissertation. “We are all aware of Kraft [sic]
and Rebman’s [sic] journeys,” Jacobs wrote, “… but how many of us have read these
works carefully enough to note that neither of them probably never [sic] actually met a
Masai proper? What clearly emerges … is the fact that they were reporting the tales of
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the Bantu African’s conception of the Masai.” 47 Youthful carelessness aside, this
complete misreading of the early missionary sources is fairly symptomatic of the
treatment they received at the hands of later writers. Jacobs opted instead to use the
writings of Wakefield, and James Christie’s Cholera Epidemics, which presents a
second-hand view of Maasailand drawn from other sources, to provide an 1868
“baseline” from which to reconstruct Maasai history.48  As an anthropologist, Jacobs also
placed great emphasis on the oral interviews he conducted in Maasailand, and took too
often at face value the contemporary Maasai version of events that had taken place a
century earlier.  Thus, the 19th-century Maasai are seen, in Jacobs’ view, as provoked by
the harrassment of the semi-pastoralists, until they eventually managed to fight back and
rid themselves of the Loikop threat.  Yet Jacobs was still somewhat at a loss to explain
the fact, as he readily admitted, that his Maasai informants still sometimes called
themselves Loikop, “in a boastful sense.”49
Historians John Berntsen and Richard Waller, working in the late 1970s and
1980s, challenged many of the popular notions that had infused writing on Maasai for the
past century. Berntsen challenged some of Jacobs’ conclusions, noting that the idea of a
division between “pastoralist Maasai” and “agricultural Kwavi” dates back no earlier
than the 1870s, when it was adopted by Farler and Johnston.50 Uncritical acceptance of
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this stereotype, he wrote, “resulted in a serious distortion of that history and an avoidance
of more complex and important issues.”51 But Berntsen’s reading of the early missionary
sources was at times inattentive. He portrays their view of pastoralist society as one of
two broad divisions – Maasai and Loikop – while barely acknowledging the fact that they
repeatedly stated that both of these groups called themselves Loikop. Berntsen also felt
that the early missionaries had misread the basis for warfare between Maasai and (other)
Loikop, accusing them of portraying the conflict as over territory rather than cattle
ownership.52 But the missionaries were well aware of the role of cattle in the conflict. At
the same time, Berntsen failed to acknowledge the strategic importance of wells and other
water sources, not to mention grazing areas and continguous access to them (i.e.
territory), in the conflicts between pastoralist groups. Berntsen, too, was somewhat taken
in by present-day Maasai ideas of identity and history.  For example, Berntsen claimed
that the word “Kwavi” did not derive from the word Loikop, which he translated as
“murder.”  Berntsen felt that “Loikop” would have been a term used to refer
contemptuously to a group other than one’s own, rather than a term of self-identification;
with this in mind, he dismissed the assertion made by Krapf, Erhardt, and others, that
19th-century Maasai and “Kwavi” pastoralists in fact called themselves Loikop.53
Richard Waller’s work covers much of the same ground as Berntsen’s. Waller,
like Berntsen, rejected the idea that Maasai and Loikop were traditionally divided by their
mode of subsistence into conflicting pastoralist and agriculturalist sections.  Citing the
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early missionary material, Waller concluded that the Maasai and Loikop sections had
very similar, perhaps identical, subsistence practices during much of the 19th century.
The Maasai may have idealized the idea of “pure” pastoralism, Waller wrote, but in day-
to-day life they almost certainly supplemented their diet with just as much agricultural
produce as the other Loikop.54  Further, he disagreed with the assertion that the Maasai
sections were not highly militarized, noting that this viewpoint “ignores a great deal of
contemporary evidence,” and theorizing that the expansion of Maasai sections during the
Loikop Wars involved a high level of military coordination in order to successfully
complete such massive cattle raids.55  Going beyond Berntsen, Waller recognized that the
word iloikop probably did not always carry negative connotations, pointing out that both
Krapf and Erhardt were firmly convinced that both Maasai and “Wakuafi” sections called
themselves Loikop; Waller also took seriously the fact that his Maasai informants were
“emphatic” in declaring that they had once been the same as the Loikop.56 But Waller
stopped short of considering the possibility that Loikop was actually the designation for
an entire pastoralist society, despite the early missionaries’ insistence on this. “I am not
sure that it helps to argue for Iloikop being part of Maasai or vice versa,” Waller recently
wrote, cautioning that he suspected “the distinction between Iloikop and Maasai, losers
and winners, is in some way ex post facto to make sense of a much more complicated
series of local scale conflicts.”57 Overall, Berntsen and Waller did much to restore an
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appreciation of the Krapf-Rebmann-Erhardt material, and to sort out many of the
confused aspects of 19th-century Maasai and Loikop history.  Yet they both persisted in
maintaining the inverted order of social groupings, in which the Loikop are seen as a
subgroup of an overarching “Ol Maa” family, rather than vice versa.  “The Maasai
community,” as Waller wrote, “for part of the nineteenth century at least, also included
the Iloikop.”58 However, our reading of the early missionary sources indicates that the
Maasai sections were originally but one part of a wider Loikop community, a viewpoint
that is stated clearly and consistently by the early missionary observers.
In reviving the question of the place of Loikop in East African history, we will
have to overcome a a well-established notion among scholars that the issue is more or
less dead and not worth reviving. On one hand there is a persistent feeling that the
evidence is simply too thin to make the case either way. “The Iloikop themselves remain
shadowy figures,” in Waller’s words, “hardly more than a list of names and associations,
to be filled out by inferences rather than by facts. ... most of our information now comes
indirectly through the eyes of their conquerors and from the reports of European
travellers.”59 Leaving aside the fact that it is unfair to designate as “travellers” men who
lived in East Africa for more than a decade, it is clear that many basic points about
Loikop society need not be inferred at all, since the missionaries devoted considerable
time to writing them out in clear and careful detail. On the other hand, there is a suspicion
that, in Waller’s words again, “the ‘Iloikop,’ as such were a myth, created out of the need
of the pastoral community to maintain its boundaries and given substance by changes in
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the economic status of particular Maa-speaking groups.”60 Perhaps the long history of
confusion and misdirection regarding differences between Maasai and Loikop has left
scholars with the feeling that the issue is simply too messy to sort out. When Berntsen
and Waller (not to mention Fosbrooke) successfully laid to rest the false
pastoralist/agriculturalist dichotomy, there may have been a sense that it was acceptable
also to discard the question of who, exactly, the Loikop were. For example, in their
otherwise excellent Being Maasai, Spear and Waller actually refer to the Loikop question
as a “much debated non-issue.”61 This attitude does a great disservice to Krapf, Rebmann,
and Erhardt, who despite their flaws, nonetheless took great care in compiling their
information. In the absence of any compelling reason to ignore the records left by the
early missionaries, any scholar who aims to develop an accurate understanding of the
history of East African pastoralists should take these sources seriously. With this in mind,
we should take it as a worthwhile exercise to reconsider the existence and importance of
an early nineteenth-century society called Loikop.
A Word in Time: The Meaning and Evolution of Loikop
In many ways, this issue turns on the meaning of a single word: Loikop. Scholars
have attempted to trace, and have often disagreed about, what this word has meant at any
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given time during the past two hundred years. While the fact that Maasai and Wakwavi
once called themselves Loikop has been underemphasized by modern scholars, it remains
a key piece of evidence. A key factor in considering Loikop (and other related terms) is
that they have been “in motion” since they were first put to paper; in other words, the
early missionaries captured these terms at a particular point in their development, and
later writers have considered them when they had evolved quite different meanings.62
Many writers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries simply disregarded
the definitions provided by Krapf and his colleagues, because they seemed to
incongruous with received wisdom or apparent realities. Berntsen and Waller, while more
attentive to the early missionary sources, nonetheless also disagreed with the early
definition of Loikop, albeit for different reasons. Berntsen, after conferring with his
Maasai informants, rejected the idea that “Wakwavi” was derived from “Loikop” and
concluded that iloikop was not ever really a term of self-identification, but had always
been associated with its present-day connotation of murder and blood-guilt. Waller, on
the other hand, accepted the notion that Wakwavi derived from loo nkuapi, which he
translated as “people of other places,” but still felt that it had not been a term of ethnic
self-identification. Rather, Waller speculated that it was a generic word used to refer to
other, neighboring sections or communities. I argue that both Berntsen and Waller failed
to appreciate the weight of evidence, not to mention the sheer explanatory sensibility,
supporting the definition provided by Krapf and his colleagues. There is an array of
complementary evidence, from earlier and later sources, to support their observations.
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The definition of Loikop used by Krapf and his colleagues during the 1840s and
1850s appears clear-cut. The basic scheme was as follows:  Loikop was the name by
which the entire network of pastoralist communities, inclusive of Maasai and “Wakuafi,”
referred to themselves. Loikop was an abbreviation of the word engob (land or country)
combined with the article loi.  The word Loikop would then be defined, according to
Krapf, as “possessors of the land, similar to the Greek word autochthonos, aborigines,
primeval inhabitants.”63 The Loikop language was called enguduk iloikop, the word
enguduk meaning “mouth” or “entrance.” All sections of Loikop (including Maasai)
spoke this language, with only slight variations.64 Each group also referred to their
common language as enguduk iloikop, the “mouth” (language) of the Loikop.65  Maasai
and “Wakuafi” both referred to themselves as Loikop, and Krapf believed that the
Swahili name “Wakwavi” derived from -kwapi, a Swahili pronunciation of -kop, the root
of the contraction “Loikop.” Krapf suggested that both “Wakwavi” and “Maasai” were
names given to their respective communities by Swahili-speakers from the coast.66 The
name Wakuafi was simply a Swahili variant, and was only used on the coast.67 (It is
worth noting that some contemporaries of the early missionaries, such as Richard Burton,
found this explanation of the derivation of “Wakuafi” to be sensible.)68 The missionaries
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used this model consistently throughout their written work. On a map drawn in the 1850s,
Erhardt labelled their country as “Iloigob (the land of the Masai and Wakuafi).”69 Krapf
listed the Loikop language in the index to his Travels as the overarching tongue
encompassing both “Wakuafi” and Maasai dialects, as represented by their
complementary published vocabularies.70
Berntsen dismissed the assertion made by Krapf, Erhardt, and others, that 19th-
century Maasai and “Kwavi” pastoralists in fact called themselves Loikop. He concluded
that the word “Kwavi” did not derive from the word iloikop, which he translated as
“murder.”  Berntsen felt that iloikop would have been a term used to refer
contemptuously to a person or group that has committed violence within the community,
rather than as a term of self-identification.71 “Particular examples of the use of Iloikop,”
Berntsen wrote, “imply a status of power and prestige in relation to the users: the pastoral
Maasai as a group are ‘Iloikop’ to all those groups, including other pastoral Maa-speakers
such as the Parakuyu, who have not successfully defended themselves against Maasai
raiders.”72 Waller added context to this argument by noting that in twentieth century
Maasai communities, iloikop was used as a term contrary to osotua, a word used to
describe good relations and cooperation within Maasai communities. When one Maasai
killed another, payment of cattle was required as compensation (inkishu l’oo iloikop).
“Groups which refuse to recognise this obligation,” Waller wrote, “and so repudiate
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osotua, ‘have bloodguilt’ and could be termed Iloikop.” Waller noted that this agreed
with Jacobs’ view of the Loikop wars, since in the Maasai view, other (Loikop) groups
were the ones who “broke osotua” with their aggressive behavior.73 Richard Waller has
raised a different objection to the early missionary definition of Loikop. Waller readily
acknowledged that the early missionary sources state that both Maasai and Wakuafi
called themselves Loikop, but felt compelled to explain the incongruity away with a bit
of speculative logic. Apparently with help from anthropologist Paul Spencer, Waller
suggested that a better translation of loo nkuapi (the words from which the contraction
Loikop is derived) would be “people of other places.” The implication is that one would
have used this term to refer to members of other (presumably related, pastoralist) groups,
and Waller notes that this use of Loikop would not have carried negative connotations.74
We have no problem admitting that the word might have been used this way in recent
times, but the nineteenth century evidence is clear that Loikop was a term of self-
identification until it was superseded by Maasai ethnic dominance. Further, Waller’s only
bit of evidence to support the “other places” suggestion is that loo nkuapi is “a phrase still
used by the Maasai to refer generally to members of other sections.”75
The objections raised by Berntsen and Waller to the early missionary definition of
Loikop are basically arguments in reverse, using post-1880 examples to argue for pre-
1880 history. But because the word iloikop evolved new meanings and nuances during
the nineteenth century, historians should first give close attention to any available sources
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from earlier years. For example, we should examine written documents that predate the
arrival of Krapf in 1843. There is a substantial written record of the Portuguese period in
East Africa, but as far as anyone knows, none of it mentions Loikop or Maasai. Likewise,
the written chronicles of the Swahili city-states on the coast do not provide information
relevant to this question. But between 1811 and 1844, there are a handful of documents
that mention Loikop (as Wakwavi), and it is important to note that none of them mention
Maasai.  In 1811, Captain Smee, sailing along the East African coast, wrote of the
“Maquafees,” who lived inland from Mombasa.  Smee noted that these people built only
temporary residences, and that they offered to trade ivory, rhino horns, amber, and goats,
in exchange for cloth, copper wire, and iron.  In 1823, a German officer made a
reconnaissance trip to Pongwe, near Wasini Island, south of Mombasa.  His report,
recounted in a travelogue by Thomas Boteler in 1835, noted that the fence surrounding
the town had been built to “keep off the Quavas … who at times are in the habit of
quitting their native inland territory in great numbers to plunder the more peacable
inhabitants of the sea-coast.” 76 The fact that Smee, Boteler, and Krapf (during his first
two years in East Africa) specifically refer to Wakwavi, and not Maasai, is significant.  It
can hardly be coincidence that three independent sources visiting the East African coast,
during a span of more than thirty years, did not record even the name Maasai, but did
record the name and a few ethnographic details of Wakwavi.  The implication can hardly
be missed: Maasai were not a widely known group until the mid-1840s, but Wakwavi
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(Loikop) were. It might be objected here that Krapf did not record the word Loikop until
1852, six years after he recorded the word Maasai (and eight years after he first recorded
the word Wakwavi).  However, as Krapf and others firmly maintained, the name
Wakwavi was the Swahili variant of the name Loikop; it simply took him a few years to
discover what Loikop people called themselves.
In fact, most of the neighboring societies of East Africa also referred to Loikop
(including Maasai) by some variant of their self-chosen name, using words based on the
roots kop, kob, kor, kap or kuap. Bantu-speaking peoples living west and east of the Rift
Valley areas occupied by Loikop used varying forms of kabi or kwavi. The Swahili, of
course, used Wakwavi, as did other groups along the coast and its hinterland. The Kamba
and Kikuyu referred to Maasai as Akabi (well into the twentieth century).77  To the west,
Bantu-speaking Luyia and Kuria also used forms of kabi. Berntsen has suggested that
during the nineteenth century, all Bantu-speakers in present-day Kenya probably used
variants of kwavi or kabi. During my own research in 2003-2004, I was informed
separately by friends from Pare and Chagga (Bantu-speaking) ethnic groups that in their
own languages, they still use forms of kwavi to refer to both Maasai and Parakuyo. “They
are all Kwavi to us,” one Pare friend informed me. In the area of present-day Kenya, this
pattern was maintained. Von Hohnel, accompanying an expedition in northern Kenya in
1887, found that the people of Laikipia (itself a term most likely derived from the same
roots) were called “Leukop,” obviously a German phonetic spelling of Loikop.78 In a
1930 article, G. W. B. Huntingford listed the names for Maasai in six languages from
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northwestern Kenya:  Nandi called them Ipuap, Keyu called them Kipkop, Kony called
them Ipkop, Sapei called them Kipkobis, and Torobo called them Ipkwap (only one
group, Suk, called them Maasai).  Huntingford recognized that these names probably
“derived from the same source as the Swahili term for Masae, Wakwavi.”79 Samburu
people of northern Kenya still refer to themselves as Loikop today, and consider it to be
their “original” name. Rendille camel keepers, who lived in close alliance with Samburu,
used Lokkob to refer to any cattle-keeping people.80 To the northeast, Oromo (“Galla”)
and other peoples referred to all Loikop (and Maasai) people as Kore.81
The pattern did not hold to the south of Loikop territory, in present-day central
Tanzania, where Loikop were known to their Bantu-speaking neighbors as Ilumbua (“the
well-diggers”), because Loikop occupied the dry steppes dotted with ancient wells. Krapf
noted that the “Wakuafi [were] called Wahumba in the language of Uniamesi,” referring
to the Bantu-speaking communities of present-day central and western Tanzania.82 Like
other related terms, Lumbwa would later become a pejorative bearing a vague
connotation of degrading agricultural work, but there is little doubt that during most of
the nineteenth century it simply referred to Loikop pastoralists. Richard Burton, traveling
through central Tanzania in mid-century, noted that the Wahumba were pastoralists who
“stain their garments with ochreish earth,” despised vegetable foods, and fought with
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spears, long daggers and clubs.83 Maasai pushing south in the mid-nineteenth century
often were seen as another group of Ilumbua by these central Tanzanian societies. As the
years wore on, Maasai began to refer to themselves as such, specifically to distinguish
themselves from the other Loikop groups. Neighboring societies probably adopted the
term Maasai because of the readily apparent fact that Maasai had distinguished
themselves by crushing other Loikop sections, and sending the survivors fleeing into the
midst of these Bantu-speaking agricultural groups. In documents written by J. T. Last and
other observers in central Tanganyika during the late nineteenth century, then, the term
Wahumba often was used to describe the (Loikop) pastoralists who lived close to, or even
among, agricultural peoples, while the term Maasai was reserved for the more dominant
people who now controlled the steppe lands and important wells.
As might be expected of an aggressively expansionist faction, Maasai invented a
variety of disparaging terms for other Loikop sections, whom they now considered
socially inferior. The most common slur, recorded by the early missionaries as well as
later writers, was embarawuio, created by adding a feminine article to the Parakuyo
section name.84 Probably applied only to people of the Parakuyo section in the mid-
nineteenth century, by the end of the century it was being applied indiscriminately by
Maasai to any Loikop peoples not yet under the sway of the Maasai, including members
of the resurgent Loikop confederation centered at Laikipia, which was defeated in 1875.
By the 1880s, Maasai also used Humba or Lumbwa as an insulting designation for other
                                                 
83 Burton, The Lake Regions of Central Africa (London: Longmans, 1860), 312.
84 Krapf, journal entry, 18 March 1852, CA5/O16, CMS; Krapf, Travels, 564; Erhardt,
Vocabulary, 57; Johnston, Kilima-Njaro, 407, 213.
83
Loikop groups.85 Most of these defeated groups had increased their reliance on
agricultural products out of necessity after Maasai took their cattle, so the designation
Lumbwa (not to mention Loikop and Kwavi) gradually picked up a connotation of
degrading agricultural subsistence (in the Maasai view). This association with farming
was in turn recorded by European observers of the late nineteenth century, and led to a
great deal of confusion in the historiography. It is also worth noting, from a concerned
historian’s perspective, that some of the later “ethnic” designations used by Maasai to
refer to their former Loikop enemies might well be invented slurs. For example, Maasai
traditions describe a series of conflicts with “Loogolala,” an Loikop group, in northern
Tanzania. However, Krapf and his colleagues do not mention Loogolala in their lists of
Loikop sections. Richard Waller has pointed out that Loogolala, which can be translated
as “people of the hard teeth,” is most likely a term of insult, “since it carries overtones of
gluttony,” and has cautioned that “it may not be the word which the ‘Loikop’ group used
of itself.”86
Just as changing circumstances led to changes in the use and connotations of the
terms Parakuyo and Wahumba, so too did the meaning of Loikop change. Berntsen, in
dismissing the early missionaries’ definition of Loikop, did not adequately trace the
historical development of his preferred definition of Loikop as “murder” or “blood
payment.” It is important to note that Krapf and Erhardt do not list murder or violence
among the meanings of Loikop in their vocabularies. To my knowledge, the earliest
recorded instance of this definition comes from the turn of the century, when Hollis used
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it in a journal article, and then again in his book on Maasai.87 Merker also mentions this
definition in his book.88 It seems a reasonable hypothesis that this use of the term
developed at the end of the nineteenth century. If this is indeed the case, then it is telling
that the association of the term Loikop with violence comes from a period after the end of
major conflict between Maasai and other Loikop sections; after Maasai ethnicity
superseded Loikop; after a devastating “triple disaster” of epidemics had severely tested
pastoralist social cohesion; and during a time when inter-Maasai relations had broken
down and serious fighting had begun between Maasai groups. Further, Berntsen did not
explore the implications of his own explanation that the word today is not a direct
equivalent for murder, but rather also signifies bloodwealth, the social ramifications and
consequences of violence, cultural prohibitions and prescriptions in the event of violence,
and a general sense of “taboo.”  In other words, the term iloikop today has connotations
of fighting that tears at the social fabric, not an unexpected development if in fact the
non-Maasai Loikop sections had been violently displaced by the expanding Maasai
sections, and then demoted to inferior social status. The hypothesis that equating iloikop
with “murder” was a later development can be supported by the evidence that there is, in
fact, a more straightforward word in Maa for murder: aar, which means “to beat, to kill.”
As would be expected, this root forms several related words, such as aa-ara, “to fight
(each other),” en-ara, “battle,” and ol-arani, “killer, murderer.”89
On a related note, Waller’s suggestion that Loikop would have been used in the
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nineteenth century to refer to other, presumably aggressive, sections of pastoralists, can
also be countered with a term that was certainly in widespread use during the Maasai
expansion. While the missionary sources state clearly that Loikop was a term of self-
designation, they also state just as clearly that the word used to refer to enemy pastoralist
groups (especially other Loikop groups) was Ilmangati, which Erhardt defined as “any
person of whom one has reason to be afraid – enemy.”90 The missionary sources make
clear that this term was used both by Maasai in reference to other Loikop groups, and
vice versa. Waller himself admits that his Maasai informants “do not refer to other Maa-
speakers collectively or individually as Iloikop.”91
Finally, we should consider the implications of the fact that the modern Maasai
oral traditions collected by Berntsen and Waller do not use the word Loikop to refer to
their nineteenth-century enemies. “Maasai informants,” Berntsen noted, “always
identified their enemies by a particular group – Il Parakuyu or Ilumbwa, Ilaikipiak,
Iloogolala, Il Uas Nkishu, Il Siria – thereby recognizing each of them as a distinct enemy
in time and place, and not an amorphous common enemy vaguely and routinely
defeated.”92 Waller noticed the same phenomenon: “Maasai do not refer to other Maa-
speakers collectively or individually as Iloikop. Instead, they refer to them either
specifically by name - Ilaikipia, Iloogolala, and so on - or generally by one of a number
                                                 
90 Johann Erhardt, Vocabulary of the Enguduk Iloigob, as Spoken by the Masai-Tribes in
East Africa (Ludwigsburg:  Ferdinand Riehm, 1857), 47-48; see also Erhardt, journal
entry, 1 May 1854, CA5/O9, CMS; Krapf, journal entry, 18 March 1852, CA5/O16,
CMS; Krapf, Travels, 564.
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of insulting epithets - Ilumbwa (well diggers), Mbarawuio, for instance.”93 Note that at
least a few of the “specific” names applied by modern Maasai to their past enemies
(Loogolala, for example) are most likely designations invented after the fact. Since at
least the time of Fosbrooke, scholars have noted that Maasai oral tradition is infused with
creative retellings, especially when referring to times more remote than the lifetime of the
informant’s grandfather. Conceptions of the past, and especially of the moral lessons of
the past, were almost certainly modified to meet the needs of the present day, and
dissonant memories or transmitted information were likely changed or ignored, or
perhaps more often simply considered unimportant. Incongruous facts, in the context of a
society’s use of oral tradition, really don’t matter all that much.
This dissonance, and the lack of concern it arouses among Maasai and Parakuyo,
can easily be seen today. One well-respected Maasai (not Parakuyo) friend, after insisting
that iloikop has always meant murder to Kisongo Maasai – specifically, he said, the
payment of 49 cows in compensation for murder – added that long ago Parakuyo and
other groups called themselves Loikop, and that for them the word had a different
meaning. Also, he said, Parakuyo and Samburu had once lived together, and their
“original” name was Lumbwa. Note that my friend’s statement incorporates, in a
piecemeal fashion, many of the terms and issues considered above. I was intrigued by his
statements about Loikop, since he had previously informed me that Parakuyo and Maasai
were identical in all but name, coming from one “father.” How, then, could two radically
different definitions of such an important term have been in play, in identical societies, at
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the same time? My friend simply shrugged as if it didn’t matter – and, of course, in a
modern Maasai social context, it doesn’t.94 What matters is that the moral lessons of
iloikop in today’s society are clear to the people who use this new definition. In a
scholarly context, however, this dissonance is unacceptable.
The current definition of Loikop, influential and widespread as it may be, simply
doesn’t agree with the nineteenth-century evidence available to historians. The evidence
clearly indicates that Loikop was a term of ethnic self-designation, and meant “the people
who live in this country.” Further, it is indicative of the powerful cultural and military
influence of Loikop pastoralists that neighboring peoples referred to them by their own
self-chosen name. These are not merely obscure historical points. If there was indeed a
broad society of Loikop pastoralists, which encompassed both Maasai and other “Maa-
speaking” sections, then this fact would have considerable implications for our view of
East African ethnic and social history in general, and more specifically, for our view of
Maasai “origins” and expansion. At the least, we might reconsider our use of the term
“Maa-speaking peoples” when referring to years prior to the late nineteenth century. But
most importantly, we should give serious consideration to the possibility that Maasai, as
such, did not exist before the nineteenth century, and that Maasai did not migrate as a
corporate body from the north, but built themselves from within the Loikop heartland
(most likely in present-day north-central Tanzania). A detailed narrative of these events
will be presented in the next chapter, but for our purposes here, we should conclude with
a brief survey of the stereotypes of Maasai history prevalent in both scholarly and popular
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media, and the ways in which a reconsideration of Maasai and Loikop history might
debunk some of these widespread assumptions.
Conclusion: Maasai History in a Loikop Context
The evidence presented in this chapter strongly indicates that Loikop pastoralists
were dominant, widespread, and well-known in East Africa at the dawn of the nineteenth
century. During the early part of the century, a few communities of Loikop realigned
themselves and turned against the other Loikop sections in a bid for expansion. Through
a decades-long process detailed in the next chapter, the insurgents, who came to be
known as Maasai, obliterated or absorbed several sections of Loikop, and the idea of
“being Maasai” superseded the idea of being Loikop. Parakuyo managed to survive
relatively intact, thanks in large part to the protection of the Shambaa kingdom. A few
other surviving Loikop communities also maintained a sense of independence, including
Njemps, Taveta, Arusha, and Samburu. These isolated communities gradually lost any
notion of Loikop identity, with the notable exception of Samburu. The decline of Loikop
identity was roughly co-terminous with the rise of Maasai identity. As noted above,
Krapf was the first to record the word Maasai, in 1844. A few remarks in nineteenth-
century documents suggest that the word might have been invented by Swahili traders,
and Krapf himself was of this opinion, although he was unable to offer much detail.95
Some writers have suggested that Swahili traders might have named them based on the
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Maa word for beads, o-saei, but to date there is no consensus (and hardly any evidence)
on where the word comes from. Regardless of the source of the term, however, it seems
clear that the word Maasai came into widespread use only during the nineteenth
century.96
The idea of “being Maasai,” then, is of relatively recent invention, dating back no
more than two hundred years. This runs directly counter to a persistent, widespread, and
utterly ahistorical notion in both academic and popular media that Maasai represent some
sort of essential, primeval African archetype. Given the long history of romanticism
associated with Maasai by colonial writers and those who profit from colonial nostalgia,
the strength of this image in popular culture is perhaps understandable. But scholars have
aided and abetted it, for reasons that might have roots in the nationalist historiography of
the independence era. Perhaps feeling pressure to find long-standing, heroic nations in the
African past, writers have often projected Maasai ethnic concepts five hundred or more
years backwards, based on little if any evidence. Historical linguists have added a veneer
of respectability to this practice by using the term “proto-Maa” to refer to reconstructed
linguistic antecedents, and historians have in turn used the term “proto-Maasai” when
referring to hypothetical migrations from the north and northwest.
Historians and anthropologists, notably Alan Jacobs and Peter Rigby, have also
flirted with a reference to ancient pastoralists published in Duyvendak’s China’s
Discovery of Africa, published in 1949. Duyvendak included a translated ninth-century
description of the inhabitants of “Po-pa-li,” whose people lived on blood and milk from
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cattle. “Whether they were, in fact, Maasai or precursors of Maasai remains a moot
point,” Jacobs wrote, somewhat disingenuously, before proceeding to speculate that they
were “remarkably similar” to present-day Maasai.97 There is, of course, absolutely no
reason to suspect that this document refers to Maasai or their ancestors, since pastoralism
and its attendant subsistence practices are hardly uncommon in East African history. Two
separate references from the Portuguese period, recorded by Monclaro in 1569 and Dos
Santos in the 1590s, state that “Mossegejo” people were living on blood mixed with
milk.98 In 1844, Krapf first mentioned a group of people not far from Mombasa who bled
their animals and drank the blood. He was referring not to Loikop or Maasai, but to
Oromo (“Galla”).99 The repeated speculation that the cattle-keepers of Po-pa-li were
Maasai, combined with the standard use of terms like “proto-Maasai” in the historical
literature, and the persistent model of migration that posits an extant Maasai ethnic group
migrating from the north before 1600, all combine to add pseudo-scholarly support to
popular misconceptions about the innate “primeval” nature of Maasai (and by inference,
African) identity and ethnicity.
The façade of scholarly corroboration allows non-specialist writers to weave
astounding flights of fancy into their ostensibly factual works. For example, Sonia
Bleeker, a popular author of anthropological books aimed at a young audience, showed
her manuscript on Maasai to Alan Jacobs for review and criticism. Tellingly, the book,
published in 1963, contains this eye-popping statement: “Scientists today think the Masai
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have lived in Masailand for well over a thousand years.”100 This stereotyped view of
Maasai history is essentially inert, and does little to enlighten us about East African
history. Again, the issue is not merely an obscure academic debate. It is important,
because if the evidence presented in this chapter is correct, the existence of a widespread
Loikop society points to an underappreciated level of dynamic change and development
in East African ethnic, political, ecological, and military history. The material presented
in this chapter requires a difficult rethinking of East African history, to be sure, but it also
opens up several interesting lines of inquiry. As we will see in the next chapter, the
definition of Loikop provided by the early missionary sources has the advantage, not only
of using evidence in a better way, but also of giving Maasai (and Parakuyo) direct
historical antecedents, providing a logical spatial and temporal frame for Maasai
emergence and expansion, and fitting well with regional historical developments.
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Chapter 3
Scatterlings of East Africa:
Maasai Expansion and the Decline of Loikop Society
This chapter provides a narrative history of the decline of Loikop pastoralists in
East Africa from c.1800 to c.1880, and attempts to explain how Maasai society emerged
from within, and then aggressively dismantled, Loikop society. Loikop pastoralists were
part of the broad stream of Nilotic-speaking people that have been moving southwards
from southern Sudan into the East African Rift Valley for several centuries. As they
migrated through the area west of Lake Turkana and onto the highland plateaus of
Laikipia and Uasin Gishu, Loikop developed a specialized pastoralist form of
subsistence, along with a social system based on age-set organization. By the nineteenth
century, Loikop society had developed into a network of independent sections that
occupied vast grazing areas as far south as the “Maasai” Steppe. These sections practiced
a formidable style of raiding warfare, against both other Loikop sections and their non-
Loikop neighbors. Sometime around 1800, a group of Loikop sections aligned
themselves under the religious leadership of Supeet, part of a new line of prophet-
diviners called oloibonok. These sections, who came to be known as Maasai, refined their
age-set organization to provide expanded military capabilities, and under Supeet’s
guidance began to expand dramatically at the expense of their Loikop relatives. Between
c.1825 and 1875, Maasai sections fought and won a series of large-scale conflicts against
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other Loikop sections, in the process demolishing any notion of a viable Loikop society.
Defeated Loikop individuals and communities were forced to join the growing Maasai
social structure, seek refuge in agricultural “oasis” communities, or serve as mercenaries
for various non-Loikop military leaders. Only two Loikop sections, Parakuyo and
Sampur, managed to survive the Maasai-Loikop Wars as intact pastoralist communities.
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, Maasai and many outside observers began
to think of all non-Maasai Loikop communities as socially inferior sub-sets of the
dominant Maasai society.
Loikop Pastoralists of East Africa
By the early nineteenth century, Loikop pastoralists lived in perhaps a dozen
independent sections across East Africa, from Lake Turkana in the north to the “Maasai”
Steppe in the south. Maasai society today is still made up of these sections, called
iloshon, and it has been well documented that their constitution can change dramatically
over time; sections of both Loikop and Maasai have been known to disappear entirely, or
fall apart only to regroup at a later date. Further, it seems quite common for there to be
sub- and super-sections which absorb, overlap, or exclude the other sectional levels over
time.  Rather than adhere to a strict definition of the sectional form of social organization,
then, it seems best to heed Fosbrooke’s explanation that “a section is in the first place a
fortuitous grouping of individuals,” constantly engaged in the twin processes of forming
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and dividing.1  At the dawn of the nineteenth century, Loikop groups in the north
included Laikipiak and Burkeneji, as well as a cluster of lesser-known sections around
Lake Naivasha and Lake Nakuru that included Dikirri, Tigerei, Momonyot, and perhaps a
section known as Kopekope. The Burkeneji section probably did not crystallize until the
early 1800s, and was comprised mostly of the “Kor” section displaced by Turkana from
the western side of Lake Turkana, with additional refugees from the dispersed Siger.
Burkeneji were perhaps the most independent of the Loikop sections. They lived in
alliance with Cushitic-speaking Boran and Rendille, who herded camels, in an area
known as Sampur (which means “butterfly” in the Loikop language, and later became the
standard ethnonym for Burkeneji). Interestingly, multiple nineteenth century sources
reported that Sampur was famous for its horses and skilled riders (although Burkeneji did
not share this avocation). Both the Sampur and Laikipia countries were favorite
destinations of caravans, not only from the Zanzibar coast, but also from Brava on the
Somali coast. In fact, the missionary Johann Krapf first learned of Loikop peoples
(specifically the Laikipia country) from the traders at Brava, before he arrived in
Zanzibar.2
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To the west and southwest of Laikipia lived the Uasin Gishu section, as well as
the smaller sections Loosekelai (probably formed in the early 1800s by Siger refugees),
Siria, Arinkon, and Tiamus. On the plains to the south of lakes Naivasha and Nakuru
lived the sections Taaramodoni, Ngwesi, Maramara, Kiringishu, and Kaputiei. Despite
the obscurity of the sections who lived there, this central area was clearly of crucial
importance to Loikop pastoralists. Mid-nineteenth century sources repeatedly cited
Kaputiei as the “country proper,” the “chief seat,” and the “native country” of all the
Loikop sections.3 Further, Loikop peoples looked to Mount Kenya (to the northeast of
Kaputiei), which they called Oldoinio Eibor (“white mountain”), as their primeval home,
and set most of their myths of origin there.4 In the southeast lived the powerful sections
Enkangelema and Parakuyo. Enkangelema lived on the broad plains north of the
Usambara mountains, while Parakuyo lived along the Pangani River and on the “Maasai”
Steppe. Richard Waller has argued that Parakuyo occupation of this area did not begin
until the 1830s, when, in his view, Parakuyo were driven southwards from Laikipia.
However, the persistence of Parakuyo in clinging to the area, as well as Krapf’s reference
to the “mighty tribe Barrabuyu,” which had never been moved from their Pangani
stronghold, indicates a period of habitation at least long enough to establish solid ties to
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the area.5 The southwest limit of Loikop occupation consisted of the newly-consolidating,
(proto-) Maasai sections.6 Since Krapf cited Enkanglema, Parakuyo, and “Kinongo” as
the three principal Loikop sections of Kaputiei, it seems possible that Kaputiei was in fact
a general term for all Loikop country south of Mount Kenya and north of Mount
Kilimanjaro; in any case, it is clear that Loikop individuals from these sections travelled
back and forth frequently, and not only in times of distress.
Independent though they were, Loikop pastoralists did constitute a single, if
loose-knit, society. Perhaps the most important element of Loikop society is that all
Loikop communities were fundamentally pastoralist in mode of subsistence. They relied
on their cattle-keeping skills for survival in relatively dry landscapes, paying close
attention to grazing conditions and the locations of lakes, rivers, and wells. Loikop
disdained agricultural labor, and it was reported that even Loikop slaves on the Swahili
coast could not be forced by their masters “to take the hoe and till the ground.”7 Loikop
communities often traded with their agriculturalist neighbors for millet, corn, and
bananas, but only women and children would eat them, not the ilmurran (warriors).8 In
addition to identical subsistence practices, Loikop pastoralists shared common cultural
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features and a probably a sense of “Iloikop-ness.” They spoke the same language.  They
believed in the same God, Engai.  They shared an origin myth, about a mysterious man
named Neiterukop who lived on Mount Kenya and fathered the first Iloikop. Krapf wrote
that Iloikop continued to think of Oldoinyo Eibor as the home of their ancestors, and to
make pilgrimages there to pray for rain, cattle, and health, calling on Neiterkob to
provide intercession between themselves and Engai (God).9 They used age-set structures
of social organization, with initiated young men serving as warriors (ilmurran), and
elders making political decisions.  They did not have chiefs or kings.  Importantly,
though, they did look to men with supernatural talents for guidance, especially
rainmakers called olkibroni and prophet-diviners called olaibonok. Political power in
Loikop communities was split between the influence of the elders and the laibon, who
according to Krapf “plans war or peace through divination.”10 The institution of prophet-
diviner may have been one of the contributions of Sirikwa to Loikop culture.11 Erhardt,
who translated laibon as “king,” wrote that their duties included rain-making and spiritual
protection for Iloikop warriors on raiding expeditions; if a laibon presided over three
consecutive losses on expeditions, he would be killed and replaced.12
Raiding warfare, against both other Loikop and non-Loikop communities, was a
regular feature of life in Loikop society. To maintain their pastoralist system, Loikop
(including Maasai) made frequent cattle raids, some of them involving long-distance
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strikes. Loikop ilmurran used throwing clubs, swords, spears, and shields.13 In addition to
small-scale cattle rustling, Loikop sections sometimes came into conflict on a larger
scale. Alliances formed and dissolved as ecological, economic, and social needs dictated.
Uasin Gishu, in alliance with Siria, fought against Loosekelai (who, as noted, probably
were connected with Siger).14 Laikipiak, in alliance with Momonyot and Ngwesi, fought
against Arinkon and Dikirri, and may have even dispersed or absorbed them.15 By the
mid-nineteenth century, Laikipiak were also coming into conflict with Burkeneji
(Sampur) to the north.16 In the southern reaches of Loikop occupation, the sections that
would later become Maasai were engaged in fairly intense struggles against other Loikop
sections. Early Maasai formation and expansion, in fact, took place within this context of
inter-Loikop pushing and shoving. Loikop raiding also had an impact on commercial
systems near the coast. Chagga, Kamba, Teita, and Usambara all engaged in sporadic
fights against Loikop pastoralists, as did the Swahili caravans that made their way to
Loikop country to trade for ivory and to buy slaves. Conflagrations between societies in
the interior and caravans in quest of slaves could sometimes escalate into large-scale
affairs involving thousands of fighters. Loikop slaves were especially prized on the coast,
so interactions between caravans and Loikop often walked a fine line between
cooperation and conflict. Although Swahili caravans were armed with muskets, Loikop
(and later, Maasai) ilmurran fought them by flattening themselves on the ground each
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time a volley was fired, and then leaping up and charging while their opponents were
reloading.17
Maasai Formation
Most academic writing has presented Maasai expansion in one of three basic
variations. One sees Maasai history in terms of a moving nucleus of “true Maasai”
pastoralist sections surrounded by various Maa-speaking communities that have blended
with other societies. The idea of “being Maasai” is often presented in this variation as
stretching back centuries and even millennia. The people we have referred to as Loikop
are seen, in this view, as later divisions or cast-offs from the dominant Maasai stream.  A
second posits that Maasai and Loikop represent two ancient, antagonistic streams of Maa-
speaking society, separated by subsistence strategies (this variation has sometimes been
referred to as the “Iloikop Hypothesis”). Maasai representing the specialized pastoralist
stream, and Loikop representing an agricultural or semi-agricultural stream. The third
variation largely forgoes any attempt to make clear statements about the period before c.
1850, but maintains the vague idea that whatever happened before that can be attributed
to Maa-speakers, and thus that there was a distinct “Maasai-ness” to whatever society
existed before.  We should note that these divergences in narrative structure were driven
to a great extent by the tenacious problem of how best to explain the existence of so
many “non-Maasai Maasai” groups: Parakuyo, Arusha, Sampur, and others, all of whom
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are sometimes referred to as “Kwavi.” There is, however, an older narrative variant of
Maasai and Loikop history that was shaped by contemporary observers, and solves the
“Kwavi problem” with a rather simple explanation. Maasai formation, in this view, can
be pinpointed to a relatively specific time and place, namely, the plains “southwest of
Chagga” (as resident missionary Johann Ludwig Krapf wrote several times) in the first
decades of the nineteenth century.  If this is correct, then all of the reliable evidence
should support a certain timeline that follows logically from this starting point.  In other
words, there should not be reliable evidence of “true Maasai” sections anachronistically
dispersing Loikop sections in central or northern Kenya before they even consolidate
their position in northern Tanzania. The available written sources and oral traditions do
appear to support the hypothesis that Maasai sections first began to distinguish
themselves from the broader Loikop society in the area “southwest of Chagga” and
expanded outward in several directions in a fairly logical geographical progression.
Despite a persistent notion that Maasai expansion somehow involved a
southward-driving movement, most of the available oral and documentary evidence
clearly indicates that Maasai formation took place in a relatively small area of what is
today north-central Tanzania and perhaps south-central Kenya, no earlier than the late
1700s. On one hand, there is no evidence that Maasai lived in the area today known as
Maasailand before the nineteenth century, a fact many scholars have taken as suggesting
that Maasai did indeed come from the north as an intact, migratory group.18 At the same
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time, however, almost all available evidence seems to point to c. 1800 (+/- 20 years) as
the “beginning of time” for the social institutions that formed the core of Maasai
distinctiveness. The first “Maasai” age-set is said to have been constituted at this time,
and scholars of Maasai oral history have noted that there are no specific traditions
relating to earlier periods. “The ‘historical’ laibons coincide with the beginning of
remembered age-sets,” Richard Waller concluded, “at a point c. 1800 which may indicate
a transition from ‘mythical’ to ‘historical’ time or linear reckoning in traditions.”19 And
as John Berntsen has noted, “Maasai traditions are very uninformative about events
between Kerio and the period when their datable oral history begins, about the 1820s.”20
This indicates that Maasai came into existence as a society in north-central Tanzania
sometime around 1800, then expanded outward in several directions. Contemporary
European observers from 1840-1850 stated repeatedly that the Maasai stronghold was
southwest and west of Kilimanjaro.21 By the 1860s the area northwest of Kilimanjaro was
added to this description, indicating northward expansion during this period.22 By these
mid-century years, Maasai looked to Oldoinyo Sambu, a volcanic mountain near the
Ngorongoro Highlands, as their spiritual center, while the rest of the Loikop sections still
considered Oldoinyo Eibor (Mount Kenya), far to the north, to be the destination of their
                                                 
19 Waller, “Lords of East Africa,” 197.
20 John Lawrence Berntsen, “Pastoralism, Raiding, and Prophets:  Maasailand in the
Nineteenth Century,” Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979, 26.
21 Krapf, Vocabulary, 24, 30; Krapf, journal entry, 20 July 1848, CA5/O16, CMS; Krapf
to Coates, 25 February 1846, CA5/O16, CMS; Rebmann, “Account of a Journey to
Madshame,” 1849, p. 12, CA5/O24, CMS.
22 Burton, Zanzibar: City, Island, and Coast (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1872 [New
York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967]), II, 72-73.
102
prayers for rain and cattle.23 The development of this north-south (Loikop-Maasai)
polarity in the mid-nineteenth century seems to preclude Maasai migration from the north
as an intact ethnic group, unless somehow they leapfrogged past other Loikop groups on
their way south. The hypothesis that Maasai formation took place in the region between
Kilimanjaro and the Ngorongoro Highlands is further supported by Maasai oral tradition,
which indicates that the earliest fighting took place against Tatog pastoralists around
Lake Manyara sometime around 1806-1821 (probably before the idea of “being Maasai”
had even developed), as well as other Loikop groups around Monduli and then Naberera
in the 1820s, when Maasai identity probably first crystallized.24
There is a logical progression in Maasai expansion. From about 1800-1820,
Loikop sections, including the communities that would become Maasai, were engaged in
intense fighting with their pastoralist Tatoga enemies around Lake Manyara. By the
1820s, faced with difficult geographical and ecological circumstances, they aligned
themselves with the Enkidongi laibon, Supeet, and formed a distinct ethnic group by
separating themselves, sometimes violently, from the other Loikop families and
communities in their midst (who refused to follow Supeet, and who they now remember
disparagingly as “Iloogolala” – a term also used somewhat indiscriminately for other
Loikop opponents). With Supeet’s guidance, these communities refined their age-set
system and military tactics, developing their own distinct cultural symbols and a
heightened, chauvinistic sense of pastoralist entitlement. Between 1830-1860, after a
severe drought provided the pretext for widespread cattle raids, these insurgent sections
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pushed east into the Maasai Steppe as far as Kibaya, west onto the Ngorongoro
Highlands and Serengeti Plains, and north as far as Lake Naivasha. In the course of these
successful military adventures, the insurgents became known as Maasai, news of their
prowess spread across the region, and the sense of distinct ethnic identity crystallized.
Their erstwhile Loikop relatives, caught offguard and lacking any real sense of cohesion
themselves, could do little to stop Maasai expansion. At this point, the death of Supeet
and the formation of a resurgent Laikipiak alliance left matters at something of a
stalemate, until the early 1870s, when Laikipiak and Maasai fought a series of relatively
large-scale conflicts in the Lake Naivasha-Lake Nakuru corridor that ended with
Laikipiak effectively defeated, and the last vestige of Loikop pastoralist identity
essentially subsumed by Maasai. As John Sutton has noted, this dramatic expansion
relied on military skill, the refinement (or “formalization”) of age-sets, and the rapid
development of a “self-conscious ethnicity.”25 There can be little doubt that in addition to
these factors, despite the reluctance of some scholars to admit it, the rise of powerful
prophet-diviners played a crucial role in Maasai expansion.
During the formative years between 1800 and 1820, the sections of Loikop who
later became known as Maasai threw their allegiance behind the Enkidongi family of
prophet-diviners (ilaibonak), one of many such religious figures constantly vying for
followers among Loikop (and other Rift Valley) communities. The Enkidongi laibon
Supeet outdid his rivals, however, in using his position to create an outward-looking,
vigorous military machine. Some scholars have gone to great lengths to argue that
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prophet-diviners did not play a centralizing role in Maasai (or Loikop) society, claiming
that laibons were simply “medicine men” whose prominent place and legendary feats
recorded in oral tradition serves as a useful mnemonic device, rather than a historically
accurate narrative. For example, in Maasai oral tradtion, Supeet is said to have recalled
companies of stray Maasai warriors from Gogo, and moved Arusha to the area around
Mount Meru specifically to grow tobacco and dig water furrows for him, while his
successor Mbatian is said to have called up the southern sections of Maasai to fight
Laikipiak in the 1870s, and then ordered his followers not to resist European conquest.26
And as Richard Waller has noted, the wars of the nineteenth-century are inscribed in oral
tradition as “a series of magical contests between rival laibons.”27 The combined weight
of evidence tilts strongly towards the conclusion that laibons did indeed play a strong,
central role in Maasai expansion. Perhaps the problem has been a concern with portraying
prophet-diviners as incipient political authorities, or even incipient warrior-kings. This
indeed would be a misleading characterization, although it is worth noting that
contemporary nineteenth-century observers regularly referred to the paramount laibon
Supeet as a “king” or “sultan.”28 Rather, it is more useful to think of laibons as
centralizing religious authorities, who used their influence to coordinate military
expeditions. The success or failure of a particular laibon depended on his ability to
convincingly demonstrate his prophetic skills in practical situations, and for the
Enkidongi laibon, these situations were often military in nature. The powerful emotional
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pull of the laibon as an individual can hardly be doubted: during emutai, the disastrous
wave of cattle and human disease that swept East Africa in the 1880s and 1890s, explorer
Joseph Thomson witnessed Maasai praying directly to the paramount laibon Mbatian
(Supeet’s successor) for divine assistance.29
The rise of Enkidongi laibon Supeet signalled a subtle but important shift in the
spheres of political influence available to different members of Loikop communities.
Laibons had three main functions in Loikop society: 1) to dispense magic charms for
cattle raids; 2) to supervise and bless age-set ceremonies; and 3) to give charms for
fertility, to cure disease, and to promote rainfall.30 During the early 19th century, the
majority of Loikop laibons may have come from the Kiporon sub-clan, whose members
focused chiefly on rain-making and ritual expertise (the word olkibroni, in fact, is
equivalent to rain-maker and ritual expert). “There are many Leibonok,” Krapf wrote of
Loikop religious leaders, “but he who surpasses all of them, is the Olkibroni.”31 It is
worth noting that Krapf’s informant came from the Enkangelema section of Loikop, who
did not follow the Maasai (Enkidongi) laibon. Oral tradition suggests that major laibons
were found in each region of Loikop occupation, such as Uas Nkishu, “Iloogolala,”
Parakuyo, and Laikipiak. Richard Waller has suggested that periods of intense warfare
increased the demand for laibon services. As noted above, it seems likely that the sections
which later formed the nucleus of an emergent Maasai society were mired in fairly
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intense conflicts at the turn of the century, fighting formidable Tatoga enemies to the
south as well as Loikop rivals to the north and west. In times of conflict, it seems likely
that people would look for religious advantage in warfare, and indeed, Supeet and the
Enkidongi laibon lineage were particularly associated with raiding and warfare. Using the
divining horn (enkidong) from which his lineage took its name, Supeet used stone-casting
in addition to his prophetic visions, perhaps an innovation that impressed clients eager to
gain any advantage. Supeet used his powers to cast spells on enemies, but more
importantly, to offer advice as to the most fortuitous time and place for attack. Maasai
think of raiding warfare as occuring in two distinct types: minor raids (oluamba) and
major raids (olorara). The names oluamba and olorara also refer to companies of
ilmurran in combat mode, with corresponding differences in size. Oral tradition clearly
associates Supeet and the Enkidongi laibons with olorara, the large-scale type of
warfare.32 With his innovative combination of skills, Supeet most likely appeared more
effective than other laibons (and olkibroni), who did not match his skill in pursuing an
aggressive agenda.33
Coinciding with the consolidation of (proto-)Maasai communities under Supeet’s
guidance, these sections of Loikop also made sophisticated adjustments to their age-set
systems specifically in order to facilitate military organization. Loikop were only one
among many East African societies to shape male life cycles in terms of age-sets. But as
Lamphear has noted, age-sets do not perform well as parts of a broader military structure
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unless there is some degree of effective political centralization.34 Supeet almost certainly
provided this central figure, in a way that other Loikop sections lacked, at least until the
emergence of the Laikipiak federation led by Koikote in the 1860s. Waller and other
scholars have noted that age-sets, and military organization in general, are more
sophisticated in Maasai society than in (other) Loikop societies.35 In practical terms,
Loikop sections almost certainly thought of the initiation period basically as a single
ritual process, incorporating all of the young men of a loosely defined span of years into
the same age-set. The sections that consolidated under Supeet, on the other hand, began
to use a clearly defined dual age-set structure in which young men were initiated in
strictly maintained intervals of eight years, forming an opposing right-hand and left-hand
sub-set for each age-set.36 Whereas most Loikop sections tended to emphasize a binary
relationship (and tension) between elders and ilmurran, the new Maasai system placed
the emphasis on relations (and tensions) both between and within age-sets.37 This refined
system, carried out at a local level for basic initiation and then progressing to society-
wide rituals for the transition from warriorhood to junior elderhood, provided a more
efficient command structure and the ability to combine or separate military units as
needed. After initiation, the ilmurran were divided into companies (isirit) that lived in
their own barracks (emanyatta). Among Loikop sections, manyattas tended to be formed
on a clan basis, but with the aggressively expanding Maasai system, manyattas mixed
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clan members, promoting an allegiance beyond kinship ties to a wider ethnic and military
cause.38
The combination of prophetic military leadership and refined military
organization made for a very effective fighting force, especially when used against other
cattle-keeping peoples who had not yet made these adjustments. When planning a raid,
deputations of ilaigwenanak (age-set spokesmen) went to see the laibon, whose
responsibility it was to craft a winning strategy. The ilaigwenak presented the laibon with
gifts of alcohol, which helped to induce prophetic statements. In the case of Supeet and
his lineage, the enkidong divining horn and stones were used as well. The laibon almost
certainly gave specific orders: where and when to attack, and how to carry out the fight.
The ilaigwenak then carried these orders to their respective fighting units; in some cases,
the laibon may have addressed warriors directly, with clarification from the ilaigwenak.39
The attack followed. The ilaigwenak were generally kept at a distance from the fight,
with a small personal guard, because they carried magical charms which had been given
by the laibon, and could not risk losing them.40 While Loikop pastoralists had already
gained a reputation as fierce cattle raiders, most contemporary accounts stress that
Maasai warriors took this to another level entirely – “savage to the extreme,” in Erhardt’s
words.41 There is some indication that Maasai took advantage of new weapons and
stronger iron materials, but this does not seem to have been a major factor in their
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success.42 Maasai regiments also made use of psychological tactics to instill fear and
despair in their opponents. As the battle approached, warriors worked themselves into a
“self-induced hysteria” of shaking and unpredictable behavior. “The arrival of a
shrieking, hysterical band of warriors in the dreaded panoply of spear, shield, two-edged
sword and knobkerry,” Fosbrooke wrote, “was usually enough to send fleeing the
inhabitants of the village selected as the target for the raid.”43 The use of terror sometimes
allowed Maasai raiding parties to steal all of a settlement’s cattle without a fight,
although considering the irreplacable value of cattle for a community’s survival, there
can be little doubt that the threat of bloodshed often had to be backed up in practice.
Maasai were expert cattle-rustlers; as a British military intelligence report later noted,
they could “drive off cattle at [a] trot and gallop. Every herd of cattle will follow the
Masai at once.”44 The military machine crafted by Supeet and his followers, for a time,
ran roughshod over most opponents. “The Masai did much damage to the land,” Krapf
and Rebmann wrote. “Before the big invasion by the Masai the [Loikop] made a few
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unimportant raids, but they were nothing in comparison with the attacks made by the
Masai since the first decade of this century.”45
The model of Maasai formation and military expansion presented here is given
credence by similar processes taking place elsewhere in East Africa at roughly the same
time. In particular, the formation and expansion of Turkana presents a useful comparative
study. In much the same way that Maasai emerged from a broader Loikop pastoralist
society, Turkana emerged from Ateker, the last major branch of Eastern Nilotes to move
down from the “cradle-land” in southern Sudan. Ateker arrived in northeastern Uganda
sometime circa 1500, and separated into several sections as they continued to push
southwards. Like Loikop, these early Ateker arrivals interacted with previous inhabitants,
initiating a process of cultural and linguistic exchange. By 1800, Ateker sections had
crystallized into several ethnic groups recognizable today: Jie, Dodos, Karimojong, and
others. Turkana began to expand rapidly in the years following 1825, in a manner
strikingly similar to Maasai. After dispersing (and partially absorbing) Siger and Oropom
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and perhaps spurred into action by a severe
drought, proto-Turkana turned to a more ambitious campaign against the “Kor” (and
eventually their Burkeneji successors). They boosted their military capabilities through a
refinement of their age-set system, and then threw their allegiance behind a prophet-
diviner named Lokerio, who replaced elders in wielding influence over military matters.
Lokerio was more willing to launch aggressive, profit-oriented raids, because they
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benefitted him economically (with a share of captured cattle) as well as politically (with
heightened prestige resulting from successful prophecy). Just as Maasai quickly began to
define themselves versus a Loikop “other,” Turkana ethnic identity was stimulated by a
long period of warfare against Sampur (Burkeneji and their allies). By the mid-nineteenth
century, Turkana were pushing Burkeneji, Tiamus, and Laikipiak sections of Loikop
away from their preferred grazing and water sources (and unfortunately for Tiamus and
Laikipiak, Maasai would soon push from the other direction). Finally, Turkana expansion
was solidified by their skilled and innovative pastoralist practice, as well as the
maintenance of efficient commercial networks, which guaranteed that Turkana society
would be able to withstand occasional periods of ecological stress. While the two cases
differ in several details, the similarities strongly suggest that both Maasai and Turkana
expansion were part of a region-wide shift towards military innovation, ethnic
distinctiveness, specialized pastoralism, and more intense, formalized commercial
networks.46
The Maasai-Loikop Wars and Loikop Disintegration
Despite a discouraging paucity of evidence, logical deduction based on available
sources suggests that during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the sections
that later became known as Maasai engaged in a localized, internal struggle that resulted
in a strong client base for Supeet, and a clear distinction between his followers and other
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Loikop who rejected his leadership. This conflict took place in a “core area” of dry
savanna between Mount Kilimanjaro in the east, the Ngorongoro Highlands on the west,
Lake Manyara on the south, and the Kaputiei-Kajiado plains on the north. The substance
of the conflict almost certainly mirrored later power struggles that have been well
documented, such as the protracted and bloody conflict between Lenana and Senteu, rival
successors to Mbatian’s leadership. Evidence suggests that each section of Loikop at the
turn of the nineteenth century had its own favored laibon, and during these early years,
Supeet would have been merely one among many aspiring prophetic leaders. The Loikop
sections in Supeet’s area, however, may have been more anxious than others to secure
precious resouces by force if necessary. As Richard Waller has noted, pastoralists in the
Rift Valley required three “lifelines” to make a viable living from the dry savannas: 1)
reserves of grazing land in temperate, highland areas; 2) advantageous access to trade
routes with agricultural societies as well as the Swahili coast; and 3) control of wells and
other water sources on the dry plains. The sections of Loikop who found themselves
stuck in the “core area” had none of these necessities, and so were likely to be living
constantly on the edge of disaster. Erhardt wrote that Maasai were “much subject to
dearths, so that [they] are constantly on the move, following the rains or the courses of
the rivers.”47 Not coincidentally, the first battles against other Loikop sections took place
around Monduli, Sanya, Simanjiro, Naberera, and the Loita Hills, areas that provided
wells, rich grazing, and control of caravan routes, while the prominent early battles
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against Tatoga pastoralists involved contests for control of the Ngorongoro Highlands.48
These early conflicts most likely involved intra-sectional fighting as Supeet consolidated
his base of support. The opponents in these early contests are often remembered simply
as “Iloogolala,” a disparaging name that almost certainly was not used by any Loikop
section at the time, and whose meaning in oral tradition has since been broadened to
include seemingly any Loikop section in conflict with Maasai before the Laikipiak
resurgence of the 1860s.49
Between c. 1820 and 1875, emergent Maasai sections, under the prophetic
leadership of Supeet and his successor Mbatian, fought and won a series of relatively
large-scale conflicts against the other Loikop sections, effectively disintegrating Loikop
society in the process. The Maasai-Loikop Wars have been a contentious issue among
historians, with proponents of the long-held notion that they involved two clearly defined
“sides” recently coming under criticism from scholars who have claimed that they were
essentially a series of complex, localized conflicts. This confusion perhaps stems from a
misreading of both the early European sources, which often did present them in dualistic
terms as a kind of shorthand, and oral traditions, which make the same simplifications for
much the same reasons. However, the Loikop Wars and the process of Maasai expansion
are not really as baffling as some writers have portrayed them. It is important to
remember that after consolidating around Supeet’s leadership, Maasai sections launched
offensive campaigns against other Loikop sections, each of which had its own paramount
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laibon and distinct sense of identity. In this sense, it is true that there were not “two
sides” to the conflict at all. One side was a highly organized, efficient military system,
while on the other was a loose-knit group of independent sections, most likely incapable
of mustering serious opposition. As Richard Waller has noted, Maasai had the advantage
of “interior lines,” meaning that they could launch attacks in every direction from their
central position.50 However, as defeated Loikop communities sought refuge with their
relatives in other sections, and as those sections in turn were defeated, annexed and
scattered by continuing Maasai expansion, it became clearer that the Loikop “side” had a
common cause. By the 1860s, then, remnants of scattered sections re-organized
themselves as part of the resurgent Laikipiak federation, specifically geared to reclaiming
from Maasai the valuable corridor between Lake Naivasha and Lake Nakuru. At this
point, the Loikop Wars can fairly be said to counterpose two clearly defined sides.
Unfortunately for the Loikop side, Mbatian displayed remarkable skill in assembling the
now far-flung Maasai regiments, and the Laikipiak federation was crushed by Maasai in
the last large-scale confrontation of the Loikop Wars. In all cases, however, it is essential
to remember that while there may indeed have been decisive battles during the course of
Maasai expansion, much of the dirty work involved in Maasai destruction of other
Loikop sections probably required repeated, demoralizing and economically disastrous
cattle raids.
Maasai expansion to the east and southeast from the late 1820s to the 1840s
focused primarily on driving the Parakuyo section of Loikop away from the important
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wells on the “Maasai” Steppe. The Loikop inhabitants of these areas might have been
from the Parakuyo section, but might also have included sections whose names are
unknown today. Maasai oral traditions collected a century later reported that while
Maasai ilmurran were staking out claims to particular wells at Naberera, the defeated
Loikop escaped to the west (probably towards Kondoa and northern Dodoma, where
some Parakuyo still live today), while the Loikop laibon closed the western pass with a
magic spell, preventing pursuit by Maasai. Maasai oral tradition recalls that two Loikop
manyattas, called Sabuki and Sitet, fled from Maasai raiders at Sanya in the 1830s. The
Sabuki took refuge to the southeast among Nguu, while the Sitet pushed even further
south to a large crater, the entrance to which they covered with stones and branches, and
in which they lived peacefully “till a German was led to the place by a dog.”51 The Sitet
are still remembered today, in southern Parakuyo oral tradition, as a legendary group that
migrated to distant, unknown southern lands. Within the realm of the known, it seems
certain that some of the Loikop communities displaced from the steppe attempted to push
into southern areas controlled by Gogo and Hehe, but were unable to match them in
battle, and thus had to settle in fringe areas or give up pastoralism entirely. Scattered
Loikop communities settled in somewhat precarious positions among Gogo, Nguu,
Kaguru, and other southern societies. Many Parakuyo, however, consolidated their
position in the foothills of the Pare and Usambara mountains on the northern bank of the
Pangani river; Krapf reported that Maasai had never been able to push the “mighty tribe
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Barrabuyu” from this stronghold.52
At about the same time that Maasai were taking control of the steppe, they also
began to launch effective long-distance raids against the Enkangelema section of Loikop,
who lived in an expansive stretch of plains north of the Pare-Usambara range.
Enkangelema had been a nuisance to their Chagga, Kamba, Teita, Mijikenda, Oromo, and
Shambaa neighbours. Several of these societies seized the opportunity provided by
Maasai attacks, and formed a temporary alliance under Shambaa leadership with the
intent of demolishing the Enkangelema section.53 “Kimeri broke the last strength of the
[Loikop] by setting the grass before them on fire,” Erhardt was told later, “[and]
advancing the legions of [Shambaa] behind them, routing them entirely.”54 Although not
connected explicitly in documentary sources, it is worth noting that the destruction of
Enkangelema coincided with the reported death of a “mighty king” of the Loikop named
Embare Kisungo, who previously had been part of a “powerful African triumvirate” that
included Kimweri of Usambara and Rongua of Chagga.55 Since there is evidence that the
Parakuyo laibon at this time was named Lengunat, it seems likely that Embare Kisungo
was an influential laibon representing the Enkangelema section of Loikop.56 The
disintegration of Enkangelema changed the political and ecological landscape of the
region. Krapf reported from Mombasa in 1845 that the destruction of the Enkangelema
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had emptied their country, and that “there are many Ukuafi [Loikop] slaves here in
consequence of the calamity.”57 The region once occupied by Enkangelema became
known as the “Wakwavi wilderness,” and gradually was resettled by Shambaa, Kamba,
and coastal peoples.58
From the late 1830s to the 1870s, evolving Maasai sections also pushed to the
north and west, first scattering the Loikop groups on the central plains, and then winning
control of the crucial highland grazing around Lake Nakuru, while at the same time
chasing Tatoga pastoralists away from the Ngorongoro Highlands and Serengeti Plains.
During the 1840s, Maasai expanded north into the Kajiado and Nairobi areas, taking
control of wells, dams and grazing areas from the previous Loikop residents. The process
by which this happened was complex and is now remembered in oral tradition as a series
of battles between various Maasai sections and the “Iloogolala.” There might well have
been a serious, but unsuccessful, attempt by some of these Loikop sections to band
together and recapture the plains northeast of Kilimanjaro. It seems likely that some of
the Loikop sections in this area, such as Kaputiei, joined the emerging Maasai federation
en masse (sending their previous laibons into exile). Other sections, such as Keringishu,
were scattered, and today exist as a clan that can be found in Parakuyo and Maasai
communities. Many Loikop families from this central area fled north to Laikipia, where a
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new federation would soon emerge.59 During the 1860s, Maasai sections (perhaps mainly
Kinopop) dispersed Loosekelai from the area around Lake Nakuru and Elmenteita. The
little-known Taaramodoni section suffered the same fate. Many of these Loikop also
went north to Laikipia, while others fled to forest refuges in the west, or simply joined the
expanding Maasai.60 At the same time, around the Ngorongoro Highlands to the west of
the “core” area, Maasai finally broke through the last of Tatoga resistance and swept
above the escarpment, chasing scattered Tatoga remnants all the way into the mountains
of present-day Mbulu. With this western expanse now at their mercy, Maasai “filled the
whole of the Serenget and pursued the Tatoga by raids and massacres through what is
now Singida District and the Wembere plains as far as Itigi.”61 The western sections of
Maasai that formed during this period gradually detached themselves from Supeet’s
influence, and a rival laibon emerged by the time of Mbatian’s ascendance in the east.
Maasai society expanded in both geographic and demographic terms by absorbing
fragments of defeated Loikop sections, either as individuals and families, or sometimes as
larger social units. For families, the process of “becoming Maasai” involved waiting until
individuals had either married into Maasai families, or until young men had been initiated
into Maasai age-sets. Larger groups of Loikop, including in all likelihood entire sections,
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could have been incorporated into Maasai society by disavowing their own laibons and
accepting the authority of the Enkidongi laibon, including adoption of the age-set rituals
and names over which he had control. As Richard Waller has pointed out, this process
created uneven growth, as some Maasai sections gained members faster than others. In
addition, some of the larger units of Loikop incorporated into Maasai society were
viewed as permanent second-class citizens; this was the case with Laitayok, who lived
near the Loita section of Maasai and who, a century later, were still not considered “pure”
Maasai, although they participated in Maasai religious and social institutions.62 Following
this pattern, then, Maasai society by 1870 had developed into several relatively
independent sections, much the same as Loikop society before them, with the notable
difference of an integrated age-set structure, and a single laibon providing a unifying
cultural symbol (although in the western Maasai sections, this was a contested issue). In
the southeast, Maasai thought of themselves as “Kisongo,” a sort of super-sectional
identity that included two major sections: Moibo, who lived around Monduli, Longido,
and Ngorongoro; and Kiteto, who lived on the Maasai steppe. The western sections
included Salei in the Highlands, Loita in the Trans-Mara area, and Serenget on the
Serengeti Plains. Just to the north of the modern Kenya-Tanzania border, most Maasai
thought of themselves as “Purko,” another broad identity similar to Kisongo. Almost all
of these developing Maasai sections included sub-sections of their own. For example, the
Loita section included the Ndasakera, who lived in the highlands around Loliondo.63
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During the 1870s, Maasai made their last significant military push, against the
northern Loikop sections, who had regrouped as a federation under Laikipiak leadership
and attempted to regain some of the key resources lost to Maasai. During the previous
decades, many Loikop refugees from the south had made their way to Laikipia seeking
refuge. In addition to the Laikipiak themselves, the alliance that developed during the
1860s included members of Enkangelema, Arinkon, Loosekelai, Lemarmar, and
Momonyott.64 For these consolidated remnants, the Laikipia Plateau became a last
stronghold against not only against Maasai to the south, but also against the expanding
Turkana in the northwest.65 Tellingly, though, there is no indication that Burkeneji, Uasin
Gishu or Siria sections made common cause with the Laikipiak. Even at this late date,
Maasai-style social integration was an uncomfortable idea to the other Loikop sections.
The Laikipiak groups did, however, adopt a Maasai-style prophetic leader, Koikoti Tonai,
who became the Laikipiak answer and rival to the Enkidongi laibon in the south.
Exploiting the death of Supeet, Laikipiak attempted to reclaim the prime lands around
Lake Naivasha. Mbatian, Supeet’s successor, apparently had lost the allegiance of the
western Serenget and Salei sections to his brother Mako. But Mbatian was able to
mobilize a large number of ilmurran from the southern Moibo section of Kisongo
Maasai, and together with Purko, fought a series of large-scale battles against Laikipiak
around Naivasha between 1874 and 1876. Attesting to the size of these conflagrations,
Joseph Thomson in 1883 came across the site of one battle, and saw the remains of two
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opposing manyattas, each of which he judged to have held at least three thousand
ilmurran. The eventual, and apparently decisive, Maasai victory over Laikipiak proved to
be a great boost for the influence of Mbatian. Koikoti fled to Siria, and the abandoned
area on the northern side of Lake Naivasha became known as Dondole, “no man’s
land.”66 Maasai regiments wasted no time in attacking Uasin Gishu and Siria to the west,
and in keeping with the patterns established in earlier Maasai campaigns, these two
groups responded in characteristic ways. Siria, after a decisive loss to Loita Maasai,
merged into Maasai society as a relatively intact, but socially inferior, community. Uasin
Gishu, on the other hand, had already been weakened by internal conflicts and constant
harrassment from Nandi raiders. They dispersed completely under the pressure of
Kisongo and Purko attacks, and the Uasin Gishu plateau became a frontier area between
Nandi and Maasai.67 The defeat of these northern sections effectively ended any socially
viable idea of a larger Loikop society. The Burkeneji (later known as Sampur) section,
the only one not to come into direct conflict with Maasai, was the only group to continue
to refer to itself as Loikop.
After their defeat, remnants of the Laikipiak federation went in different
directions. Like other defeated sections, some simply joined Maasai society. Many went
in the opposite direction, and took refuge with Turkana, forming a distinct clan called
Komesoroko. These refugees presumably participated when Turkana took advantage of
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Laikipiak dispersal by pushing into the area east of Lake Turkana, forcing Sampur to
retreat. Still others took refuge with Meru and Kikuyu farmers living around Mount
Kenya, or became Torrobo hunters in the forests. Twentieth-century Torobbo groups who
probably scattered from Laikipia included Lemarmar, Ngwesi, and Momonyot. The
Momonyot apparently tried to move north to raid for cattle, but were soundly beaten by
Somalis, and eventually settled at Meru, intermarrying with Torobbo remnants of
Mukogodo. To the north, an intact group of Laikipiak launched raids against the
Burkeneji, Rendille, and Boran, in an attempt to recoup their losses. During the next
decade, they fought several times around Marsabit, where Burkeneji had concentrated to
avoid Turkana, as well as in Boran areas to the north. These persistent Laikipiak were
gradually driven back and finally dispersed in the early 1900s, although as late as 1929,
colonial officials in Kajiado (southern Kenya) were moving small bands of pastoralists
claiming to be Laikipiak. The Burkeneji, on the other hand, strengthened by their alliance
with Rendille and Boran, have maintained an intact social viability to the present day,
although they are now known as Sampur, after the country they occupied.68
Throughout East Africa, scatterlings from all the Loikop sections concentrated in
“oasis” communities, where they often took up farming, and in some cases even fishing
and hunting, as means of survival. These refuge communities included Arusha Chini,
Arusha Juu, Kahe, Kimangelia, Mazinde, and Taveta (all in the Pangani valley);
Nkuruman, Ndassekere, and Ndesserian (in western Maasailand); and the Tiamus
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settlement on Lake Baringo. Most of these communities aspired to return to pastoralism;
the Loikop refugees at Ndesserian, for example, raided Kipsigis to the northwest in an
attempt to rebuild their herds.69 The Tiamus settlement flourished between 1840 and
1870, its residents fishing and hunting as well as farming, but constant harrassment by
Maasai and Suk, combined with the decline of caravan trade, gradually forced people to
seek other homes.70 Loikop who settled in Taveta from 1840 onwards had better fortune
than their relatives at Tiamus. Taveta was already a well-established caravan stop,
populated by a mixture of Pare, Shambaa, and Chagga outcasts, with a diverse economy.
Loikop culture was adopted wholesale by all residents of Taveta, including age-set
organization, clothing and jewelry styles, and to some extent the Loikop language.
Situated on the banks of the Lumi River, in the midst of a six-mile wide forest, Taveta
could only be approached by a narrow pathway, patrolled by guards to protect from
Maasai attacks. Once inside, visitors found an abundance of food production, including
bananas, yams, cassava, maize, millet, beans, sugar cane, honey, tomatoes, fish, fowl,
goats, and stall-fed cattle. Crops and gardens were fed by a system of artificial canals.
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Joseph Thomson was typically enthusiastic, describing Taveta as “kaleidoscopic in its
infinite variety.”71
The Arusha settlement of Loikop refugees had even more success. During the
early years of Maasai expansion in the “core” area, a group of dispossessed Loikop
settled at Arusha Chini, south of Moshi. They became skilled irrigation agriculturalists,
and developed trading links with Maasai. By mid-century, and possibly with
encouragement from Supeet, some of these Loikop moved west to the foothills of Mount
Meru, and established the farming settlement of Arusha wa Juu. These Arusha, as they
came to be known, were fully adopted into the Maasai social system, following Supeet as
their paramount laibon, participating in Maasai age-set rituals, adopting identical clan
names, and intermarrying with Maasai. Arusha provided Kisongo Maasai with grain,
honey, tobacco and labor. In exchange, Arusha began to accumulate cattle, which were in
turn kept on the open plains by Maasai stock partners. This close-knit integration with
pastoralist Maasai allowed Arusha to prosper and grow dramatically in size.72
Many Loikop men found that their unique skills made them employable.
Loosekelai and Uas Nkishu remnants fled to the west, taking refuge among Kalenjin,
Luhyia, and Nandi. Warriors from Uas Nkishu, led by their laibon Sayeu, moved to the
Wanga chiefdom (in Luhyia) and played an important role in Wanga expansion under
Mumia. Several European travellers noted the presence of Loikop mercenaries in
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Kavirondo during the 1880s and 1890s, in such great numbers that, as Karl Peters
reported, they formed “the principal warrior contingent for the whole of Kavirondo.”73
Chagga chiefs in the 1880s used Arusha mercenaries, while Shambaa kings employed
Parakuyo for the same purpose. At the same time in western Tanzania, Mirambo
apparently made use of both Parakuyo and Maasai mercenaries in his battles for
ascendancy, while a few pioneering Parakuyo even went as far as south as Usangu, where
they served as warriors for Merere.74 Enterprising laibons could also find work even after
the dispersal of their Loikop sections. Von Hohnel discovered in 1887-1888 that the
“Maasai” laibons of both the Kinangop and Laikipia areas actually were Loikop from
Uasin Gishu.75
Conclusion
Despite the thoroughness with which Maasai demolished Loikop society, the era
of their dominance proved to be brief. By the 1880s, their aggressive expansion had
reached its limits, as other societies caught up to and then surpassed them in military
capability. After their dramatic victories in the 1870s, Maasai did not occupy the areas
previously inhabited by Laikipiak and Uasin Gishu pastoralists, but stayed for the most
part south of Naivasha. Maasai, in fact, did not have the capacity to stop Nandi expansion
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into Uasin Gishu, and were at a loss to match Suk and Kipsigis raiders as well. On the
western frontier of Maasailand, Luo migrants were steadily encroaching from across the
Kavirondo Gulf. In the south, the forces of powerful Hehe leader Mkwawa (and in one
battle, those of his sister) effectively stopped large Maasai raiding parties.76 Even within
Maasailand, pastoralist Maasai were no longer the most dominant cattle raiders. During
the 1860s and 1870s, Arusha ilmurran had been very successful in refining their military
structure along Maasai lines. By the 1880s, they were brazenly raiding Maasai
settlements for cattle and even forcing them away from water sources on the Mount Meru
foothills. This did not go unnoticed among their neighbors, and Chagga rulers such as
Mandera and Sina, who previously had used Maasai mercenaries, began to assemble
armies of Arusha ilmurran to bolster their ambitions. Mandera, for example, effectively
combined Arusha raiders with his own soldiers, who used flintlock muskets. Arusha
profited from these adventures by acquiring cattle and wives, which in turn helped to
expand Arusha society. Thomson reported that Mandera had a thousand Arusha ilmurran
at his service, and could field a combined force of more than two thousand men. Von
Hohnel noted in 1887 that many of the large-scale raids that had recently been attributed
to Maasai were actually carried out by Arusha. Maasai military affairs, in fact, were now
focused elsewhere, as an intense civil war had broken out between followers of rival
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successors to Mbatian, who had passed away on the eve of colonial conquest. To make
matters worse, a devastating “triple disaster” of bovine pleuropneumonia, rinderpest, and
smallpox was sweeping across East Africa, leaving many Maasai communities destitute.
During the 1890s, in fact, many Kisongo Maasai were forced to take refuge with partners
and relatives in Arusha.77
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Parakuyo Lives and Livelihoods in Northeast Tanganyika, c.1850-1918
This chapter describes Parakuyo resilience and adaptation from the 1850s to the
end of the First World War, a period of expanding commerce, ecological disaster,
regional warfare and rapid political change in East Africa. Parakuyo history during these
years is largely a story of displacement, precarious subsistence, and strategic
opportunism. Maasai expansion dislodged Parakuyo, and other Loikop, from their claims
to the vital wells and pastures on the “Maasai” Steppe and neighboring areas during the
mid-1800s. Small groups of Parakuyo fled in different directions from Maasai attacks:
some went across the Pangani River to the northeast, hunkering down in secluded valleys
and near trading settlements affiliated with Shambaa leaders; many went south and
southeast, forging new settlements on the peripheries of farming groups such as Zigua,
Nguu, Kaguru, and Gogo; still others went to the west and southwest. Parakuyo raided
cattle on a small scale to offset their losses, but they remained a minor factor in regional
warfare. During the years of German colonial rule, Parakuyo enjoyed a brief advantage
against their Maasai adversaries, but this ended with the disruptions caused by the First
World War. The meaning of Parakuyo identity had been thrown into question with the
overwhelming success of Maasai ethnic expansion, but the continued existence of a
separate Parakuyo prophetic lineage preserved the viability of a distinct, if far-flung,
Parakuyo community.
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Scattering, Settlement and Opportunism
In 1853, the missionary Jakob Erhardt recorded in his journal that “the Wakuafi
that remained after the battle with their brethren the Masai have sought refuge behind
Usambara in the plain between the [Mkomazi and Pangani] rivers.”1 This is perhaps the
earliest written description of a post-Maasai expansion Parakuyo community: still intact
as a social entity, but “homeless” in the sense that they had no real territory to claim as
their own, and always dependent on the good graces of their more populous neighbors.
That this early Parakuyo refugee settlement was established on the eastern side of the
Pangani is telling, as the river would mark the theoretical (if sometimes not the practical)
boundary between Maasai and Parakuyo in this region for several decades to come.
Expansion-minded Maasai held up at the river because its eastern bank was dangerously
close to the powerful Shambaa kingdom. It is in this context, then, that another
missionary, Johann Ludwig Krapf, could write that the “mighty tribe Barrabuyu” had
never been moved by Maasai from its stronghold on the banks of the upper Pangani.2
Parakuyo did not simply flee from Maasai in an indiscriminate flurry. Quite to the
contrary, they carefully moved to targeted areas where they were fairly certain they
would find year-round grazing, reliable water sources, and an amenable local political
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system. There would of course be a loss of status as Parakuyo families negotiated access
to crucial resources on unfavorable terms, but their relative wealth in cattle, combined
with the occasional display of force, provided at least a modicum of leverage. In the
northeast, Parakuyo fleeing from Maasai expansion developed a close relationship with
the rulers of the Shambaa kingdom, which reached the height of its influence between
1815 and 1862 under Kimweri Nyumbai. Kimweri himself had been the leader of a
regional alliance that completely demolished a different Loikop section, called
Enkangelema, during the 1840s. Despite the apparent seriousness of this conflict –
Zanzibar sultan Seyyid Said even contributed soldiers to help defeat the Loikop section –
Shambaa rulers did not question the benefits of having Parakuyo (and probably dispersed
Enkangelema) refugee communities close at hand, not to mention partly dependent on
their good graces. Kimwere expected all cattle-keepers under his protection to give him
the first offspring of each cow and goat, an arrangement that Parakuyo were in no
position to question. By the 1850s, then, substantial numbers of Parakuyo who had been
chased by Maasai from their grazing and water sources west of the Pangani river had
found safe shelter in parts of Usambara, including, as we have seen, the plain between the
Mkomazi and Pangani rivers.3
Parakuyo settled in several separate areas of lowland Usambara during the mid-
1800s. The settlement with the most lively interaction was near Mazinde, a nominally
Zigua market town along the Pangani caravan route. Parakuyo lived with their cattle
                                                 
3 Krapf, journal entry, 20 March 1852, CA5/O16, CMS; Steven Feierman, The Shambaa
Kingdom: A History (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 138-139; Richard
F. Burton, Zanzibar: City, Island and Coast (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1872), II, 228-
229; Erhardt, journal entry, 12 August 1853, CA5/O9, CMS.
131
outside the town, but visited frequently to participate in the large monthly market, where
they traded with Zigua, Pare, Shambaa and Mbugu neighbors. This interaction was well
established by the 1850s, and was the general pattern of Parakuyo settlement and contact
throughout Usambara. Just to the south of Mazinde was Mtalawanda, where another
small group of Parakuyo had settled on the eastern bank of the Mkomazi river. On the
northern rim of the Usambara mountains, Parakuyo clustered around Dongo Kundu,
which lay on the caravan route from Tanga, as well as the plains around Gonja, where
they were at least somewhat under the good graces of the exiled Shambaa leader Fungo
Mwanamata, who built a trading center there during the 1860s. Parakuyo almost certainly
also remained in areas to the west in Pare country. In all of these areas, Parakuyo warriors
served as hired help for aspiring local chieftains.4
Parakuyo developed a particularly close relationship with Semboja, a son of
Kimweri Nyumbai, who spearheaded the expansion of Shambaa power into the lowlands
and set up his headquarters at Mazinde during the 1840s. After his father died in 1862,
Semboja, an unusually gifted politician, became the most powerful Shambaa ruler, and
the center of power moved from Vuga in the highlands to Mazinde, the first Shambaa
capital in the lowlands. J. L. Krapf met Semboja in 1852, and described him as an
“intelligent young man, who likes strangers.”5 During their meeting, Semboja boasted
about the Parakuyo families settled outside Mazinde. Semboja’s careful protection of
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local Parakuyo settlements earned him an alliance that would endure several decades.
Parakuyo called him Naibor (“the white one”), according to Justin Lemenye, because
they thought he was “of light countenance like an Arab.”6 Lemenye stresses in his
autobiography that Semboja was, almost literally, a shield for Parakuyo against further
attacks by Maasai. In return, Semboja employed Parakuyo warriors in his regional
campaigns, although the Maasai front remained essentially a standoff. When Jakob
Erhardt visited in 1853, Semboja described to him a combined force of 350 men he had
formed in alliance with the Parakuyo laibon Mtango and the Zigua leader Kifuma (who,
it is worth noting, was in theory Semboja’s rival and enemy). This group had attacked
Maasai with apparently disastrous results, and Maasai in turn launched fierce raids on
Mazinde itself. In time, Semboja’s political maneuvering won him considerable leverage
over these same Maasai, and by the 1870s, the Shambaa ruler was commanding warriors
from both Parakuyo and Maasai age-sets. The Parakuyo relationship, however, remained
Semboja’s most intimate; after the laibon Mtango passed away, Semboja made a blood
partnership with his son and successor, Maitei. Semboja was also remembered to have
been a member of a Parakuyo age-set.7
To the south of Shambaa, scattered Parakuyo communities settled on the blurred
southeastern edges of Maasailand, interacting with Zigua, Nguu, Kaguru, Luguru, Sagala,
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Zaramo, and other communities. These southeastern neighbors can in many ways be
considered a single “people,” although colonial administrators later classified them as
distinct “tribes.” James Giblin, following on a point made earlier by Beidelman, has
argued that the “tribal” names in this area were not really ethnonyms, but rather generic
terms related to a group’s geographic affiliation: the names Kaguru and Nguu, for
example, derive from words for “highland,” while Zigua and Sagala derive from words
for “lowland.” They shared a common culture and economy, and spoke mutually
comprehensible languages. They were all matrilineal, decentralized farming communities
who used shifting cultivation to grow maize and millet. They generally placed their faith
in healers and diviners. Politically, they were organized into “neighborhood groups,” as
Beidelman has termed them, with far-reaching clan structures that often cut across ethnic
divisions. Most of them relied on charismatic leaders who commanded allegiance through
their own intelligence, initiative, and ability to manipulate the lucrative networks of trade
extending from the Zanzibar-controlled coast.8
The most powerful of these groups were the Zigua, who developed profitable
commercial links with the coast. As early as the mid-1800s, Zigua were acquiring guns
and powder which they then used to raid their neighbors for slaves. The fortunes of Zigua
leaders were intimately tied to their success in managing the cycle of slave raids and
coastal trade. This competitive environment led to the development of four rival alliances
of “predatory chieftains” (in Giblin’s words) that expanded westward, leaving
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impoverished communities in their wake. The chaos created by these chieftains
paradoxically fit well into the increasingly solid trading networks pressing inland from
the coast. The Zigua chieftains were so successful, in fact, that with support from
Zanzibar, they constituted a real threat to Shambaa power in the region. Here, too, the
Pangani river served as a useful boundary. Krapf reported in 1852 that there were four
villages on the Pangani estuary: two on the north bank controlled by Shambaa, and two
on the south bank controlled by Zigua.9
Amid this storm of Zigua raiding and commerce, Parakuyo carefully settled in an
area on the eastern edge of the Maasai Steppe that was nominally under Zigua control but
in many ways remained a frontier zone, roughly corresponding to the modern district of
Handeni. Parakuyo lived there year-round next to Zigua and Nguu farmers, negotiating
shared access to water sources and grazing their herds on the farmers’ fields after they
had been harvested. At the same time, Kisongo Maasai left their steppe pastures each dry
season to graze in the area as well. Both Maasai and Parakuyo raided Zigua for cattle, and
Zigua leaders in turn made a series of shifting alliances with particular Maasai and
Parakuyo groups. By the late 1800s, Zigua who lived along the Pangani river had taken to
building fortified villages on islands in the river to protect against “Maasai” (most likely
Arusha) attacks.10
To the southwest of Zigua territory, Parakuyo settled on the northwestern
outskirts of Kaguru territory. Again, this was a targeted move, based on knowledge of
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reliable watering points that lay more or less in a line between Kitange and Mamboya.
Parakuyo (and possibly members of other southern Loikop sections) may have been
bumping up against the Bantu-speaking farmers who inhabited the area even before
Maasai expansion, but pressure from Maasai provided additional momentum. By mid-
century Parakuyo were actively chasing the farmers into the high hills, forcing them to
abandon their cattle. During the next few decades, an interdependent system developed,
in which Parakuyo played a significant role in Kaguru politics. No aspiring Kaguru
chieftain could hope to advance without making blood-brotherhood with an influential
Parakuyo. Despite the rocky and often violent relationship between the two groups, this
interdependence would prove remarkably durable. As Thomas Beidelman has noted, it is
telling that when German rule was established in the area, the Kaguru leaders who had
the strongest personal connections with Parakuyo tended to be the ones who received
official recognition as representatives to the administration.11
Parakuyo were also part of local society in Gogo country, southwest of Kaguru in
central Tanganyika, although here there was little in the way of a political structure to
exploit. The area consisted simply of a patchwork of refugee communities who had fled
from Loikop and Maasai to the north, Sagala to the east, and Hehe to the south. A small
but noticeable number of these refugees were from Loikop sections, and at least a few
were unfortunate Maasai outcasts. The travellers Burton, Speke, and Stanley each passed
through Gogo between 1857 and 1875. Burton noted in 1857 that while “Humba” often
raided Gogo and Sagara, there were also several settlements of “Humba” mingled among
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Gogo communities, and that they had adopted many of the customs of their new
neighbors, swapping “the hide-tent for the hut, and the skin for the cotton-cloth.”12 Speke
also reported that Gogo villages lived in fear of “Humba” raids, but noted that when in
1861 an Arab-Swahili group attacked a Gogo village in retaliation for its resistance to an
ivory- and slave-seeking caravan, “some Wahumba, having heard the cries of the
Wagogo, joined in their cause, and both together fell on the Arab force,” demolishing it
completely.13 In 1875 Stanley visited a cluster of “Humba” villages in the area, and found
them humble but rich in cattle. “Each of the principal men and women extended to us
pressing invitations to stop in their villages,” he wrote, “and handsome young chiefs
entreated us to become their blood brothers.”14 Henry Fosbrooke, in his analysis of age-
group structures among Tanganyika pastoralists, concluded that Gogo had either adopted
age-set names from Loikop immigrants at an early date, or adopted “back-dated” age-set
names from Loikop fleeing from Maasai expansion.15
Finally, a substantial number of Loikop who previously held sway on the western
ranges of the Maasai Steppe simply moved further to the west to avoid Maasai expansion,
settling among Sandawe people north of Gogo country. The sectional affiliation of these
Loikop is not known, and it is likely that many were from non-Parakuyo sections;
however, their descendants today identify themselves as Parakuyo, and are regarded as
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such by Parakuyo in other locales. Unfortunately, information on these early migrants to
Sandawe country is lacking. It is important nonetheless to remember that they were there,
as they appear to have been numerically comparable to Parakuyo groups in other areas of
settlement. There is evidence of a Sandawe oral tradition that mentions a leader named
Amas during the mid-nineteenth century, who was defeated by Maasai, and a successor
named Songa, who held Maasai at bay and then drove them north again.16 Given their
roles in similar events elsewhere, we can speculate that Loikop immigrants likely pitched
in during these conflicts.
Parakuyo continued to move to the south, in small groups, during the second half
of the nineteenth century. During the 1870s, for example, one group of Parakuyo moved
into the Sagala hills, southwest of Kaguru. The missionary J.T. Last collected information
on Parakuyo in this area while he was stationed there between 1879 and 1884. Last
visited them frequently, especially the Parakuyo “chief” of the area, Lekinana, who
proved to be a good source of information. Parakuyo were “a very friendly, cheerful
race,” according to Last, “… much less noisy than the Masai, and with far less
presumption.”17 Last emphasized that although some Parakuyo had been forced to take
up farming in this area, they considered it degrading, and preferred to live on a diet of
cattle products. They did not hesitate to raid their neighbors for cattle when the
opportunity presented itself. Last wrote that Parakuyo also were constantly engaged in
reciprocal raiding with Maasai to the north, but that Maasai clearly had the upper hand in
                                                 
16 “Tribal History and Legends: Notes on some of the Sandawe Alagwa,” Dodoma
Regional Book, mf. 13, TNA.
17 J. T. Last, Polyglotta Africana Orientalis (London: Society for Promoting Christian
Knowledge, 1885), 27.
138
those contests. Maasai added to their military superiority the “the bitterest hatred” toward
Parakuyo, and could not “bear to have the name of Humba mentioned before them.”18
Further to the south, Hehe tradition states that Parakuyo have been in Iringa (a highland
area in south-central Tanganyika) since precolonial times, the result of an arrangement by
which Parakuyo who had been defeated by Hehe were allowed to remain in the area and
tolerated “with a kind of amiable disdain.”19 Perhaps corroborating this tradition, Arthur
Dodgshun, travelling on the southwestern outskirts of Gogo in 1878, saw several herds of
cattle tended by “Humba” and Hehe, in what was nominally Nyamwezi country.20
Cultivating Local Relationships and Forging Regional Networks
In each area they settled, Parakuyo families established personal connections with
families of agriculturalists. It is important to remember that despite the Maasai invention
of a disparaging stereotype that associated Loikop remnants with a dependence on
agricultural labor for their survival, Parakuyo remained firmly committed to maintaining
their pastoralist subsistence base, whenever possible, as they sought new social and
ecological niches in which to settle. Indeed, their ability to negotiate on favorable terms
with settled communities depended on the leverage provided by their relatively large
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herds of cattle. Parakuyo living among Shambaa, Zigua, Nguu, and Kaguru established
specific, individual relationships with farming households. In exchange for cattle, milk,
and hides, farmers provided Parakuyo with maize, beans, bananas, rice, tobacco, beer,
medicine, and iron tools and weapons. European observers often referred to these
reciprocal relationships, between people who were in many cases nominally enemies, as
“blood partnerships,” indicating the personal, local level of exchange. These personal
contacts allowed for Parakuyo to graze their herds directly on cultivated fields after the
harvest, or water them at shared sources, with a minimum of violence. Parakuyo and their
farming neighbors also developed rituals that they performed together, and consulted the
same ritual experts for advice. There is no doubt that some Parakuyo owned farms, and
Parakuyo women, especially, tended gardens. But this resort to agricultural labor was
always kept to a bare minimum, and served as a last resort, as when a large number of
cattle had been looted by Maasai. Many Parakuyo who owned fields did not tend to them
in person, but hired their Zigua, Nguu, and Kaguru neighbors to work them (a practice
that continues today).21
Beyond these local relationships of exchange, Parakuyo settlement patterns
allowed them to participate – from a distance – in the rapidly expanding commercial
networks pushing inland from the coast during the nineteenth century. Several of the
major caravan routes that emerged in East Africa beginning in the 1840s passed through
areas inhabited by Parakuyo: one that followed the Pangani river upstream through
Shambaa and Pare to Chagga; another that proceeded from Sadani to Nguu country; and
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yet another that went from Bagamoyo to Gogo country and beyond. The major neighbors
of Parakuyo settlements played key roles in this commercial world. The missionary
Johann Ludwig Krapf described in clear language the connections between the growth of
European and American commercial interest in the East African coast, the booming trade
between coast and interior – especially at key points such as Mazinde – and the friendly
protection offered by Kimweri to the Parakuyo living there. Semboja, following
Kimweri’s death, expanded the connections from both sides, developing closer
connections with Parakuyo by joining one of their age-sets, while at the same time
impressing visitors from the coast with his cosmopolitan outlook and knowledge of both
European culture and Islam. Steven Feierman has noted that Semboja was perhaps the
best example of contemporary regional leaders who anticipated the colonial era by
developing supra-ethnic political loyalties while intensifying broad networks of
commerce and warfare. Semboja’s capital at Mazinde, for example, was a functioning
hive of multiculturalism: Zigua was the most common language; the Parakuyo who lived
at Mazinde were fluent in both Zigua and Shambaa. To the south, Parakuyo also
participated in Zigua links with the coast. The rapid growth of clove plantations on
Zanzibar and Pemba during the 1830s and 1840s spurred demand for slaves, which in
turn fueled the rise of Zigua raiding chieftains. Parakuyo and Zigua collaborated in the
movement of cattle, slaves, and ivory to the coast. Parakuyo sold captives, as well as
ivory they acquired from Dorobo hunters, to Zigua in return for iron weapons (which
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Zigua acquired from smithing specialists in the Kaguru mountains); Zigua then resold
these products to coastal merchants.22
Rustlers and Rustlees: Cattle Raiding by Parakuyo, Maasai, and Arusha
It is safe to assume that as opportunistic pastoralists, Parakuyo certainly did their
share of raiding during the nineteenth century. They needed to recoup losses to Maasai,
and it seems clear that they took their frustrations out on Kaguru, Sagala, Gogo, and
others, as described above. Further, it is well-established that Parakuyo served as
mercenaries for chieftains in other societies. Some scholars, however, have assumed that
Parakuyo must have been responsible for any “Maasai” raids to the east of Maasailand.23
The evidence, and logic, indicate otherwise. To begin with, it is worth noting that most
knowledgeable precolonial European observers were in fact quite selective in their use of
ethnonyms. For example, note the wording in the following passage, written in 1849 by
Johann Ludwig Krapf, a careful writer: “we crossed the high-road, which the Masai use
to take on their invasions into the Galla-country, and vice versa the Galla on their attacks
of the Masai and Wakuafi.”24 This description gives the distinct impression that
“Wakuafi” were mostly being raided, rather than raiding. A report from Jakob Erhardt in
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1853 likewise specifically mentions “Wakuafi,” along with Zigua and Pare, on the
receiving end of a large Maasai raid.25 In addition to this clear wording in the sources, it
requires a leap of logic to ascribe large mid-century raids to Parakuyo. During these
years, Parakuyo were scattered in very small groups across a wide area, and it would
have been extremely difficult to muster the large contingents of warriors necessary to
carry out these spectacular raids. In fact, there is some evidence that Parakuyo were so
unsure of their raiding capabilities that they were actively seeking to purchase guns.26
Maasai, on the other hand, wreaked havoc on coastal societies between 1849 and
1860. Sweeping past Usambara, they sent Parakuyo and Shambaa alike running to the
hills for safety. They attacked Zigua, Kamba, Mijikenda, and Oromo. They attacked the
coastal towns of Tanga, Vanga, and even the suburbs of Mombasa, with little resistance.
Evidence from contemporary observers clearly indicates that these were not small
incursions but large-scale cattle raids, carried out by warriors numerous enough, and
disciplined enough, to rout opposition from soldiers equipped with firearms.27  “The
terrible hordes of the Masai actually came down to the water’s edge,” wrote the
missionary Johannes Rebmann in 1857, “even to the plantation of Abdullah Ben Bisallah
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. . . and even to Makuba (the ferrying place from the Continent to the island of
Mombas).”28 The Giriama and Duruma people near Mombasa, formerly mixed agro-
pastoralists, resigned themselves to giving up their herds: “They have not the heart to
feed cattle,” wrote Charles New, “as they say the should only be doing it for the
Masai.”29
There is little mention in contemporary evidence of Parakuyo as agents in these
events. In light of this absence, there are essentially two sensible ways to view Parakuyo
involvement in the large-scale cattle raids that swept the region from 1849 to 1860. The
first admits that contemporary observers were generally correct in ascribing the raids to
Maasai; the chronology of large-scale raids then fits into a clean progression, with Maasai
venturing further to the east, year after year, until they reached the “water’s edge,” each
time of course returning with their captured cattle to the Maasai heartland. The second
view asserts that at least some of these large-scale raids were in fact carried out by
Parakuyo; the chronology then involves a kind of billiard-ball effect, with Maasai taking
cattle from areas inhabited by Parakuyo and their neighbors, which then necessitates
Parakuyo raiding towards the coast. Both are reasonable positions, but given the
weakened military capabilities and scattered settlement patterns of Parakuyo at the time,
and the aggressive, unified movements of Maasai, the first position is most likely the best
approximation of what actually happened: Maasai carried out most, and perhaps all, of
the large-scale raids against the coast between 1849 and 1860.
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During the 1860s and 1870s, a gradual shift in military capabilities relegated
Maasai, as well as Parakuyo, to playing secondary roles in regional conflicts, even those
grounded in the style of warfare they had helped to create. Maasai military capability was
sharply drained by the conflict with the Laikipiak federation, a group of resurgent Loikop
pastoralists in north-central Kenya who attempted to reclaim the rich grazing and water
sources of the Naivasha-Nakuru corridor. Maasai did defeat Laikipiak decisively in 1875,
but only at the expense of calling up warrior regiments from far afield, disrupting the
security of Maasai settlements as far south as the Maasai Steppe. On top of this, the
Maasai military machine gradually lost its luster as both allied and rival societies copied
its most successful innovations, often producing even more lethal systems. For example,
the enthusiasm with which Arusha farmers, originally dependent on Maasai protection,
copied the military system of their benefactors, combined with their proximity to aspiring
Chagga chieftains, allowed Arusha mercenaries to gradually supplant Maasai as the most
feared cattle raiders in the region (see previous chapter). At the same time, the astute
power grabs of Semboja in Shambaa, as well as the Chagga chieftains at Kilimanjaro,
fueled the development of not only their own militaries but also those of their rivals.
After the death of Kimweri Nyumbai, the Shambaa kingdom split into competing
factions, leading to a civil war that escalated during the early 1870s and continued until
German conquest. Several other societies were drawn into the conflict, including Maasai,
Parakuyo, Teita, and Zigua. Semboja and his son Kimweri each had contingents of
Maasai and Parakuyo mercenaries at their command, and they raided across Usambara.
Semboja, for his part, had become so influential that Maasai could no longer raid
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Usambara or the coast without permission from Semboja’s agent at Hedaru, a Shambaa
colony in western Pare.30
By the 1880s, then, Maasai were significantly weaker in military capability.
European visitors now regularly reported Maasai defeats: for example, that Pare
highlanders had “more than once given these freebooters [i.e. Maasai] a sound
thrashing,”31 or that in 1884 “strong parties of Masai were nearly annihilated by the
Hehe.”32 Both Maasai and Parakuyo now undertook mostly small-scale cattle raids, or
served as mercenaries for ambitious chieftains. Of the three “Maasai-style” warrior
contingents in the area – Maasai, Parakuyo, and Arusha – it was the Arusha who now
held a decisive superiority in logistical and combat capabilities. Observers sometimes
continued to ascribe large-scale raids to “Maasai,” at least in part because Arusha
warriors were more or less indistinguishable from Maasai. European traveller Ludwig
von Hohnel, untangling this confusion in 1887, wrote that Mandara, the strongest Chagga
chieftain at the time, launched his raids “with the help of the natives of Arusha-wa-ju,
and to their combined forces are due most of the thefts in the coast districts, with which
the Masai are generally credited.”33 The confusion continues among scholars today.
Referring to an 1881 attack by a force of 800 to 900 “Maasai” against the coastal town of
Sadani, recorded in the archives of the Spiritan mission, anthropologist Arvi Hurskainen
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assumed that this must have been the work of “the Parakuyo of Handeni area.”34 Indeed,
in geographical terms, Parakuyo settled in Handeni would have been the nearest “Maasai-
style” fighters to Sadani. However, given the state of affairs at the time, it seems doubtful
that the Parakuyo settlements in Handeni could have mustered 800 warriors for an
independent long-distance raid. It is much more likely, if we accept Hohnel’s advice from
1887, that these raiders were Arusha mercenaries acting under the guidance of a Chagga
chieftain.
The era of outright hostilities between Parakuyo and Maasai ended with a
whimper, in stark contrast to the “bang” that brought a close to Maasai-Loikop conflicts
in the north. Sometime in the mid-1880s, according to oral tradition, Parakuyo from the
Shambaa area sent a deputation of age-set spokesmen to negotiate with Mbatian, the
Maasai paramount laibon. Soon after, a formal peace treaty was enacted with a ceremony
at the Sangaruma ford on the Pangani river.35 As noble an event as it sounds, the sad fact
of the matter, as we have seen, is that by the time of this formal agreement, regional
political and military developments had already relegated both of these societies to
outsider status – in fact, despite their widespread fame, Maasai at this point may have
been outsiders to an even greater extent than Parakuyo, who at least resided in areas close
to well-worn commercial routes. Adding injury to insult, pastoralist societies in East
Africa were devastated by a series of ecological disasters that lasted from 1883 to 1892.
Pastoralists were hit in quick succession by bovine pleuropneumonia, rinderpest, and
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smallpox; the first two decimated herds, while the latter affected humans. This desparate
period, known as emutai (“to finish off completely”) in Maasai tradition, weakened
Maasai communities to the point that families were forced to find other means of
subsistence, including simply begging from their agricultural and hunting neighbors. It
also broke down intra-Maasai social cohesion, disrupted the complicated system of cattle
loans and transfers, and set in motion a wave of intense, small-scale raids that pitted
Maasai against Maasai as families struggled to rebuild their herds. On top of this, the
remaining Maasai herds were now easy targets for neighboring pastoralists such as
Parakuyo, Iraqw, Mbugwe, and others, who wasted no time in exacting revenge for
earlier raiding.36
The “triple disasters” suffered by Maasai were part of a region-wide ecological
crisis across East Africa during the 1890s. The crisis unfolded in a complicated
patchwork of epidemics, vermin infestations, drought, and famine; local contexts varied
dramatically, as some areas avoided one disease only to be hit by another.37 Parakuyo
experienced difficulties during these years that differed from those suffered by Maasai. In
Shambaa country, 1887 brought famine and smallpox, and was regarded by Parakuyo as
olari le ngolong, “the year of scorching sun.” When Maasai on the other side of the
Pangani moved across the river because their pastures were “finished,” Parakuyo, whose
herds were suffering from East Coast Fever, were eager to meet the new arrivals. Justin
Lemenye recalled that at that time, Maasai and Parakuo were still nominally enemies, but
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that Semboja arbitrated a truce enforced by his gun-toting soldiers (perhaps a more
realistic version of the “peace treaty” remembered in oral tradition). According to Justin,
the two groups had been separated for so long by this time that they were surprised by the
similarities in their languages, and found the differences in dialect funny. Maasai
eventually returned to the other side of the river, hoping to avoid transmission of East
Coast Fever from Parakuyo cattle to their own, but the experience left Parakuyo thinking
that it was now safe to move further into the lowland areas around Mazinde and
Mombo.38
Shifting States: Parakuyo During the German Years
The brutal style of German exploration must have been a shock to Maasai and
Parakuyo, who had been accustomed to holding the upper hand in relations with
travellers. In 1883, Gustav Fischer forced his way through the area west of Kilimanjaro,
killing an influential elder and two women along the way. Maasai in the area were so
upset by this offense that Joseph Thomson’s expedition, following close behind, was
forced to return to the coast for a time. When Count Teleki met a Maasai warrior in a
Shambaa trading town in 1887, he asked the warrior to lay his shield against a tree.
Teleki then ordered his Somali porters to shoot it to pieces as a demonstration of
European firepower. Perhaps the most vicious of them all was Karl Peters, who never
hesitated to shoot first and ask questions later. It was in Nguu country, with Parakuyo
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settlements nearby, that Peters acquired his first “treaty,” in which Nguu village headmen
“ceded” control of their territory to Peters. If this transaction bore any similarity to
Peters’ other interactions with Africans, it was an unpleasant experience for the Nguu
representatives. In one particularly telling encounter, Peters attacked a Maasai settlement
(in what is today north-central Kenya) after they demanded that he pay tribute. A strong
Maasai counterattack led to a sprawling, messy battle. Peters and his men prevailed, as he
readily admitted, by killing more than a hundred Maasai, burning their houses, and
cutting the heads off of corpses. Added to this forceful, abrupt shift in relations of power
was the unsettlingly rapid spread of European settlement and society in East Africa.
Harry Johnston, reporting in 1884 from the northern slopes of Usambara – well within
the range of Parakuyo villages – noted even to his own dismay that there were already
European settlements with “horses, churches, schools, dispensaries, and, I daresay,
tennis-courts and cricket-grounds.”39 By 1888, the German East African Company had
set up eighteen stations in Tanganyika; a stubborn coastal revolt from 1888 to 1890
quickly drew the German government into formally taking control of the colony.40
The formal consolidation of German control, spanning the years between 1890
and 1898, involved military action against Maasai and, on at least two occasions,
Parakuyo. While campaigns against the famous Maasai were recorded in detail, actions
against less familiar pastoralist groups such as Parakuyo were apparently not well-
                                                 
39 Johnston, Kilima-Njaro, 310-311.
40 Joseph Thomson, “Mr. Thomson’s Report on the Progress of the Society’s Expedition
to Victoria Nyanza,” Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society 5 (1883), 477;
Hohnel, Discovery, I, 74; Peters, New Light, 228; Iliffe, Modern History of Tanganyika,
90-91.
150
documented. Emin Pasha left Bagamoyo in April 1890 with a force of more than 500
men, travelling along the central caravan route. The expedition quickly turned into little
more than a rampage, during which Emin Pasha and his men destroyed nineteen villages
and looted at least two thousand head of cattle. One of these encounters was fought
against Parakuyo (recorded as “the Wahumba”) at Marenga-Makali in 1890. Emin Pasha
then turned his attention to Gogo recalcitrants before moving to the west and entangling
himself in local politics. In 1897, an expedition under the command of Lts. Glauning and
von Beringe fought with “Wahumba” and Maasai. A number of other campaigns targeted
Maasai specifically, but these appear to have been the only two launched against
Parakuyo. One possible explanation for Parakuyo avoidance of German punitive
measures was the quick acquiescence of Shambaa leaders (and thus, presumably, their
Parakuyo allies and mercenaries) to German rule. After the failure of the coastal Bushiri
rebellion in 1888-1889, Semboja displayed his characteristic political astuteness,
negotiating a deal by which the German flag was raised as Mazinde, and he lived his
remaining five years on a monthly wage from the colonizers. The Germans used Mazinde
as a linking station with Tanga to supply their military expeditions against Maasai and
Arusha to the west. Semboja’s son, Kimwere II, received a government subsidy for
leading punitive expeditions against Maasai. After Mazinde was raided by Maasai, or at
least “Maasai-style” rustlers, in 1893, Semboja was assigned the task of driving them
back to the south side of the Pangani river (although the Germans suspected, probably
correctly, that Semboja had in fact coordinated the Maasai raids to begin with).41
                                                 
41 Erick J. Mann, Mikono ya Damu: "Hands of Blood": African Mercenaries and the
151
German rule was particularly hard on Maasai pastoralists. When Hermann von
Wissman set out in 1891 to etablish German control of the northern caravan route, he
easily pushed aside Maasai warriors demanding tribute. On his return from a grueling
series of fights against Chagga chieftains and their “Maasai-style” (mostly Arusha)
mercenaries, Wissman found Maasai (and presumably Parakuyo) herds devastated by
rinderpest. Weakened already by emutai and German military campaigns, Maasai also
suffered from a disastrous civil war that broke out following Mbatian’s death between
two competing successors, Senteu and Lenana. Between 1898 and 1900 the followers of
Senteu, pushed to the Serengeti plains, withered completely under a combination of
attacks from other Maasai, Arusha, and German forces. Those Maasai who remained in
north-central Tanganyika, mostly of the Kisongo alliance, found themselves competing
for land with German ranchers settling around Kilimanjaro and Meru, which, along with
Usambara, were until 1914 the only areas of substantial European settlement. Maasai
were able to offer little resistance when, in 1905, the German government dramatically
reduced their territory and concentrated them in a dry reserve south of Arusha, restricting
their access to the richer highland pastures that were now controlled by European settlers.
The most resistance Maasai could muster was to spend the next decade annoying local
settlers and officials by occasionally grazing beyond the boundaries of the reserve.42 A
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British intelligence report prepared during World War I noted that after “bloody fights”
around Kilimanjaro at the onset of German rule, Maasai now had “a wholesome respect
for breech-loaders,” and had been reduced to infrequent cattle theft as their primary
martial activity. “They find life in the Reserve irksome,” the report continued, and “leave
it frequently to get away from control.”43
During the years of German rule, then, Parakuyo found themselves in a more
advantageous position relative to their Maasai rivals than at any other point in almost a
century. They, too, had suffered from emutai and German conquest, but apparently on a
much less devastating scale. In this context, with the threat of further German
“pacification” serving to restrain Maasai military responses, Parakuyo seized the
opportunity to take back at least a portion of the cattle that Maasai had raided from them
in previous decades. Details of Parakuyo interaction with government officials are hard to
come by, and in all likelihood, there was very little contact. German rule during the 1890s
required local collaborators, and sometimes shifted authority between influential figures
as loyalties were tested, but otherwise small-scale communities were left to go about their
lives with little interference. We can at least state with some certainty that the paramount
Parakuyo laibon, Maitei, who lived in the Shambaa area, was recognized as the “official”
representative to the government, while in the south, the government recognized
Masingisa Lekinana, an influential elder and the son of J. T. Last’s informant Lekinana
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Mtetere, as a local “headman.”44 But for the most part, pastoralists such as Parakuyo
could expect little help from German officials. When Walter Kisbey, a missionary
stationed at Korogwe, petitioned the German officer at Mazinde in 1895 on behalf of a
young “Maasai” (in this case, almost certainly Parakuyo) slave named Farajala who had
been living with him for a few months, and whose parents had sold him for the price of a
gun, he received a less than encouraging reply. “I am sorry, not to be able to grant
freedom to [him],” wrote Storch, the German officer, “as he had been bought a long time
ago, when Germans [had] not yet … come in this country … When you give Jaha [the
owner] the price of his gun, Farjallah will become free.”45
In 1914, British forces attacked Tanganyika, bringing World War I to East Africa,
and once again, relative social and military advantages among pastoralist groups were
inverted. Maasai also relished the opportunity to display their martial skills once again,
serving as spies and auxiliaries, at first for both sides, and then exclusively for the British.
European commanders quickly realized that pastoralists were not suitable for regular
army service, but had unique and valuable skills.46 The Intelligence Division of the
British Admiralty War Staff praised Maasai as “excellent auxiliaries” who “know all
watering places,” were capable of “big marches of 43-49 miles in several days running,”
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and who had an “extraordinarily quick means of communicating news.”47 Maasai
auxiliaries earned one cow per man per campaign; the intelligence report noted with a
hint of admiration that Maasai, “when cattle-stealing, drive off cattle at trot and gallop.
Every herd of cattle will follow the Masai at once.”48 British officer F. J. Bagshawe,
whose service in East Africa during the war proved to be the start of a long tenure as
administrator, was immediately impressed with Maasai auxiliaries. “They are great
walkers,” he wrote in his diary in 1916, “and come and go fearlessly through country in
[British] hands or enemy [hands] with despatches from one column to another.”49
Maasai also took advantage of the breakdown in colonial administrative control
caused by the war to reassert their dominance over neighboring pastoralists. The German
government now had little time to monitor Maasai activity, and Maasai promptly
reclaimed much of their former land north of the Reserve, including areas that were
nominally European farms and Crown lands. Further, they pressed to the east and south,
into territory that had been settled by Parakuyo, Chagga, Iraqw, Mbugwe and others, and
raided a substantial portion of the herds these groups had painstakingly built during the
Pax Germanica (often at Maasai expense).50 Bagshawe noted with some amusement in
1916 that Maasai were “taking advantage of [the] general disturbance caused by our
invasion to make a little private war of their own.”51 Later, as an administrator in 1921,
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Bagshawe visited Kapurwa, a prominent Maasai elder who lived north of Kibaya, and
found that much of the cattle in the area had been acquired in raids only a few years
earlier. “Had a good look at [Kapurwa’s] cattle,” Bagshawe recorded in his diary. “I
amused them very much by picking out the different strains of loot amongst the herd.”52
Becoming Sort-of Maasai:
Parakuyo Identity and Social Continuity
At some point during the late nineteenth century, Parakuyo began to identify
themselves – to certain outsiders – as Maasai. This practice, which is still common today,
almost certainly began in areas along trade routes, where Parakuyo interacted with
coastal traders and sometimes with Europeans. The reasons for doing so are
uncomplicated: the idea of “being Maasai” was now so closely linked to the image of the
“true” pastoralist, that anyone who intended to trade in cattle gained immediate social
prestige and negotiating leverage by claiming to be Maasai. For Parakuyo, this sleight of
hand was especially easy, considering their common historical and cultural roots with
Maasai. Maasai, for their part, went to great pains to make it clear that Parakuyo were not
Maasai. Since at least mid-century, they had commonly referred to Parakuyo as
embarawuio, a slur formed by adding the feminine form to the name Parakuyo. Maasai
considered Parakuyo, and indeed all former Loikop sections not fully dispersed and
absorbed into Maasai society, as socially inferior objects of contempt. In central
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Tanganyika, for example, Maasai no longer accepted the term “Humba,” which had long
been the ethnonym used by Bantu-speaking farmers to describe Loikop (and at first,
presumably, Maasai). When Parakuyo began to identify themselves as Maasai in their
transactions with outsiders, then, Maasai responded with strong disapproval.53 This clash
of ethnic ideologies was described beautifully by Harry Johnston in 1886:
If you ask the ‘Wa-Kwavi’ [i.e. Parakuyo] of Mazindi what they are, they will reply
at once, ‘Masai.’ And if you ask a nomad Masai of the Ruvu [Pangani], or elsewhere,
what he calls his congeners of Mazindi … he will answer contemptuously, ‘Em-
barawuio,’ a feminine word of not very pleasant signification.54
Johnston’s passage also supports the idea that centers of trade and multi-cultural
interaction (such as Mazinde) served as the flashpoints at which opportunistic Parakuyo
began to claim “Maasai-ness.” This self-identification, then, was an intentionally
superficial one – within their own communities, it is highly unlikely that Parakuyo
considered themselves Maasai.
At the same time, there is little reason to believe that all of the scattered former
Loikop communities in Tanganyika even considered themselves Parakuyo. The families
who belonged to the Parakuyo section of Loikop certainly did, of course, but most of
these people simply shifted to the eastern fringes of the Maasai Steppe, and then held
their ground in northeastern Tanganyika. Other scattered communities, including those
who fled west of the Maasai Steppe, may have descended from other, dispersed Loikop
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sections. Today, they all regard themselves as Parakuyo, but there is no evidence to
indicate if this was always the case, or when Parakuyo ethnic identity was extended to
these far-flung settlers. For example, there is evidence that Kiringidju, now a clan within
Parakuyo society, was once a separate section of Loikop, presumably dispersed by
Maasai. On top of this uncertainty, we should note that in the aftermath of the 1875
destruction of the Laikipiak federation, which left several former Loikop communities
completely dispossessed, a stream of ex-Loikop refugees flowed south to seek shelter in
the Pare lowlands, close to Parakuyo settlements in Usambara. Over time, these people
would also become Parakuyo.55
Despite their complicated ethnic identity, Parakuyo did maintain a sense of group
cohesion. They did this primarily through continued allegiance to their own lineage of
prophets, who asserted their independence from Maasai prophets. This would prove to be
a crucial factor in maintaining a sense of Parakuyo community during subsequent
scattering across a remarkably wide area, although Parakuyo laibons rarely served as
political leaders. The line of descent for Parakuyo laibons seems clearly established by
independent sources, and can be traced from the 1830s to the present day. At the time of
the first Maasai-Parakuyo conflicts, the Parakuyo laibon was named Lengunat.
Lengunat’s son, Mtango, occupied the position during the 1850s, when Parakuyo were
driven from the Naberera wells on the “Maasai” Steppe. Mtango is remembered as using
magic to close a pass west of the wells, blocking Maasai warriors (of the Kidotu age-
group) from further advance. He also participated with a young Semboja and the Zigua
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leader Kivuma in forming a combined military force of 350 men that launched a
disastrous attack on Maasai, who in response raided as far as Mazinde, Semboja’s base of
power, most likely sending Parakuyo deeper into Shambaa territory for refuge. Mtango’s
son Kirigo succeeded him for a short time, but authority then passed laterally to Kirigo’s
brother, Maitei, who continued the “blood partnership” with Semboja and held the
position until the end of German rule. In 1918, “official” recognition (by the colonial
government, at least) was passed to Maitei’s nephew Sameni Kivasis (better known as
Justin Lemenye), while ritual authority eventually passed to Maitei’s son Moreto. Moreto
took up the challenge of dealing with the British colonial administration, engaging in a
lively correspondence with officials, even as small groups of Parakuyo scattered in a
dramatic fashion across the country. Since Moreto’s death, authority has been transferred
laterally between his sons, apparently according to age.56
Justin Lemenye’s story is in itself a remarkable one, and worth telling here as it
offers particular insights into the unsettled state of Parakuyo life, and East African life in
general, during the years between 1880 and 1920.57 Justin was born Sameni Kivasis, son
of Kivasis Morindo, c. 1878 at Madala, a Parakuyo settlement in lowland Usambara near
Lushoto. Growing up under the protection of Semboja, Sameni and his friends
entertained themselves by stealing crops from Shambaa gardens. At the age of nine he
went to live with a Maasai family on the steppe, the result of an arrangement settling old
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debts between Maasai and Parakuyo, mediated by Semboja. When Sameni arrived at his
new home halfway between Naberera and Kibaya, he was amazed at the Maasai herds.
“There were so many,” he recalled later, “[that] I said to myself that the cattle which I
had been used to at home were cattle in name only.”58 In 1890 Sameni, along with many
others, fled from the devastating ecological disasters of emutai and sought shelter in the
part of Chagga country controlled by Rindi, a powerful chieftain. In 1891, he was one of
thirty children selected to attend a new mission school near Moshi. When the school
masters, Baxter and Stegall, moved across the border to Taveta, Sameni followed. On 2
April 1893 he was baptized and given the name Justin Lemenye; the following year, he
went to Mombasa to continue his education. During the coastal rebellion of Bushiri,
Justin and several of his colleagues were given military training and issued rifles. In the
event, as Justin remembered it, “out of the sixteen of us who had been issued with guns,
only one arrived at the firing line, but why worry, the fighting was over and the result
was peace.”59 During the last year of the nineteenth century, Justin divided his time
between Mombasa and Taveta, now working as a teacher and supporting a wife and
child.
In 1900, Justin met and immediately befriended A. C. Hollis, who offered him
employment in Nairobi. “Mr. Hollis gave me the job of writing everything I knew about
the Masai,” Justin recalled, “their customs, stories, and other such matters. I worked at
his house on this for about three months.”60 Justin, in fact, provided most of the material
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for Hollis’ widely-read The Masai: Their Language and Folklore (1905). He then served
as government interpreter to the Maasai living in Laikipia, in northern Kenya. Justin
resigned this position in 1903, and returned briefly to the area of his birth, where he
learned to his dismay that his father had passed away the previous year. He then accepted
a job with the Africa Inland Mission near Nairobi, supervising a school with three
teachers. While at this job, Justin met Theodore Roosevelt, who visited the school during
his well-publicized safari. “We went to sing to him in English,” Justin wrote, “and he
praised us greatly. We sang three quartets. He entertained us by singing two Nubi
songs.”61 In 1911, Justin resigned his position and returned home to Usambara, living in a
Parakuyo community. He served as an occasional assistant to Maitei, the Parakuyo
laibon, and did well enough that when Maitei resigned his “official” government position
in 1918, he selected Justin to take his place. He served as the Parakuyo “headman” for
Same district until 1947, when he finally retired at nearly seventy years of age. Justin felt
that he had finished his life’s work at this point, and was content: “Now we are old and
have our sons and daughters around us.”62
In September 1951, colonial administrator Henry Fosbrooke, a dedicated
researcher on pastoralists, visited Justin at his home. Fosbrooke took the opportunity to
write a letter describing this meeting to A. C. Hollis, now retired to England:
We have never met personally [Fosbrooke wrote to Hollis], but … recently I met your
collaborator … Justin Ol-omeni. You will be glad to hear that he appears very well
and happy. The only weakening of his physical powers is a slight deafness. He still
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speaks English with a very pure accent, though with some hesitancy owing to lack of
practice. He is living in a typical Masai Boma with his cattle around him … To me
one of the most remarkable features of the Masai is the strength of this call to the
pastoral life.63
Hollis replied enthusiastically:
I am delighted to receive the photograph of my old friend Justin Ol-omeni. I have had
no news of him since before I left Kenya in 1912, and I thought he had long been
gathered to his forefathers. Please remember me very kindly to him and give him my
best wishes. I believe he once named a bull-calf after me: I wonder whether he has
any of its progeny!64
Fosbrooke encouraged Justin to write an account of his remarkable life. The result, a
detailed work completed in less than half a year, impressed Fosbrooke: “If I am fortunate
enough to live seventy years or more and should I retain the faculties and strength to
write such a book as this, I will be a truly thankful man.”65 Justin’s autobiography was
published in Swahili as Maisha ya Sameni ole Kisavis, Yaani Justin Lemenye. An English
translation was published in the journal Tanganyika Notes and Records. Justin died on 23
June 1954, at about 76 years of age.
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Chapter 5
“Right and Wrong Views About the Wakwavi”:
Racial Theories and Veterinary Science in Colonial Approaches to Parakuyo
Pastoralists
African and European thought collided in the early colonial era. Different ideas
about knowledge and identity met head-on, intermingled and went forward together with
subtle and sometimes surprising results. Europeans looked to a growing collection of
scientific ideas in laying the intellectual groundwork for colonial rule, while Africans
drew on an equally formidable set of skills and knowledge gained through centuries of
accumulated experience. This chapter examines the various ideas at play in the collision
of British administrators and Parakuyo pastoralists in Tanganyika after World War I.
Faced with Parakuyo ethnic ambiguity, administrators drew on racial theories to impose a
suitable form of classification, especially by trying to place Parakuyo within a popular
myth of ruling and conquered races. Colonial veterinary officers asserted their authority
by drawing on recent innovations in disease research and range management concepts
derived from the relatively new science of ecology. Political and veterinary officers used
these ideas to justify a wide range of ambitious plans, but they were kept in check by the
realities of administering vast areas with limited resources. Parakuyo, for their part, had
their own well-developed ideas about political authority – they did not like it – and range
management.
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Victorian Racial Theories and Parakuyo Ethnic Ambiguity
In previous chapters, we have seen that the first European missionaries in East
Africa believed Maasai society originated as one among many groups of a wider, and
older, pastoralist society known as Loikop. During the late nineteenth century, however,
European observers inverted this model, making Maasai the “ruling race,” and seeing
dispersed Loikop remnants as merely subgroups of Maasai. In one sense, this was
understandable, given that Maasai by that time had established their cultural and military
dominance over other, now mostly defunct, Loikop sections. Maasai, for their part, also
were happy to reinforce this perception when Europeans inquired. However, the
continued existence of an independent, pastoralist Parakuyo community in Tanganyika
proved to be a constant puzzle to later European ethnologists. The debate over the precise
identity and history of “the Kwavi” has had a healthy life, and in fact continues to this
day. Since the late 1800s, however, in spite of substantial and readily available evidence
to the contrary, most European writers have continued to see Parakuyo and other ex-
Loikop remnants as castoffs from a more vigorous Maasai aristocracy. I argue that the
constant recourse to this myth reflected a powerful strain of racial thought among
Victorian and modern colonial intellectuals. Further, the readily apparent fact that
Parakuyo did not fit into this preconceived framework resulted in a permanently muddled
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and contradictory administrative approach to dealing with “the Kwavi.” At the same time,
there was an unresolveable tension between the European view of Maasai as the “ruling
race,” superior in blood, and the parallel view that “Kwavi” farmers had taken a step up
the evolutionary ladder from their supposed Maasai roots. This confused state of affairs
had a direct impact on Parakuyo history, producing restrictive and dismissive actions
intended to make them conform to Maasai policies, but at the same time producing “soft
spots,” frequent moments of official hesitation and sympathy that Parakuyo exploited for
all they were worth.
To begin with, we should remember that in East Africa, as elsewhere, Victorian
intellectuals interpreted humanity as a collection of groups arranged on a hierarchical
scale progressing from savagery to civilization. Richard Burton, for example, wrote in
1872 that the “wild” people of East Africa were composed of three “orders” indicated by
their subsistence practices, and arranged on a vertical scale from primitive to near-
civilized: the lowest rung was occupied by the “fierce pastoral nomads” such as Maasai
and Oromo. Above the pastoralists were the “semi-pastoral” peoples such as Kamba, who
despite a lack of permanent homes, at least “make their women cultivate the ground.” At
the top of the ladder, agricultural groups such as Shambaa and Nyamwezi had taken “the
first step towards civilization.”1 This interpretation of history was still prevalent during
the early colonial era. In 1924, for example, administrator F. J. Bagshawe described East
Africa as consisting of representatives of the two “great African races,” namely Bantu
and Hamitic-Nilotic, plus the “ancient, aboriginal” people he referred to as Bushmen.
                                                 
1 Richard F. Burton, Zanzibar: City, Island and Coast (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1872),
II, 71-72.
165
Filling in a stage omitted by Burton, Bagshawe described Bushmen as “stunted, nomadic
savages of an intellectual order so low that to this day their few descendants remain
incapable of absorbing even a veneer of the civilisation which has surrounded them for
generations.”2 Bagshawe even added an intermediate group for good measure: after the
Bushmen, but before the Bantu, came the “Hottentots,” who were “more numerous and
intellectually better developed, though still low in the social scale of African races …
pastoralists of a still primitive order.”3 Typically, of course, Europeans placed themselves
atop this hierarchy, and the colonial encounter was believed to be the best hope for the
lesser peoples below them on the ladder. Bagshawe, relating the history of his
administrative district, wrote that when the “two great human streams began to meet,”
forcing Bantu against Hamite and Nilote, “for several generations a tribal and racial
‘Donnybrook’ raged, which was ended only be the appearance of Europeans from the
east.”4
Victorian and later colonial writing on non-Western history leaned heavily on
images of epic migrations and conflicts between broadly conceived races and tribes. In an
essay on Indian colonial history, Sumit Guha has provided a compelling summary of
European racial thinking as it encountered and grappled with the complexities of history
in colonized areas of the world.5 Essentially, Victorian thinkers resorted to a widely held
interpretation of social formations that saw hierarchical systems as the result of the
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mixing and layering of conquering and conquered races. Many scholars have been quick
to ascribe this kind of thought to the influence of “Social Darwinism,” but as Guha and
others have noted, the myth of the “ruling race” has deep roots in European thought.
Further, its professedly scientific manifestation predates the publication of Darwin’s
Origin of Species in 1859, and was explicitly linked to geological, rather than
evolutionary, science. Following the publication of Lyell’s Principles of Geology in
1831, pioneering anthropologists laid their tracks directly atop the new geological
foundation. In their view, successive waves of human migration and conquest produced
observable markers in human populations just as geological processes left observable
traces underfoot. The new scientists of mankind intended to “read” human characteristics
in precisely the same way that geologists interpreted rock formations. It goes without
saying that, especially in a colonial context, the new science was amenable to making
judgments of superiority and inferiority. Indeed, the very first issue of the Journal of the
Ethnological Society of London, published in 1848, made this agenda very clear: “The
grand and fundamental idea of all modern changes is the natural equality of men … In the
name of science, we assert that the idea is false.”6 As Guha has demonstrated in the case
of India, British observers quickly formulated models of Indian history that ascribed
complex social formations to the interactions between conquering (more advanced) and
conquered (less advanced) groups. Similar approaches held sway in other imperial
locales.
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These theories were no doubt foremost in the mind of Richard Burton, whose
widely read works reflected and applied them to East Africa. To his mind, the evident
prowess of Maasai pastoralists in relation to less successful groups marked them as a
conquering race amid lesser peoples. Thus in 1857 Burton labeled Parakuyo, or “Humba”
as they were known in central Tanganyika, as “one of the terrible pastoral nations,” but
nonetheless merely “a tribe or a subtribe of the great Masai race.”7 This model was a
complete inversion of the view espoused by the missionaries who preceded Burton in
East Africa, but Burton’s opinion held sway. Sponsored by the Royal Geographical
Society, an organization so trendy in the second half of the nineteenth century that its
meetings were attended by royalty and celebrities simply for the prestige value of having
been seen there, Burton’s expeditions were avidly followed by scientists and the educated
public alike. The popularity enjoyed by Burton and the Society meant that the ideas they
promoted could easily overwhelm those of Krapf and his colleagues, who lacked formal
British schooling, were marked as suspect by their German nationality, and who were
often ridiculed when they attempted to advance “scientific” claims (that there was a
snow-capped mountain on the equator, for example). Medical doctor James Christie,
compiling his Cholera Epidemics in East Africa, did not hesitate to turn to Burton for
authoritative information on Maasai. Repeating Burton’s claims almost verbatim, Christie
proclaimed Maasai the “ruling race,” noting that while they and the “Wakwavi are
generally admitted to be of the same stock,” Maasai nonetheless represented “the original
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race.”8 By the end of the nineteenth century, this view had become solidly established
among European writers who considered themselves well-educated on East Africa. For
example, Joseph Thomson, another celebrity traveller sponsored by the Royal
Geographical Society, stated in 1884 that the “Kwavi” were merely “one among many
septs of Masai.”9
Burton’s inversion of ethnic and historical relationships between Maasai and
“Kwavi” was soon complemented by a subtle but tenacious modification in the types of
subsistence practices ascribed to each group. Several observers had noted by the late
nineteenth century that “Kwavi” groups (such as Parakuyo) had at least partially taken to
agriculture as a means of survival. Until the 1880s, this habit was generally admitted to
be a last resort adopted by people who, all things being equal, would have chosen to live
primarily as pastoralists. “Many of the [Wakwavi] … having been stripped of all their
cattle by their brethren, the Masai,” wrote Christie, “have been compelled to turn their
attention to agricultural pursuits as a means of obtaining a livelihood.”10 During the
1880s, however, some observers began to imagine that these communities had in fact
always been farmers, and that they represented a kind of agricultural Maasai. J. P.
Farler’s description of caravan routes, written for the Royal Geographical Society in
1882, posited that the “Kwavi” were “an agricultural branch of the Masai people” who
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had “reached a much higher stage of civilisation” precisely because they were farmers.11
This new interpretation led Farler to make several confused statements in his essay; for
example, he claimed that Mbatian, the paramount Maasai laibon (and a pastoralist if ever
there was one), represented the pinnacle of “Kwavi” society because he had established a
“regular dynasty” and “settled government” at his base in Monduli. In contrast, he
suggested that a settlement at Mkomazi (in the heart of Usambara, and a long-standing
Parakuyo refuge) was inhabited by Maasai because they did not cultivate but “breed
cattle, sheep, and goats, which they sell to passing caravans, and also exchange with the
Wakilindi [Shambaa] for grain.”12 The confusion introduced by this new interpretation
led later observers to write circles around themselves while trying to explain the
difference between Maasai and “Kwavi,” especially when colonial administrators were
confronted with the stark reality that Parakuyo remained firmly committed to cattle-
keeping as their primary form of subsistence.
Despite its many obvious shortcomings, the Maasai myth – of a “ruling race” and
a subgroup associated or “tainted” in some way with agriculture – was so firmly
entrenched by the turn of the century that it provided the framework for writing on
Maasai and Parakuyo well into the 1970s. Harry Johnston’s 1886 bestseller Kilimanjaro
contains perhaps the most confused and, paradoxically, enlightening expression of this
myth, published on the eve of formal colonial consolidation in East Africa. Johnston, a
precocious and snobbish traveller who fancied himself a master of all scientific
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disciplines, did not hesitate to advance a theory of Maasai history despite a profound lack
of evidence. Johnston’s history is a Kiplingesque tale spilling over with bloodthirsty
warriors, “rapine and dominion,” “pure” races and intermixtures, utterly lacking in
reliable detail but impressive in its enthusiastic racial worldview. Johnston considered the
“Kwavi,” including Parakuyo as well as other ex-Loikop groups settled at Taveta and
elsewhere, to be “a tribe of settled Masai who have turned from lawless robbers into
honest, thrifty tillers of the soil.”13 These “agricultural Maasai,” as Johnston called them,
had formed one side in the series of Loikop wars recently brought to a close, and were to
be encouraged in their settled pursuits, inasmuch as they were the best hope for receiving
“commerce” and “civilization” from Europeans. Johnston, in fact, may have been the first
in a long line of European writers to predict an imminent end to the existence of pastoral
Maasai. Noting the calamitous effects of emutai, the series of ecological disasters that
devastated cattle-keeping communities during the 1880s and 1890s, Johnston predicted
that Maasai would have to give up their cattle and learn to farm – “the process of
becoming ‘Wa-kwavi’,” as he put it – and that this would be the best thing for them,
“although they may fail to see it.”14
By now, the reader may have recognized a crucial paradox in the widely
circulated Maasai myth of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: one the one
hand, Maasai were seen as the “ruling race,” possessors of superior bloodlines and
admirable martial qualities; on the other hand, Parakuyo and other “Kwavi” had, in
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theory at least, taken a definite step up the evolutionary ladder towards civilization, a
development that was precisely the sort of thing colonial policy was supposed to
encourage. This logic of development through degeneration is evident in a wide sampling
of written material from the colonial era. The “Kwavi” communities of East Africa,
especially those that had taken up farming, were seen as inferior in racial theory: they
were “a little degenerated through the admixture of Bantu blood”; 15 they were “a
degenerate branch of the Masai”;16  they were “a bastard race of Maasai,” who had
“completely lost their warlike character and good qualities of the parent race.”17 Maasai
warriors, in contrast, exuded those “good qualities,” specifically in that they were finely
evolved, aesthetically pleasing martial specimens. “It is a treat to the anthropological
student to gaze on such magnificent examples of the fighting man,” wrote Johnston in
1886. “It is an example of one side of our multiform nature pushed to an exclusive and
supreme development. The Masai warrior is the result of the development of Man into a
beautiful Animal.”18 This description was echoed in 1905 by Charles Eliot, the first
Commisioner of the East Africa Protectorate, who added an editorial comment that
strikes at the heart of the issue: “They resemble the lion and the leopard, strong and
beautiful beasts of prey, that please the artistic sense, but are never of any use, and often a
very serious danger. Even so the manly virtues, fine carriage, and often handsome
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features of the Masai arouse a certain sympathy.”19 Thus, while “pure” Maasai blood was
superior to degenerate “Kwavi” blood, and certainly worth a sentimental pause for
admiration, Maasai simply could not provide any useful service in civilized society.
Parakuyo and other “Kwavi,” however, represented both a lost romantic past and a
possibility for the future. Colonial policy throughout the first half of the twentieth century
wrestled with this indeterminate, ambiguous status, with different administrators and
officials often butting heads over their different interpretations of how Parakuyo should
be treated. Parakuyo, for their part, wasted no time in exploiting this tension.
The tension in colonial attitudes towards “the Kwavi” emerged very quickly
during the consolidation of administrative control in East Africa. After A. C. Hollis had
compiled his work on Maasai ethnography in 1904, he sent the manuscript to Charles
Eliot for review. Eliot responded enthusiastically, but took the opportunity to raise
concerns about Hollis’s conceptions of the “Kwavi.” Hollis had presented the view that
“Kwavi” had only taken up agriculture after being stripped of their cattle. In his
comments on the manuscript, Eliot wrote to Hollis:
What are the right and wrong views about the Wakwavi? … I confess I don't like
the phrases “their poorer brethren who owing to the loss of their cattle have been
obliged to cultivate the soil.” … But of course if it is scientifically true, there is
nothing more to be said. But is it really indubitably true? Why should one assume
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that people who have settled down to a reasonable life and begun to behave like
decent bodies have done so under the stress of poverty?20
In the introduction that Eliot eventually contributed to Hollis’s book, published in 1905,
Eliot advanced an alternative hypothesis that resolved the obstacle “the Kwavi” presented
to the logic of racial theory. Eliot proposed that the “agricultural” section of Maasai was
in fact more ancient, and that “adventurous warriors detached themselves” from this
parent society to develop pastoralist frontier settlements, in the process becoming Maasai
“proper.”21 The Loikop wars, in this view, were conflicts between these opposing
agricultural and pastoralist streams of Maasai society, in which the fierce cattle-keepers
emerged victorious. This hypothesis failed to gain much traction in intellectual circles,
but it did reflect an ongoing uneasiness with the confusion over “Kwavi” identity. This
uneasiness often resulted in an almost comical state of confusion in government reports.
For example, in Sandford’s 1919 official report on Maasai, Eliot’s hypothesis is reprinted
with favorable comment, only to be followed immediately by a direct quotation from
Krapf that clearly indicates “the Kwavi” were originally pastoralists.22
For the officers charged with setting up functioning administrations in
Tanganyika, practical concerns usually outweighed reflection on subtle distinctions.
Colonial administrations essentially consisted of a small number of European officers
working in collaboration with a larger cadre of African subordinates in an effort to
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control very large areas with diverse populations. The popular conception of the “Thin
White Line,” as Anthony Kirk-Greene has demonstrated, was if anything an
understatement of the realities of colonial administration, especially during the interwar
years.23 Until the 1930s, the central administration, or secretariat, in each colony
consisted of little more than a governor, a chief secretary, and a small group of assistant
secretaries. Outside of the central headquarters, colonies generally were organized into
provinces, districts, and sometimes sub-districts; the officers at each level, then, were the
provincial commissioner (PC), district commissioner (DC), and assistant district officer
or administrative officer (ADO or AO). Looking at the numbers for Tanganyika, an area
of 363,000 square miles with a population of more than five million people, the fact that
administrators managed to do anything at all is remarkable. In 1920, shortly after Britain
had wrested control from Germany, Tanganyika was governed by 33 DCs and 88 ADOs;
provincial administrations had not been established yet. Five years later, the situation had
not changed much: nine PCs, 35 DCs, and 78 ADOs. In practice, the DC served as the
focal point for almost all interactions between Africans and the colonial administration.
In the minds of many Africans, the DC and government were synonymous, and the DC
often found himself in a lonely and potentially precarious position. Perhaps surprisingly,
though, as Kirk-Green points out, the thin white line rarely was at risk of losing its
authority, because it had four key elements on its side: coercion, collaboration,
confidence and competence. Each of these elements came into play during the contest of
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wills between Parakuyo and administrators during the 1920s. The threat of force usually
sufficed in British Tanganyika, whose people had survived the brutal warfare of the
German years, although elsewhere in Africa British governments often had to back their
threats with actual firepower. More important in Tanganyika were the large numbers of
African employees who did the lion’s share of administrative work: messengers,
interpreters, policemen, clerks, treasury staff, forestry assistants, and, especially
important in relation to Parakuyo, veterinary guards. At the same time, each district had a
parallel government more directly responsible for African affairs: the key figures here
were “paramount chiefs” and district “headmen,” often selected by the colonial
administrators themselves, but usually vested with at least a thin veneer of recognized
political legitimacy. The DC simply could not function, or indeed survive, without the
collaboration of both his African staff and the local “native” administrators. Finally, we
should note that the psychological elements, confidence and competence, did play a role
in colonial administration. Officers believed that their authority was real and justified;
beyond that, most of them took pride in their work and their own competence. As
described below, this sense of pride certainly affected official responses to Parakuyo
assertions of their own autonomy.
For the men on the thin white line, racial theory provided a practical basis for
forging viable political units in a quick and, they hoped, efficient manner. Colonial
officers disliked having small, independent ethnic groups in their territory, because their
presence complicated the pursuit of efficient administration. When possible, officers
“effaced subtle distinctions” between these small groups, as James Giblin has pointed
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out, by lumping them together or merging them into more populous groups for
administrative purposes; this process shaped the Zigua and Nguu “tribes” out of a much
more complicated patchwork of local structures.24 In northern Tanganyika, officers saw
one dominant pastoralist group – Maasai – next to whom all other “kindred tribes,” such
as Parakuyo, were “small and insignificant.” The question of Parakuyo, or “Kwavi,”
identity, then, would be decided not by anthropological speculation, but by finding the
most expedient “tribal” designation that could be assigned to these ambiguous
pastoralists. This problem introduced a different kind of tension into colonial attitudes
towards Parakuyo. As we have seen, colonial officials saw Parakuyo as falling
somewhere between pastoralism and agriculture. But most tribal designations were
assigned with a particular role in mind: farmer, cattle-keeper, soldier, plantation laborer,
urban worker. These classifications did not necessarily have anything to do with
“traditional” cultural characteristics, but at the same time, they did not materialize out of
thin air. Historians disagree on the precise relationship between precolonial cultural
history and colonial “tribalization”; the issue has produced a long and often politicized
series of debates. In some ways, the debate has been unnecessary: at the very least, we
should recognize that colonial intent and African agency intertwined and played off of
each other in complicated ways. Beyond that, however, historians have not appreciated
the degree to which this relationship developed in ways that neither “side” intended.
The importance of contingency in the evolution of colonial “tribes” can be
illuminated with a brief case study. Certain groups in colonial Africa were designated
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“martial races” because they were important sources of soldiers for colonial armies. This
custom developed in colonial India, where officials charged with maintaining an effective
army needed to invent efficient recruiting tactics amind a bewildering array of cultural
diversity. We should not be surprised, then, to learn that the effort fell back on, and took
inspiration from, racial theories and classifications then in vogue in Europe. The Indian
designations went through several modifications, after the 1857 mutiny prompted
officials to reconsider their recruiting strategies, and then again in the 1880s when
Russian threats on the northwestern frontier forced a shift in emphasis in that direction.
Colonial officers transplanted the Indian system (not to mention Indian troops) intact to
Africa. In French West Africa, for example, the “martial” designation fell to Bambara,
Tukolor, Malinke, and Wolof peoples; in the British colonies of eastern Africa it fell to
Yao, Kamba, Nandi and northern Ugandan peoples. In most cases, groups gained this
attribute simply by virtue of living close to recruiting stations, and by demonstrating their
willingness to enlist and submit to military discipline. European officials then took hints
and glimpses from local tradition and reshaped them to produce ethnological treatises that
played up the fighting capabilities of designated “martial” groups during precolonial
times. The “martial races” themselves often participated willingly in the maintenance of
this illusion. Kamba society did not have a particularly distinguished precolonial military
system compared to others in the region; early colonial officials, in fact, did not think
they would make good soldiers. But circumstances soon shifted: officials began to see
Kamba as an efficent source of recruits, and Kamba began to see the army as a route
towards economic and social status. Kamba then embraced the self-image of a “martial”
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people to such an extent that after independence, they used the idea against other ethnic
groups as justification of their dominant status in the Kenyan army. As Timothy Parsons
has demonstrated, Kamba soldiers and colonial officers clearly did not see eye to eye
over the meaning of large-scale enlistment; for example, Kamba soldiers expected (and
pursued) considerations and influence in the shaping of policies that affected Kamba
civilian affairs. The creation and maintenance of “martial tribes,” then, involved the
constant interplay of chance, negotiation and unintended effects, on the part of both
Africans and Europeans.25
“War Must Be Waged Against Fevers and Other Diseases”:
Colonial Veterinary Science, East African Pastoralists and the Effort to Gain Control of
Tanganyika’s Rangeland Ecology
Parakuyo dedication to cattle-keeping meant that in addition to dealing with
demands for ethnic clarity from administrators, they also would have to deal with the
concerns and plans of veterinary officers charged with maintaining the health and
productivity of Tanganyika’s rangelands. The veterinary officers assigned to Tanganyika,
and to a certain extent the political officers as well, saw rangeland management in terms
of the new, and in many ways immature, optimism fostered by the apparent success of
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European scientific research and technological development. In a colonial setting, this
optimism often translated into epic visions of ecological transformation. As Charles Eliot
put it in The East Africa Protectorate (1905):
Man reclaims, disciplines, and trains Nature. … Marshes must be drained, forests
skilfully thinned, rivers be taught to run in ordered courses … a way must be
made across deserts and jungles, war must be waged against fevers and other
diseases whose physical causes are now mostly known.26
The reality of colonial administration at the ground level, however, where local officers
implemented policy with miniscule staff and resources, usually imposed a severe
handicap against the realization of these visions. This was certainly the case in the years
immediately following the First World War, and even more so in Tanganyika, a relative
backwater among colonial possessions because of its Mandated Territory status, and
considered a lesser sibling to its more prized neighbors, Kenya and Uganda. The “thin
white line” extended to the applied sciences: in 1904 there were 21 European medical and
veterinary officers for all of German East Africa; in British East Africa, there were
fifteen.27 These officials theoretically were to protect the health of humans and cattle in
the colonies, but in practice they often could do little more than watch as events unfolded.
Our discussion of colonial veterinary science will focus on responses to three of
the most serious cattle diseases in East Africa: rinderpest, trypanosomiasis, and
theileriosis. During the first few decades of colonial rule, East Africa suffered a dramatic
increase in the frequency and severity of outbreaks of these diseases. A rapid series of
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disruptions provided favorable conditions for epidemics: the ecological crises of the
1890s, the often violent consolidation of colonial rule, the disruption to the food and
labor supply caused by the First World War, and recurrent famine that uprooted entire
societies.28 Colonial officials may not have recognized the historical links between these
factors, but they certainly noticed the epidemics in their midst, and they raised alarms
early and often. Colonial officers were among the first to champion a serious effort to
identify and combat the microscopic sources of disease. The Earl of Crewe, Secretary of
State for the Colonies, delivered an address at the Royal African Society in 1909 in which
he pleaded with his colleagues to reorient their patterns of thought: “We have been in the
habit of describing a lion in the path as something very serious … [while] we speak of
brushing away some small matter as easily as brushing away a fly.”29 His point, of
course, was that diseases such as trypanosomiasis, carried by tsetse flies, did much more
damage than lions to lives and livelihoods in Africa. “Entomology,” meaning the study of
insects as vectors of disease, was a challenge that “must be persevered with and carried
through to the utmost extent if we are to make Africa all that we hope to see it.”30 Crewe
appointed a committee to promote the study of “economic entomology,” with hopes of
“stimulating official and other residents to collect and observe noxious insects, and of
affording instruction in the use of scientific methods.”31 But again the reality of limited
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resources for an immense continent undercut this ambitious plan: the committee intended
to employ only two scientists, one stationed in East Africa and the other in West Africa.
Rinderpest, known for centuries in Europe and Central Asia, first appeared in
Africa in the late 1880s, entering via Ethiopia and then spreading rapidly to the south and
southwest. A highly contagious viral disease, rinderpest causes high fever, bloody
diarrhea, and lesions that lead to bloody discharges from the cow’s mouth and nose, and
is usually fatal. Transmitted through inhalation, rinderpest requires close contact between
healthy and sick cattle for the infection to spread, because the virus dies after only a few
hours outside the host. Nonetheless, rinderpest devastated herds across Africa, and was
one of the fundamental components of the ecological crisis of the 1890s, known as
emutai in Maasailand. European scientists devoted considerable effort to the study of
rinderpest, especially as it affected European-owned cattle in South Africa. Boers in
Transvaal and Orange Free State developed their own preventive measures, using a
mixture of bile and blood from dead cattle to immunize healthy ones. Robert Koch,
working in South Africa in 1897, built on this homegrown knowledge to develop more
reliable methods for injecting bile and blood serum. During the 1904 outbreak, Theiler
and Stewart Stockman devised an even better version of immune serum injection.
Essentially, they created “hyper-immune” cattle by selecting already immune cattle and
injecting them with large quantities of infected blood; this, in turn, made their own blood
serum highly effective when injected into non-immune cattle. Despite these advances in
prevention, the cause of rinderpest was still completely unknown. Transmission was
believed to be through blood, mucus and other sections. The infective agent responsible
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was believed to be so small that it simply could not be seen with available microscopes at
the time.32
In contrast to the relatively recent and sudden arrival of rinderpest,
trypanosomiasis and theileriosis have much longer histories in Africa. Trypanosomiasis
also appears in a form that attacks humans and is often called “sleeping sickness.”
Trypanosomes are protozoa capable of changing their characteristics while in a host’s
bloodstream, frustrating the host’s immune system response. Tsetse flies are the vectors
of trypanosomiasis; the most prevalent species in Africa are Glossina morsitans and
Glossina swynnertoni. Tsetse flies acquire the trypanosomes from wildlife that are highly
resistant, such as bush pigs and bushbuck, which live in areas of dense brush and thickets.
The flies then infect humans and domestic cattle. Five different populations, then, are
involved in the transmission of trypanosomiasis: humans, livestock, plants, tsetse flies,
and the trypanosomes themselves.33 Scientists knew little about tsetse-carried disease
until 1895, when Walter Hely-Hutchinson, the governor of Natal and Zululand,
spearheaded a research effort in response to a severe outbreak. This effort quickly
overturned the commonly accepted notion that tsete killed animals by injecting them with
poison, much like snake bites. Scientists discovered that tsetse carried a kind of blood
parasite, called Trypanosoma after its screw-shaped structure, already familiar to
researchers who had identified it in Indian rats, horses, and mules. During the severe
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outbreak of sleeping sickness in Uganda in 1905, two army medical officers, Gray and
Tulloch, discovered that trypanosomes bred exclusively in tsetse, and not other types of
blood-sucking flies. Researchers soon learned that tsetse acquired the parasite from wild
animals such as buffalo, kudu and wildebeeste. Despite instense research around the
globe, however, no method of vaccination or inoculation was developed during the early
colonial era. A widespread belief that cattle could not develop immunity led most
colonial officials to advocate a policy of complete segregation between cattle and tsetse
fly.34
East Coast Fever (ECF) is the common name for the epizootic form of theileriosis
that affects East Africa. The disease is transmitted among cattle by the brown ear tick,
Rhipicephalus appendiculatus, which thrives in cool, moist environments and spends
most of its life resting in soil and vegetation, especially among tall grasses. Cattle
infected with virulent ECF develop severe diarrhea, swollen lymph nodes, edema, and
nasal discharges. The transmission of ECF is closely linked to the life cycle of the tick,
which proceeds through three stages: larva, nymph and adult. Adult females lay their
eggs on the ground, several thousand at a time. The eggs take about a month to hatch,
depending on weather conditions. After the larva is born, it immediately crawls to the top
of a blade or stem of grass, and waits for an animal to brush past. When a host presents
itself, the larva crawls onto it, searches for a suitable spot, and begins to feed. At this
point, the larva can acquire ECF from infected cattle. After three days, the larva drops
back to the ground and molts for about three weeks, emerging next as a nymph. The
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nymph repeats the process of feeding, crawling onto the next available host, to which it
can now transmit the disease as it feeds, or acquire the disease if it did not do so during
its larval stage. The nymph also drops off after three days, and undergoes a second molt
of about two and a half weeks before emerging as an adult. Adult males and females then
crawl onto another animal, where they mate and feed; if they acquired ECF as nymphs,
they can now transmit the disease as well. Females ingest large quantities of blood during
this stage to feed their eggs; they then drop off and begin the cycle again. Adult females
do not transmit ECF to their eggs, so each tick generation much acquire the infection on
its own.35
Colonial research on theileriosis developed concurrently with studies of
trypanosomiasis. Robert Koch, a renowned German bacteriologist, named the disease
East Coast Fever while studying it in Tanganyika shortly after the turn of the century.
Koch realized that ECF was endemic in a long, narrow belt along the East African coast,
where local cattle had developed immunity, but cattle passing through in either direction
risked infection. Koch was invited to South Africa in 1903 during an outbreak there, in
the hope that he could develop a method of artificial inoculation. Koch failed in his
attempt, but during 1904 and 1905, South African researchers led by Theiler and
Lounsbury at least identified the brown tick as the primary vector. They also learned that
disease transmission was intimately connected to the tick’s life cycle, after experiments
with injecting infected blood straight into healthy cattle had no effect whatsoever. A 1904
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intercolonial conference at Cape Town revealed the difficulties in preventing ECF
transmission. Researchers had observed that, if necessary, ticks can remain perched on
blades of grass for months on end without feeding. Even if all cattle were to be removed
from a grazing area, the ticks infesting it would be capable of transmitting disease more
than a year later. Dipping cattle in solutions such as arsenic or paraffin also proved
unsatisfactory, because ticks only feed for three days at a time, meaning that cattle would
have to be dipped at least twice a month. The conference concluded that the best
available method of control was to kill all infected cattle immediately, leave infected
grazing areas clear for almost two years, and dip cattle as frequently as possible. Most
European cattle owners found these drastic measures both unpalatable and impractical;
African cattle owners were even less likely to accept them. In the absence of practical
measures, the disease continued to be a serious concern in colonial Africa; for example,
an outbreak devastated many cattle-keeping areas of Tanganyika between 1906 and
1908.36
Aside from monitoring and responding to disease, colonial veterinary officers
were charged with maintaining the health of African rangelands. They grounded their
approach to herd management in new theories of ecological science. Their views of range
management and African pastoralism were influenced in particular by two recently
developed concepts: plant succession and carrying capacity. The theory of plant
succession, described in a general form by Frederic Clements in 1916 and adapted
specifically for use in rangeland policies a year later, posited that vegetation in different
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environments developed through a series of characteristic stages. In this view, vegetation
ultimately reached a stable “climax” stage that represented the most appropriate, balanced
combination of ecological relationship; the goal of scientists and administrators, then,
should be to find ways to maintain stability in landscapes under their supervision. The
elegance of Clements’ ideas, and his growing popularity in academic and government
circles, led officials across the globe to adopt them in their own practice. At the same
time, veterinary officers thought in terms of carrying capacity, which, in a rangeland
context, meant the highest number of cattle that could be sustained by a defined grazing
area, above which the landscape suffered from “overgrazing.” This idea also had gained
popularity in ecological circles by virtue of its elegance. In practice, however, the sheer
complexity of the biological relationships involved often led researchers to make crudely
reductive generalizations, leading in turn to clumsy interpretations of evidence and then
ill-informed policy recommendations. These unfortunate effects were nowhere more
evident than in colonial Africa, where officials were handicapped not only by biological
complexity, but by lack of resources and an unfamiliar terrain. Further, the models of
range management in which they had been schooled had been developed in western,
fenced rangelands, leaving administrators at a loss in understanding the wide-ranging
movements of African pastoralist societies.37
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Colonial veterinary and agricultural officers were schooled in these current
concepts and carried them to Africa. The extent of this influence, and the state of
ecological and veterinary science, in Tanganyika during the 1920s can be discerned by
examining the work of John Phillips, the deputy director of the colony’s Department of
Tsetse Research. The department had not been established until 1925, after its first
director, C. F. M. Swynnterton, had spent the previous four years attempting to survey
tsetse-infested areas in central Tanganyika. The department centered its research on
Kondoa-Irangi and Shinyanga; field research was conducted by Phillips under
Swynnerton’s supervision. In a series of academic journal articles published in 1930 and
1931, Phillips made clear the influence of contemporary ecological thinking on his own
research, citing with admiration the work of Clements and the U.S. Forest Service and
Biological Survey. One of Phillips’ essays described his application of the ideas of plant
succession to his own research in central Tanganyika. Phillips also expressed his desire to
see cattle-keeping techniques in Africa brought in line with the lessons of applied
ecology, recommending that officers responsible for pasture management and veterinary
work be kept up to date on the latest findings. Professional recognition and a sense of
heroism helped to make the effort worthwhile: an academic journal praised Phillips and
his colleagues in 1929 for ignoring the risk posed by this kind of research to their own
health, noting that “the danger seems to be taken as all in the day’s work.”38 Again,
though, the reality of the thin white line constantly undercut the grand visions of colonial
researchers. In 1931, Phillips proposed establishing an ecological survey to cover all of
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southern, central and eastern Africa, to be staffed with nineteen research officers, one
secretary, fourteen assistants, and several “Asiatic” clerks. This peculiar combination of
serious research and unrealistic goals colored the attitudes of colonial officers towards the
African farmers and cattle-keepers under their administration.39
Collisions of European and African Thought in Colonial Encounters
The collision between European and African thought rarely has been appreciated
for the rich, complex engagement that it was, or for the insights careful study can provide
into the historical contingency behind both the evolution of scientific thought and social
responses to science. Colonial officials often knew less than they presumed, or knew less
than implied by their actions and policies; Africans usually knew much more about their
environments than colonial officials cared to admit. Colonial administrators had seen
with their own eyes the tangible benefits of experimental methods and rigorous critical
thinking; many Africans had not seen these benefits. Western science arrived in their
communities parcelled with colonial rule, usually in the form of heavy-handed policies
based on incomplete or incompatible information, often aggravating the problems they
were intended to solve. African societies, not surprisingly, remained unimpressed by such
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meddling in local livelihoods. In some cases, long-established African approaches to
disease, agriculture and pastoralism simply worked better than the “scientific” but crude
schemes enforced by colonial government. Still, we should be careful not to overstate the
case: just as we should recognize that African knowledge sometimes trumped western
science circa 1920, we also should reject a binary opposition between “bad” colonial
science and “good” African knowledge. In some cases, science-based methods and skills
that clearly provided superior benefits over local African practices were resisted or
ignored because of the domineering ways in which they were introduced. The transfer of
western science to Africa is inseparable from its colonial context and the stubborn racism
embedded in colonial attitudes; in retrospect, this might have been the greatest tragedy in
the colonial encounter.
Much of the science practiced in colonial Africa was misguided in the sense that it
appears to us, today, as a departure from careful reasoning, and in the sense that it
sometimes failed to meet basic standards even at the time. Colonial officers were a well-
educated group, but still they went to Africa with knowledge and skills profoundly
overmatched by the new environments and problems they were charged with managing.
In this context, the slow and careful approach to gathering information, and then using it
to make informed decisions, often lost out to sweeping generalizations and premature
policy decisions. Colonial Africa was a hotbed of racial theorizing; South African settlers
and administrators, for example, avidly carried the torch of phrenology. Developed by
Franz Gall earlier in the century as a means of understanding individual psychology,
racial theorists adapted phrenology to explain differences between groups of people.
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During the Xhosa Wars of the 1830s and 1840s, South African doctors collected the
skulls of African battlefield casualties and used them to “prove” theories of racial
superiority and inferiority.40 During the 1890s, the West African colonial service lost
several of its best employees to pseudoscience: Europeans used racial theories to erect a
rigid color bar that forced African and West Indian administrators – some of them high-
ranking – to step aside in favor of less competent white officers.41 Administrators often
made crude leaps of logic to hide their own dim awareness of local contexts.
Commenting on the hardships brought to central Tanganyika during the 1921 famine, the
Dodoma district officer saw a teleological progression in a temporary recourse. “The
Wagogo and Wanyaturu now distinctly rank as agricultural as well as pastoral tribes,” he
wrote in his annual report. “Even the Masai and Tatoga of this district cultivate shambas
[gardens] and this definite step from the purely pastoral to the agricultural stage is
undoubtedly due to the famine.”42 European officials rarely treated pastoralists in the
same way that they treated Africans from agricultural or trade-based societies as
relatively intelligent, subordinate partners. To explain his lack of progress in bringing
Parakuyo and Maasai into the administrative fold, one officer wrote in 1925 that
“progress” with these people “must, of necessity, be slow. … The difference in mental
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status between an unsophisticated Masai warrior and a Coastal native from the Township
of Dar-es-Salaam or Tanga is as wide as that between a European and a Somali trader.”43
European racial attitudes notwithstanding, East African pastoralists had a
sophisticated understanding of rangeland ecology, gained through centuries of trial and
error. This extensive knowledge transferred from one society to the next: Maasai
pastoralists, for example, learned and adapted the cattle-keeping techniques of their
Loikop predecessors, who in turn learned them from previous Cushitic-speaking
inhabitants of the Rift Valley, and so forth. In describing this accumulated expertise,
historians of East Africa speak in terms of African “control” of precolonial
environments.44 In this recent but now relatively well-established view, nineteenth
century East Africa consisted mainly of settled areas near water sources, where the
landscape was controlled with fire, clearing and grazing. Both farmers and pastoralists
used burning to a great extent; European missionaries were stunned by seemingly charred
landscapes that turned vibrantly green during the next rainy season. The settled areas
were separated by waterless Grenzwildnisse, uninhabited brush country populated with
wildlife and tsetse flies. The borders between settled areas and Grenzwildnisse constantly
shifted, but the key was human management of vegetation, for example by keeping
grasses closely cropped, which in turn helped to confine disease vectors to certain areas.
As anyone who has tried to swat away persistent tsetse flies – or had to remove a tick
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from the soft spot behind their knee – can tell you, walking through tall grass in East
Africa presents challenges that strip the romanticism from safari adventures. Most people
would prefer to walk through managed grasslands, burned frequently and grazed by
cattle.
The issue of African environmental “control” involves a sometimes fine line
between appreciating local knowledge and potentially overstating the case. Certainly, the
immense practicality of African knowledge was systematically ignored well into the late
twentieth century. John Ford, in a trailblazing study of trypanosomiasis published in
1971, argued that precolonial African societies dealt with disease by limiting, but not
eliminating, contact between tsetse flies and humans with their cattle.45 Contact took
place in areas of wood or thicket intentionally left uncleared by local communities; these
thickets would have harbored wild boards and bushbucks, the preferred hosts of tsetse
flies. Ford’s key assumption was that occasional movement through these disease-
harboring zones built up resistance in humans and cattle, in effect sacrificing small
numbers of cattle and humans but minimizing losses in the long run. At the time, and
certainly during the colonial era, most scientists assumed that cattle could not develop
immunity to trypanosomiasis; since then, studies have shown that they can and do.
Following on Ford’s work, James Giblin advanced a theory of precolonial African
control of East Coast Fever. In the case of ECF, unlike that of trypanosomiasis, scientists
have long known that cattle develop resistance by surviving the disease. Giblin argued
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that clearing, burning and grazing of pastures kept tick infestation confined to limited
areas; by allowing occasional exposure of cattle to tick-infested areas, East African
cattle-keepers boosted the resistance of their herds. One Parakuyo informant told Giblin
that all calves had to go through a mild episode of ngidano (ECF).46 Ford and Giblin
made invaluable contributions to our appreciation of African knowledge, but this
argument can be pushed too far.
We should remember that although Africans and Europeans made use of careful
observations and accumulated knowledge, they both tended to fill gaps in their
knowledge with speculation and over-generalization. Historians in recent years have
constructed a narrative that assumes Africans “controlled” their precolonial
environments; in this view, their control broke down after the ecological disasters of the
1890s and, especially, because of the unsettling effects of colonial intrusion. Following
this school of thought, Giblin argues that precolonial East Africans “maintained a stable
state of theileriosis enzooticity” that “was lost in the colonial period, allowing East Coast
Fever to become and remain a dangerous epizootic.”47 There is a great deal of value in
appreciating the detailed knowledge and skills that African societies acquired through
centuries of trial and error. During the late nineteenth century, for example, European
observers noted that some pastoralists inoculated their cattle against certain diseases by
grafting infected tissue from dying animals into the skin of healthy ones. We should be
mindful, however, of the danger in affording precolonial Africans an unrealistic level of
biological understanding. Examples of African expertise that might surprise western
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readers are balanced by practices that fit comfortably into the familiar category of folk
remedies. Giblin’s informants told him that pastoralists in northeastern Tanganyika
treated East Coast Fever by “applying heat and the sap of a Euphorbia tree to swollen
lymph nodes.”48 Perhaps historians would do well to remind their readers that colonial
responses to disease during the first few decades of the twentieth century were sometimes
no more scientific than folk remedies themselves. Early colonial officials were convinced
that tsetse fly infestation prohibited human and animal settlement, even though
contradictory evidence paraded in front of their eyes. Tsetse “renders thousands of square
miles of Africa uninhabitable,” wrote David Bruce in 1906. “No horses, cattle, nor dogs
can venture, even for a day, into the so-called ‘fly country.’”49 European ecologists
similarly maintained a steadfast commitment to crude concepts of carrying capacity and
overstocking, even as East African pastoralists subsisted comfortably on rangelands that
provided food for much higher numbers of cattle than theoretically possible. Historians
should be mindful of the different ways that colonial officials and Africans were acting
based on limited information.50
The early history of British colonial veterinary policies in northern Tanganyika
sheds light on the subtleties hidden in the collision of African and European thought.
British efforts towards veterinary control of Maasai rangelands began in 1919, with the
appointment of J. W. Hayes as the area’s first veterinary officer. Hayes’s position
mirrored that of the lonely DC; likewise, his ability to conduct affairs at all rested on a
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large staff of African employees who carried out policy. This reality was not lost on
Europeans in the administration. At his appointment in 1919, Hayes was backed by eight
veterinary guards; by 1926 that number had increased to 27. The veterinary officer
praised these employees in a 1926 letter to his provincial commissioner:
The Veterinary Guards provide a most valuable link between the Masai and the
European veterinary staff. Their duties consist of maintaining a constant patrol of
Masailand and examining stock for disease, looking out for illicit stock
movement, assisting in water conservation, collecting information about tsetse,
and forwarding useful information of any nature … There is not the least doubt
but that without their services very little could have been done.51
The presence of a large staff of African guards did little to convince Maasai of the
usefulness of western techniques of rangeland management and disease control. The
veterinary officer’s ambitious and sometimes impractical efforts were met with
indifference and passive resistance from Maasai cattle-owners for the next several
years.52
Early attempts at fighting cattle disease saw mixed results. During the First World
War, Maasai cattle from Kenya brought bovine pleuropneumonia (BPP) south across the
border, leadaing to an outbreak in Tanganyika Maasailand in 1917. Officials crafted a
plan to inoculate all Maasai cattle against the disease, but only two hundred (out of an
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estimated half million in Maasailand) were inoculated before the attempt was abandoned.
With the help of the newly established veterinary department, the administration did
manage to establish a quarantine zone enclosing Maasai settlements with a total of 80,000
cattle by 1923. Between 1922 and 1925 a second effort managed to inoculate about
20,000 cattle, an impressive increase over the first attempt but still only a fraction of the
animals at risk from the disease. In the meantime, as BPP spread, more infected Maasai
herds and their owners were added to the quarantine zone. A separate zone had to be
created when BPP was detected in southern Maasailand; officials were unable to create a
single quarantine area because of a large belt of tsetse-infested bush between the two
zones. A third separate area had to be drawn for the same reason.53
Veterinary officials were constantly confronted with the reality that no matter
how useful their expertise, practical limitations would effectively eliminate most of the
potential actions they could take. While they grappled with the BPP outbreak, a
concurrent rinderpest epizootic spread among Maasai herds in 1923. As we have seen,
Europeans in Africa had developed effective methods of fighting rinderpest decades
earlier; in Tanganyika, the accepted policy was a combination of strict quarantine and
serum inoculations. However, the outbreak in Maasailand overwhelmed the veterinary
department and its limited resources; officials had to stand back and let the disease run its
course. The department had already taken this stance towards another disease, East Coast
Fever, which flared up occasionally in Maasai cattle. Dipping cattle in chemicals
remained the only effective measure against ECF; Tanganyika veterinary departments
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had neither the finances nor the employees to make that a viable program. Staff members
attempted to keep records of cattle losses to rinderpest, but their final tally of 20,000 was
by their own admission only a rough estimate. By the end of 1925 the rinderpest had
diminished, and officials could once more assess the BPP situation. By 1926, a total of
155,712 cattle, about 28% of total Maasai herds, were in designated quarantine areas.
Despite these numbers, the veterinary department believed that their policy of
“progressive segregation” combined with limited inoculation was gradually bringing
scientific disease management to Maasailand.54 The PC Northern Province reported to the
Chief Secretary in Dar es Salaam that “only now” were Maasai “commencing to realize
how good [a] friend a competent Veterinary Officer can be to them.”55
European veterinary officers and political administrators held diverse opinions of
the cattle-keeping skills and environmental knowledge of the African pastoralists among
whom they worked; sometimes these views defied the stereotype of the chauvinistic
colonialist. On one level, it is fair to describe most colonial officials as paternalistic in
their treatment of Maasai. “What we do is to issue orders and take steps that we can
enforce,” wrote the PC Northern Province in 1926, “and we do enforce them. The Masai
may not like the force any more than the schoolboy likes being made to go to school.”56
This presumption of superior knowledge lent itself to crude generalizations and pseudo-
scientific claims. The veterinary officer at Arusha (anticipating Melville Herskovits’
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famous essay on “the Cattle Complex”) believed that Maasai simply hoped to increase
their herds to infinite numbers, with no idea of selective breeding and no concern for
“overstocking,” which officials believed not only damaged the rangelands but helped to
provide an environment amenable to outbreaks of East Coast Fever.57 Moreover,
administrative paternalism lent itself just as easily to stern treatment of Maasai who failed
to follow the advice of administrators. When a group of Maasai (or Parakuyo) crossed
into his district with herds of cattle suffering from rinderpest in 1922, the AO Dodoma
sent notice to the veterinary pathologist at Mpwapwa: “I am sending a posse of armed
police … to arrest every offender. I would urge the wisdom of destroying all infected
animals and burning the carcasses with fire.”58
At the same time, though, many officials possessed an appreciation of pastoralists
that went far beyond the superficial, racialist view of Maasai as aesthetically pleasing
man-animals devoid of intellect or work ethic. To begin with, low-ranking officers
stationed in harsh environments could not help but notice the considerable skill and effort
required to make a viable living on the dry savanna. R. A. J. Maguire, ADO for the
remote and vast southern portion of Maasailand, pointed out in 1925 that “the charge of
idleness so often brought against them has little foundation in fact. The amount of work
necessary daily, adequately to water and graze large herds of cattle with the primitive
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facilities at their command, is considerable.”59 Despite the large number of thoroughly
inconsiderate policy decisions and development plans, at least some officials understood
that pastoralist practice in East Africa involved a well-developed combination of skills
and specialized knowledge. While these officials still reserved a privileged place for
western science as interpreted by colonial administration, they did temper this by
attempting to build on African-based expertise. The PC Northern Province reflected this
moderating influence when he appealed to the Chief Secretary in Dar es Salaam for a
particular approach to Maasai: “We should try to … add to the knowledge that he has
acquired himself that knowledge which the advance of science has brought to European
stock farmers.”60
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“A Menace To Native Progress”: Parakuyo Opportunism and a Contest of Wills on
Northern Tanganyika’s Rangelands, 1922-1926
This chapter explains the collision of European and African thinking that played
out between 1922, when British administrators enacted a policy of forcing Parakuyo
pastoralists to settle within the boundaries of the Masai Reserve, and 1926, when
repeated and uncontrollable interdistrict movement by Parakuyo forced the government
to abandon its policy. From the British side, the roots of the policy rested on two
elements: scientific (though often mistaken) theories of race, ecology, and veterinary
control; and the physical realities of governing a very large territory with limited
manpower. From the Parakuyo side, resistance to the policy rested on an unshakeable
insistence on freedom of movement and identity, combined with a persistent conviction
that European methods of livestock and disease control were unsatisfactory in an East
African context. For both sides, the flashpoint of the conflict rested on the issue of
Parakuyo ability to graze their cattle when and where they saw fit. There were
disagreements on both sides: some local officials sympathized with Parakuyo concerns
and spoke out on their behalf, while some Parakuyo were eager to win the advantages
conferred on those who collaborated with colonial authorities. The reservation policy
itself posed a broad threat to Parakuyo society, as it explicitly aimed to do away with any
notion of a separate identity. By 1926, however, Parakuyo had demonstrated their ability
to defy administrative orders by moving at their own discretion. The demands this
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movement placed on the time and energy of local officials prompted the Governor of
Tanganyika Territory to intercede and end the reservation policy. This by no means
ended the tension, as each side still had its sights set on incompatible goals. But the
successful assertion of autonomy by Parakuyo proved to be crucial in preserving their
distinctive identity, and set the stage for their remarkable geographical expansion in later
years.
“Definitely Masai or Not Masai”: Crafting a Reservation Policy
Before turning their attention to Parakuyo, British officials had their hands full
simply dealing with Maasai. Amid the chaos of the First World War, Maasai had seized
the opportunity to launch raids in all directions, crossing geographical and political
boundaries with little to stand in their way. By the time Britain began to set up an
administrative apparatus in the area it controlled in 1916, Maasai were scattered across
much of northern Tanganyika, in the process of recouping losses they had suffered during
emutai and the years of German rule. This untidiness did not sit well with officers
attempting to sort out clean units of ethnic affiliation and political control. From the start,
they held a vague idea that Maasai properly belonged in the steppe lands south of
Kilimanjaro and Arusha. In 1917, for example, a group of Maasai under the leadership of
Kapurwa pushed south from the steppe into areas of Mpwapwa District inhabited by
Sagala people, rustling cattle as they went. In 1919, the Maasai group asked for
permission to move even further south in search of water and grazing. Tellingly, the
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native authorities in the proposed settlement area were willing to allow this only on the
condition that the Maasai return cattle they had looted from the area during the early
months of the war. All of the European officers involved hoped to see the Maasai group
removed far to the north, but quarantine had been imposed on Mpwapwa because of an
outbreak of East Coast Fever. The group was ordered to move as soon as the quarantine
had been lifted. Finally, in 1920, the administration set about creating a Masai Reserve.
Chief Secretary A. C. Hollis supervised the project from Dar es Salaam, while local
officers made painstaking adjustments to district boundaries over the next few years in an
attempt to create a viable grazing area for such a large number of pastoralists. Maasai
continued to cross the boundary in small numbers and in various directions, but by and
large the reserve was administered as an effective political and ethnic unit. One nagging
problem remained, though: what to do with the various sort-of Maasai groups known as
Kwavi or Lumbwa.1
District and assistant district officers were aware of tensions between Parakuyo
and Maasai. Along the eastern and southern fringes of Maasailand, Parakuyo frequently
tussled with Maasai over access to water sources. One flashpoint centered on Kiteto, an
area on the southern border of Maasai territory that contained a cluster of two dozen
wells and springs that provided reliable water during the dry season. During the years of
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German rule, a dispute between Parakuyo and Maasai over Kiteto led to a “quarrel”
between the German officers in charge of the districts on either side of the area
(foreshadowing later arguments between British administrators). Colonial boundary-
making failed to settle the dispute; when Parakuyo complained in 1920 that the wells
were rightfully theirs, local administrators fined Maasai fifty cattle. Maasai “angrily”
pulled back to the north, and for a time no one used the wells. However, the Kiteto water
sources became especially important during the 1920s as tsetse fly invaded other dry-
season sources to the north, such as Loiborserret, Oldoinyo Sambu, and Mukuyuni.
Maasai relied on Kiteto to such an extent that when faced with the possibility of losing
access when the boundaries of the new Maasai Reserve were drawn, many Maasai began
to identify themselves to officials as “Lumbwa” in hopes of being recognized as residents
of Kilosa and Handeni districts.2 Relations between Parakuyo and Maasai were equally
tense along the northeastern fringes of Maasailand. At the start of British rule, Maasai
had been allowed to graze east of the Pangani River during the dry season, but problems
with local residents, including Parakuyo, were a constant source of concern. Along the
river itself, Kihurio fishermen complained that Maasai cattle trampled the traps they used
to catch fish in the shallow bays of the river. In addition, Parakuyo regarded Maasai with
such trepidation and anxiety that officials felt compelled to devote a good deal of
attention to tracking Maasai movements in the area. Colonial administrators in Lushoto
(on the Usambara side of the river) felt that Maasai should be kept out of the area
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altogether, reasoning that Parakuyo would be grateful for the additional pasture and peace
of mind.3
Many of the officers in districts adjoining Maasailand shared concerns about the
potential for conflict if Parakuyo were to be forced into Maasai society, but high-ranking
administrators and officers in Maasai districts already had reached a consensus that all
“Kwavi” should physically reside in Maasailand as a subgroup of the Maasai “tribe.” The
plan called for Parakuyo living in Lushoto, Handeni, Kilosa, Morogoro, Mpwapwa, and
western Kondoa to be moved within the borders of Arusha and eastern Kondoa-Irangi
Districts, the area soon to be marked off as the Masai Reserve.4 H. C. Murrells, the
administrative officer in southern Maasailand who would now have jurisdiction over
Parakuyo moved into the area, responded to the fears of his colleagues by arguing that
they failed to appreciate that it was the “considered opinion of the recognised authorities
both British and German” that Parakuyo and Maasai were “all of the same original
stock.”5 Murrells warned officers in Dodoma not to be fooled by Parakuyo farming
practices, noting that their situation was merely the result of misfortune, and predicting
(not without justification) that they would return to full-time pastoralism as soon as they
had built up their herds. As for the possibility of conflict between Maasai and Parakuyo,
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Murrells looked on the bright side: “I am inclined to think that the intermingling of the
peoples would tend to greater cordiality.”6 E. D. Browne, the Senior Commissioner at
Arusha, echoed Murrells’ hopes: “If all the Masai and their kindreds are in one
reservation they will grow friendly with each other. … I personally do not think that the
Masai of Kibaya have any desire to intimidate the Lumbwa.”7
The decision to confine Parakuyo to the Masai Reserve posed remarkably difficult
problems for Parakuyo individuals and the society as a whole. There can be little doubt
that the policy was intended to eliminate Parakuyo distinctiveness altogether, by
subsuming the vague “Kwavi” ethnic designation into other tribal units, especially
Maasai. European distaste for the vagueness of Parakuyo identity often surfaced in
official correspondence, as it did in a letter from the Chief Secretary “regarding the
transfer of the Oikop Masai (Lumbwa Balaguyu Wakwavi) into the Masai Reserve.”8
Horace Byatt, governor of Tanganyika from 1920 to 1924, put it most succintly: “They
must be definitely Masai or not Masai.”9 A. C. Hollis, the Chief Secretary, wrote in 1923:
“I recommend that they all be treated alike. There seems little use in forming a Masai
Reserve and then permitting those who do not want to move to occupy other lands unless
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they are prepared to give up their claims to be Masai.”10 Those Parakuyo who remained
outside the reserve, then, had to accept “citizenship” in other tribes, such as Gogo and
Zigua. Officers took this point seriously enough that many of them began to refer to
Parakuyo in their correspondence as “ex-Kwavi.”11 This attitude constituted a real threat
to Parakuyo livelihoods. After losing their prized pastures and watering points to Maasai
expansion in the mid-1800s, Parakuyo had spent more than half a century carefully and
painstakingly establishing a niche for themselves among Bantu-speaking communities in
northern and central Tanganyika. Now, without warning, they faced the prospect of
losing their entire network of settlements and being forced to live under the thumb of the
same Maasai society that had evicted them in the first place. In one sense, this would not
have been without precedent: Loikop and Maasai sections had formed, transformed,
merged and disappeared in succession during the previous centuries. This was an
accepted part of life for pastoralists in East Africa. What Parakuyo refused to yield – and,
in retrospect, what probably saved them in the years ahead – was a firm belief that the
autonomous society they had forged for themselves remained vastly preferable in both
social and economic terms to the prospect of disintegration. We should note that this
attitude had helped Parakuyo resist the pressure of Maasai cultural expansion during the
                                                 
10 Quoted in Arusha District Annual Report 1925, File AB 31 (1733/1/36), Secretariat
Early Series, TNA. See also Senior Commissioner [Browne], Arusha, to Chief Secretary,
10 March 1923, File 41/9, Accession 46, TNA.
11 Arusha District Annual Report 1925, File AB 31 (1733/1/36), Secretariat Early Series,
TNA; Acting Administrative Officer, Dodoma, to Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam, 9 May
1923, File 41/9, Accession 46, TNA; [AO] Dodoma to AO Masailand, 24 March 1924,
File 41/9, Accession 435, TNA.
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nineteenth century, and would again help them to withstand economic and social changes
in the late twentieth century.
The Trouble with Kibaya
The colonial administration intended to move most Parakuyo into Kibaya Sub-
District, which essentially formed the southern half of Tanganyika Maasailand. This area
had no practical administration at all between 1916, when British forces occupied the
area, and 1922, when an Administrative Officer, P. E. Mitchell, was finally appointed to
Maasailand. During these early years, southern Maasailand was defined as part of
Kondoa-Irangi District, which was in itself an area difficult to administer. In 1923, in the
interest of bringing all Maasai into one administrative unit, southern Maasailand was
moved into Arusha District, and the area was redefined as Kibaya Sub-District. An
officer was to be stationed at Kibaya, the closest thing to a town in the area, essentially to
serve as a European counterpart for Kapurwa, the Maasai Government Agent who
nominally supervised the local inhabitants. H. C. Murrells, the first Administrative
Officer assigned to Kibaya Sub-District, faced an overwhelming task. Stationed far from
district headquarters, he would be responsible for an area of about 5,500 square miles,
inhabited by about ten thousand Maasai pastoralists. A large part of the area was
considered uninhabitable because of either a lack of water or the presence of dense bush
filled with tsetse flies. The area saw its fair share of raiding and banditry; colonial
officers and the “recognized” African authorities were not exempt from these realities. In
208
1923, for example, a rumor was circulated that Europeans planned to leave the country,
and several Maasai took the opportunity to “get their own back” from Kapurwa. Eighteen
Maasai were arrested and punished in that case. As late as 1926, Murrells’ successor
fretted that he would misplace the single pair of handcuffs provided for his office, leaving
him without an effective means of detaining suspects. Not surprisingly, the area held little
attraction for travellers; indeed, the AO Kibaya had only nine European callers during
1925.12 The area did have several clusters of reliable wells and springs, such as Kiteto,
which made it viable for people subsisting primarily on cattle. However, a lack of dry-
season reserve grazing and water sources within the boundaries defined by the colonial
government set definite limits on the number of pastoralists who could realistically live in
Kibaya at one time.
The process of moving Parakuyo into the reserve proved problematic from the
outset. To the north of the reserve, Parakuyo had lived in Lushoto for several generations;
this area was home to Moreto Maitei, the oloiboni kitok, as well as his administrative
counterpart, the “headman” Justin Lemenye. Neither of these two moved into the reserve,
                                                 
12 PC Northern Province to Chief Secretary, 15 March 1926, File P42, Accession 471,
TNA; Senior Commissioner, Arusha, to Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam, 14 December
1925, File AB 105, Secretariat Files, TNA; Senior Commissioner, Arusha, to Chief
Secretary, Dar es Salaam, 19 February 1923, File AB 1050, Secretariat Files, TNA;
Senior Commissioner, Arusha, to Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam, 19 February 1923, File
AB 1050, Secretariat Files, TNA; Kibaya Sub-District Annual Report 1925, File AB 31
(1733/1/36), Secretariat Early Series, TNA; Northern Province Annual Report 1926, File
AB 61 (1733/8:66), Secretariat Early Series, TNA; Assistant District Officer [Maguire],
Kibaya, to Provincial Commissioner, Arusha, 8 April 1926, Secretariat Files, TNA;
Kondoa-Irangi District Annual Report 1923, File AB 17 (1733: 16), Secretariat Early
Series, TNA; Kibaya Sub-District Annual Report 1925, File AB 31 (1733/1/36),
Secretariat Early Series, TNA.
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and Lushoto officials were hesitant to force any of their kinsmen to go ahead of them. By
1923, even Murrells had conceded that a move from Lushoto was inadvisable owing to
the lack of grazing on the reserve immediately west of the Pangani. More than a few
Maasai from the reserve covertly grazed their cattle east of the river in Parakuyo areas for
precisely this reason, a fact Murrells learned while touring the eastern reserve boundary,
when he was greeted by the sight of Maasai elders crossing the river from Lushoto to
bring him their tax payments.13 To the east of the reserve, in Handeni District, some
Parakuyo were moved in 1922, but many were allowed to remain where they were
because of an outbreak of East Coast Fever, a situation that would last four more years.14
Parakuyo communities to the west of the reserve, who had lived among Sandawe for
several decades, sent a formal deputation to the DO Kondoa asking to remain in his
district. The officer supported their request, possibly because he saw their herds as an
asset to the area. The matter was presented to the Chief Secretary, and it was eventually
decided that this group, too, could stay where they were.15
Many Parakuyo were moved into the reserve, but only with considerable effort
and tense standoffs between district officers. Parakuyo communities in Morogoro found a
staunch ally in their district officer, A. W. M. Griffith. Griffith did not approve of the
reservation policy, and dragged his feet when called upon to force Parakuyo in his district
                                                 
13 Administrative Officer, South Masailand [H. C. Murrells] to Senior Commissioner,
Arusha, 10 November 1923, File 41/9, Accession 435, TNA.
14 Pangani District Annual Report 1922, File AB 22 (1733: 22), Secretariat Early Series,
TNA.
15 Kondoa-Irangi District Annual Report 1923, File AB 17 (1733: 16), Secretariat Early
Series, TNA.
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to move north into the reserve. In November 1923 Murrells reported with dissatisfaction
that some Parakuyo families from Morogoro had finally moved into the reserve near
Kiteto, but that the majority were still in Morogoro, including Masingisa Lekinana
Mterere, the most influential elder in the area. Even worse, those Parakuyo who had
moved were drifting back towards their old district, ostensibly to look for better water
sources. Murrells believed that this movement was in fact simply due to homesickness;
he chastised Griffith for his reluctance to enforce the new policy, arguing that if it had
been laid down decisively in the first place, the Parakuyo families “would have settled
down and accepted their situation” by now.16 Bowing to this pressure, Griffith finally
moved the entire group across the boundary at the end of 1923, but felt compelled to
speak out in his annual report. He had not intended to delay the move at all, he claimed,
but he had considered that “knowing the feeling which existed” among Parakuyo
regarding the move, it had been inadvisable to leave the matter in the hands of his
assistants. Instead, he had felt it important to supervise the transfer personally, when the
time was right, and to tread carefully even then. Masingisa had been rallying local
Parakuyo in opposition to the move, and “was certainly prepared for passive resistance,”
but eventually “moved quietly with all his people” as a result of Griffith’s gentle
prodding. Griffith felt no pride in his success – quite the opposite, in fact. “My failure to
convince the authorities of the undesirability of this move will always be a source of
regret,” he wrote in his annual report. “I have not justified the trust which the Kwavi
                                                 
16 Administrative Officer, South Masailand [H. C. Murrells] to Senior Commissioner,
Arusha, 10 November 1923, File 41/9, Accession 435, TNA.
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placed in me, but circumstances have been strongly against me and that is my only
excuse for failure, and a poor excuse it is.”17
Colonial officers had an even more difficult time deciding what to do with the
“Lumbwa Masai” who lived in Dodoma District. Parakuyo, and a few Maasai, had lived
for generations in the midst of the predominately Gogo society of the area. These
Parakuyo did not follow a single subsistence strategy, but used various combinations of
farming and cattle-keeping. Roughly speaking, the Parakuyo who lived north of the
Central Railway line still maintained separate communities and based their subsistence
on cattle. In 1920, this group was reported to consist of 196 men, 234 women, and 318
children, with 18,953 cattle. South of the railway, Parakuyo relied much more on
agriculture and were much more intermingled with Gogo. The difference in subsistence
practices was reflected in the census figures for this group: 122 men, 102 women, and
222 children, with 5,114 cattle. Parakuyo who lived in the area of Kilimatinde, especially,
had almost disappeared completely into Gogo society: here there were 55 Parakuyo men,
with 43 wives, most of them Gogo, 32 children, and only 829 cattle. All but one of these
men had been born in Kilimatinde, and the lone exception had moved there as a child; the
APO Kilimatinde, in fact, considered them to be better farmers than the Gogo
themselves. Both the APO Kilimatinde and the DO Dodoma assented to moving the
pastoralists with large herds into the reserve (which did take place by 1923), but strongly
opposed removing the more integrated Parakuyo from their Gogo communities. They
                                                 
17 Morogoro District Annual Report 1923, File AB 76, Secretariat Early Series, TNA.
Griffith left his position at Morogoro in January 1924, for reasons not listed.
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feared that the men would fail as cattle-keepers in the reserve, and that their wives and
children in any case simply would refuse to move even with strong inducements.18
Murrells and his colleagues debated the issue in correspondence, but by 1923 they agreed
tentatively that the Parakuyo who had intermarried with Gogo would be allowed to
remain in Dodoma, provided that they “relinquish any claim to being Masai” and
accepted the tribal designation of Gogo.19
At the end of 1923, Murrells reported with some understatement that the progress
of the Parakuyo reservation effort was “really unsatisfactory.”20 About 3,300 Parakuyo
now lived in Kibaya, probably no more than a fourth of their total numbers; the rest still
lived outside the reserve. But if administrators were surprised at their inability to confine
all, or even most, Parakuyo to the reservation, they would soon learn that those Parakuyo
who did move into the Masai Reserve were no easier to manage once they had reached
their designated locations. R. A. J. Maguire, who replaced Murrells in April 1925, found
the Parakuyo under his supervision to be much more difficult than the Maasai. Maguire
spent a considerable amount of time touring the area and working to build lines of
administration in Parakuyo settlements, but came away frustrated. He found no plausible
candidates for headmen, other than Masingisa, the influential elder who had been so
                                                 
18 APO Kilimatinde to DPO Dodoma, 1 January 1920, File 41/9, Accession 46, TNA;
DPO Dodoma to DPO Arusha, 9 February 1920, File 41/9, Accession46, TNA;
Administrative Officer, South Masailand [H. C. Murrells] to Senior Commissioner,
Arusha, 10 November 1923, File 41/9, Accession 435, TNA; AO Dodoma to Chief
Secretary, 15 December 1923, File 41/9, Accession 435, TNA.
19 Acting Administrative Officer, Dodoma, to Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam, 9 May
1923, File 41/9, Accession 46, TNA.
20 Administrative Officer, South Masailand [H. C. Murrells] to Senior Commissioner,
Arusha, 10 November 1923, File 41/9, Accession 435, TNA.
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difficult to remove from Morogoro District and who now lived near Engaiyagi within the
reserve. Masingisa was appointed headman for all Parakuyo within the reserve in 1924;
Maguire felt that he might “develop into a useful man if he can be persuaded to renounce
his perennial craving for beer.”21 In general, though, Maguire found little in Parakuyo
attitudes to be optimistic about. Their “chief aim of existence,” he wrote, “… would
appear to be to disassociate themselves as far as possible from Government and all that
Government means. ‘Lawlessness’ is perhaps too strong a term to apply to [their] childish
disobedience and obstinacy.”22 To make matters worse, it was evident to Maguire that
Parakuyo and Maasai remained antagonistic and shared “a feeling of mutual distrust”;
Maasai, in particular, considered Parakuyo to be of a distinctly lower class and treated
them as such.23
In February 1924, Lesubugu Mwenesi, part of the Parakuyo community in
Dodoma who had refused to move to Kibaya in 1923, went to Murrells and stated that he
and other Parakuyo now wished to move into the reserve. Murrells was puzzled about
their change of heart, but agreed to the request provided that they obtained veterinary
permits. The ADO Dodoma, H. Hignell, called a meeting of Parakuyo elders in March to
discuss the matter. All of them insisted that they wanted to stay in Dodoma, and asked
that Lesubugu be moved as soon as possible, because, according to Hignell, they
                                                 
21 Kibaya Sub-District Annual Report 1925, File AB 31 (1733/1/36), Secretariat Early
Series, TNA.
22 Kibaya Sub-District Annual Report 1925, File AB 31 (1733/1/36), Secretariat Early
Series, TNA.
23 Kibaya Sub-District Annual Report 1925, File AB 31 (1733/1/36), Secretariat Early
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considered him a weak-minded troublemaker. Lesubugu and his fifty cattle were sent to
Kibaya with an escort, while his four wives stayed behind temporarily to harvest their
crops.24 Murrells assured Hignell that he had placed Lesubugu well within the reserve,
but warned that “with a nomadic people like the Masai, it is most difficult to keep trace of
individuals the whole time.”25 Sure enough, by March 1925 Hignell was complaining that
Lesubugu had appeared in Dodoma once more, causing trouble of an unspecified nature
at Nzoissa near Mpwapwa. Murrells was unable to force Lesubugu to move immediately
this time, as cattle quarantines had been imposed to fight an outbreak of East Coast
Fever. In May, though, veterinary guards from the Kibaya office literally rustled
Lesubugu’s cattle while he was absent from his camp, and moved them back into the
reserve.26
At the same time that Murrells was coping with Lesubugu’s movements, a
different case came to his attention. Masigalla Mbume, a farmer who still lived at Ngepa,
within the Masai Reserve, claimed that his father had been a “Kwavi,” and therefore he
                                                 
24 Administrative Officer in Masailand [H. C. Murrells] to Administrative Officer in
Charge Dodoma District, 29 February 1924, File 41/9, Accession 435, TNA; Handwritten
note [author uncertain], 22 March 1924, File 41/9, Accession 435, TNA; AO Dodoma to
AO Masailand, 24 March 1924, File 41/9, Accession 435, TNA. Present at the March
1924 meeting in Dodoma: Lesubugu Mwenesi, Chilungali Madumba (“Lumbwa chief”),
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25 AO Kibaya, S. Masailand [Murrells] to AO Dodoma, 16 April 1924, File 41/9,
Accession 435, TNA.
26 AO Dodoma [H. Hignell] to Senior Commissioner, Arusha, 17 March 1925, File 41/9,
Accession 435, TNA; AO Kibaya [Murrells] to Senior Commissioner, Arusha, 18 April
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41/9, Accession 435, TNA.
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had the right to remain where he was. The official response to this situation is
enlightening: Murrells (the officer in charge of the southern Masai Reserve) actually
wrote to Hignell (the officer in charge of neighboring Dodoma district) to request his
permission to allow a farmer to remain inside a pastoral district.27 Hignell’s response was
that Masigalla could remain in the reserve, but only if he went “back to the pastoral state
of his supposed Kwavi father.”28 Hignell noted that the boundary between their districts
had been drawn explicitly with the goal of separating farmers and cattle-keepers, and that
Dodoma district had lost considerable territory and several watering points in the process.
With this in mind, Hignell concluded, “I must ask you to see that if Masigalla wishes to
continue life as an agriculturalist he must do so in his own agricultural area of Dodoma.
Otherwise … the creation of a pastoral reserve loses all point.”29
In October 1924, Masingisa complained to Murrells that a group of Parakuyo had
crossed from the reserve into Dodoma, and were now living among Gogo at Sagala. This
group of people had originally come from the Pawaga area of Dodoma, but had moved to
Masingisa’s area of Kilosa in 1921 to escape famine. When Masingisa moved into the
reserve in 1923, they had followed him. Murrells, fearing that allowing their return to
Dodoma would set a bad example for other Parakuyo in the reserve, wrote to Hignell
demanding that they be sent back to Kibaya. Based on Hignell’s response in the case of
                                                 
27 AO Kibaya, S. Masailand, to AO Dodoma, 12 May 1924, File 41/9, Accession 435,
TNA.
28 AO Dodoma [Hignell] to AO South Masailand, 31 May 1924, File 41/9, Accession
435, TNA.
29 AO Dodoma [Hignell] to AO South Masailand, 31 May 1924, File 41/9, Accession
435, TNA.
216
Masigalla, the farmer who had requested to remain in the reserve, one might have
expected that Hignell would readily send Parakuyo cattle-keepers back to their “pastoral
reserve.”30 Instead, he reasoned that they should remain in Dodoma. “These people are all
Wabaraguyu,” Hignell noted in his reply to Murrells. “They have married Wagogo
women and follow Wagogo customs. They have never lived in Masailand. Under the
circumstances I consider it would be in the interest of justice to allow these people to
remain in their old district.”31 Murrells did not argue the case further, in part because he
had no clue what the word “Wabaraguyu” meant and apparently was too embarrassed to
ask: “I had been informed that they were of Kwavi extraction,” he wrote back
apologetically, “hence my letter regarding their removal.”32 As it turned out, however,
Murrells’ concerns were well-founded. By September 1925 his successor, R. A. J.
Maguire, was writing to the AO Dodoma to warn him that several more groups of
Parakuyo had moved without permission into Dodoma and the neighboring districts of
Kilosa and Handeni. Maguire reported that the “offenders” were being chased by
veterinary guards and Masingisa himself, and asked that chiefs and headmen in Dodoma
district be put on alert and requested to assist in removing the migrant Parakuyo. As an
added warning, Maguire asked Hignell to be on guard against the “chicanery that must
                                                 
30 AO South Masailand [Murrells] to AO Dodoma, 8 October 1924, File 41/9, Accession
435, TNA; AO Dodoma [Hignell] to AO South Masailand, Kibaya, 10 November 1924,
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31 AO Dodoma [Hignell] to AO South Masailand, Kibaya, 10 November 1924, File 41/9,
Accession 435, TNA.
32 AO Kibaya to AO Dodoma, 22 November 1924, File 41/9, Accession 435, TNA.
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inevitably ensue between these men and their friends in your District … it is likely that
they will all endeavour to persuade the local authority that they have not moved, but are
permanent residents of your District.”33 Hignell replied that the men in question had
appeared in court in October and asked permission to settle down “as Wagogo” in
Dodoma.34 But Maguire would not back down as Murrells had before him; several of the
Parakuyo migrants were convicted and punished.35
By the end of 1925 it was clear to R. A. J. Maguire, who had replaced Murrells at
Kibaya earlier that year, that Parakuyo had soundly rejected government policy on
settlement in southern Maasailand. In his annual report for 1925, Maguire laid out some
stark numbers: out of 38 total criminal cases in Kibaya Sub-District during the year, 25
had been against Parakuyo. Every one of those 25 cases had involved the interdistrict
movement of cattle without a permit. In the cases, 62 different Parakuyo men had been
charged, many of them the principal stock-owners of their kraals. At the time there were
77 Parakuyo kraals in the Masai Reserve; in other words, a majority of Parakuyo elders
had been charged with illicit cattle movements during the year. Further, Maguire
estimated that despite the government’s original goal of moving all “Kwavi” into the
                                                 
33 AO Kibaya to AO Dodoma, 21 September 1925, File 41/9, Accession 435, TNA; AO
Kibaya to AO Dodoma, 21 September 1925, File 41/9, Accession 435, TNA. The names
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reserve, less than a third of all Parakuyo in Tanganyika paid taxes to Kibaya in 1925.
Sizable Parakuyo communities still existed outside the reserve in Usambara, Kondoa
Irangi, Handeni, Kilosa, Morogoro and Dodoma Districts. Maguire believed that most of
the criminal cases brought against Parakuyo in Kibaya during the year had originated
when Parakuyo outside the reserve encouraged their relatives inside the reserve to come
and join them. In Maguire’s view, these facts suggested two possible resolutions: force
all “Kwavi” to move into the reserve, with thorough enforcement this time; or allow
Parakuyo the opportunity to decide where they wanted to live, “once and for all.” The
first alternative carried the risk of provoking serious opposition and discontent, and there
remained the probability that southern Maasailand did not have enough water and grazing
supplies to support such a large influx of people and cattle. The second alternative risked
producing a sense of victory and privileged status among Parakuyo, but nonetheless
would (in the government’s still-naïve view) allow for a definite determination of
settlement patterns and ethnic allegiance that had been decided upon by Parakuyo
themselves, and, it was to be hoped, put an end to uncontrolled cattle movements. “The
Wakwavi, residing in the place where they desire to live,” wrote Maguire, “… might well
prove an asset to the country. The Wakwavi, living under present conditions … [and]
surrounded by the temptation to carry out illegal and dangerous stock-movements, can
never be anything but a nuisance.”36
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The Governor of Tanganyika, Donald Cameron, agreed with Maguire’s
assessment. In January 1926 Cameron issued a minute, MP 7834/53, that ended
government efforts to confine Parakuyo on the Masai Reserve. The minute stated:
These people (Wakwavi) should not be forced to live in the Reserve if they do
not wish to do so and if they can be accommodated on other land, but they
must understand that they will become part of the native community to whose
lands they remove and be subject to the jurisdiction of the Chiefs and
Headmen of that community. Their cattle would have to be moved subject to
veterinary precautions. It is not necessary, however, to broadcast this policy
and invite the Wakwavi to move. It should be noted and followed if they raise
the question again and ask to be allowed to move.37
Some officials expressed dismay at the new policy. The PC Northern Province, for
example, felt the need to defend the old policy in a letter to the central administration in
Dar es Salaam. After stating his desire that the “form of control” established in 1924 not
be allowed to lapse, the PC Northern pointed out that this effort, which included the
installment of Masingisa as headman, was merely “the first step towards bringing the
Kwavi into a tribal entity.” Restating a concern first laid out by Maguire, the PC Northern
predicted that Parakuyo outside the reserve would never accept control by any other
“tribe,” as the governor’s new policy required, and pleaded that “while I have no desire to
imprison the Kwavi in Masailand, I have a right to ask that they shall not live on the
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boundaries of the Masai area as a bad example to the Masai and a menace to good
administration.”38
Note that the Governor’s minute refrained from endorsing the idea of freedom of
movement for Parakuyo. Rather, it simply endorsed the idea that Parakuyo would choose
where they wanted to settle – permanently, in the view of administrators. Whatever their
disagreements over the reservation policy, every officer firmly believed that Parakuyo
movement must be controlled. “A nomadic pastoralist without any bounds governing his
wanderings and the wanderings of his herds,” Maguire wrote in his 1925 annual report,
“will be a menace to native progress and can only induce chaos and lack of
administrative control.”39 His predecessor Murrells, now the DO Masai stationed at
Longido, shared this sentiment. Murrells recognized that Parakuyo had “signified their
dissent in no uncertain manner, to their proposed incorporation” with Maasai, but he also
felt more strongly than ever “the necessity for restraining these people from continual
inter-district migration. It is obviously unfair that they should be a privileged people,
especially having regard to their general lack of control and intolerance of outside
control.”40 The Chief Secretary instructed Maguire to “warn these people that they will
not be allowed to do as they please; they have elected to move out of the Masai Reserve
                                                 
38 PC Northern Province to Chief Secretary, 29 April 1925, File 45/6, Accession 69,
TNA.
39 Arusha District Annual Report 1925, File AB 31 (1733/1/36), Secretariat Early Series,
TNA.
40 DO Masai [Murrells] to PC Northern Province, 4 September 1926, File 45/6,
Accession 69, TNA; see also DO Masai to ADO Kibaya, 27 December 1926, File 45/6,
Accession 69, TNA.
221
and they must remain out of it … [If] they break the law they must be punished with such
severity as may be necessary to cause them to respect it.”41
On the Trail of Mameo and Sakadege
Before the Governor’s minute could be carried to remote outposts such as
Handeni and Kibaya, one small group of Parakuyo led administrators and police on a
remarkable chase across northeastern Tanganyika. Since 1923, Parakuyo living near
Kiberashi, in Handeni district, had been allowed to remain there temporarily because
there simply was not enough water and grazing for them inside the Masai Reserve. In
early February 1926, after the Governor’s decision but before its transmission inland,
administrators decided that grazing and watering conditions in Kibaya were finally
sufficient to move Parakuyo resident at Kiberashi in Handeni to new locations inside the
Masai Reserve.  On 16 February, Stock Inspector D. M. Calder visited the 26 Parakuyo
kraals in the area, assigned them each a site within Kibaya, and left the supervision of the
move to a veterinary guard. Most of the Parakuyo families followed orders, but one group
led by Mameo Lasita and Sakadege Kasima, and including a dozen other Parakuyo
elders, broke away from the rest without asking for permission, and returned to Handeni,
settling temporarily at a spot about fifty miles east of Kiberashi. Once there, these
Parakuyo quickly set about “farming out” a large percentage of their stock to local Nguu
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families. Maguire got word of this on 28 February, and went to Handeni with his police,
who managed to arrest six Parakuyo men quickly. A combined force of police, veterinary
guards, and Maasai murran approached the remaining offenders, now camped about
twenty miles northeast of Handeni. Word of their approach got out, however, and all of
the males at the Parakuyo camp fled to the north just as the police arrived, leaving behind
49 women and children, as well as 300 head of cattle and 500 sheep and goats. The
women and children, as well as the cattle, were taken back to Handeni. At the same time,
Maguire realized that the fleeing Parakuyo men most likely intended to take refuge with
their relatives in Usambara.42
A reinforced party of police, guards, and murran set off to the north in pursuit,
while warrants were quickly typed up at Handeni and Maguire wired the District Officer
Lushoto to ask for cooperation. Doubting that the small Handeni police staff could cope
with the problem, Maguire sent another two “quarantine guards” as well as ten Parakuyo
murran and a Parakuyo “headman” who could identify the offenders.43 On 5 April
Lushoto police arrested Mameo and Sakadege, along with Masangwi Suyani, Salamba
Sawinyi, Lupandu Lawinyi, and Lahali Lasita. The police officer at Lushoto sent a
telegram to Handeni asked for warrants and an escort, but did not receive clear directions
in return. Feeling pangs of conscience after holding the prisoners far beyond the legal 24
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March 1926, File 45/6, Accession 69, TNA.
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hours without a warrant, the Lushoto officer asked his District Officer, G. Barnes, for
advice. Barnes, unhappy with the “casual way” the Handeni and Kibaya officers had
treated his own staff, ordered all the prisoners released.44 The release of the Parakuyo
boundary-breakers set of a firestorm of angry correspondence between officers in Kibaya,
Handeni and Lushoto. Maguire alone wrote half a dozen separate complaints about
Lushoto’s handling of the matter, all the while demanding that the DO Lushoto respond
with some sort of action “other than redundant and ill-advised criticism of the work of his
Brother-Officers.”45 Even the Provincial Commissioners joined the fray: the PC Northern
Province (which included Masailand) wrote to the PC Tanga (which included Lushoto)
that the Lushoto officers failed to appreciate the geographic isolation of Handeni and
Kibaya stations, the latter of which did not even have a telegraph line. “The Kwavi are a
nuisance to Government because they have no idea of obedience to their Chiefs or the
Administration,” the PC Northern wrote, “and for that reason alone cooperation by
District Officers in adjoining districts is very desirable.”46
In the meantime, Handeni police were surprised to discover the Parakuyo
offenders right at their doorstep. Mameo and Sakadege, along with their colleagues,
apparently had sought an audience with the Commisioner of Tanga Province, but had
                                                 
44 Telegram, Police to Political Handeni, 6 April 1926, File 45/6, Accession 69, TNA;
Police Officer Lushoto to DO Lushoto, 10 April 1926, File 45/6, Accession 69, TNA; DO
Lushoto [G. Barnes] to Police Officer in Charge, Lushoto, [?] April 1926, File 45/6,
Accession 69, TNA.
45 ADO Kibaya [Maguire] to DO Masai, 18 May 1926, File 45/6, Accession 69, TNA;
see also ADO Kibaya [Maguire] to AO Handeni, 13 May 1926, File 45/6, Accession 69,
TNA, and other correspondence in File 45/6.
46 PC Northern Province to PC Tanga, 4 June 1926, File 45/6, 43, Accession 69, TNA.
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been told that he was on tour in Handeni. They followed him, in effect returning to the
place they had started. Mameo, Sakadege, and Salamba were quickly arrested.47 By the
end of April ten of the wanted Parakuyo had been rounded up. They were tried by
Maguire at Kibaya on 29 April and sent the next morning to the jail at Kondoa Irangi.
Mameo and Sakadege, as the “prime movers,” were sentenced to six months of rigorous
imprisonment and fined 200 shillings each; six of the others (Muluyu, Persangui,
Saramba, Makonda, Ndohe and Kangere) received lesser sentences, and the two youngest
Parakuyo men (Kimaia and Mamaiye) were let off with a verbal reprimand. Six
additional Parakuyo were arrested and tried on 7 June for their participation in the illegal
move; three were fined small amounts, but none received jail time.48 The PC Northern
Province, reporting the matter to the Chief Secretary in Dar es Salaam, endorsed the
sentences, and pleaded that they be allowed to stand, fearing that their release would set a
bad example for other Parakuyo.49 Governor Cameron, however, quickly ordered that the
sentences be remitted and the Parakuyo prisoners be released at once. On 19 June the
eight imprisoned Parakuyo were released and sent back to Handeni; they were allowed to
return to Handeni, the area from which they had been driven, and their surviving cattle
were returned to them. By August the community of Mameo, Sakadege, and thirteen
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Kibaya [R. A. J. Maguire] to DO Handeni, 29 April 1926, File 45/6, Accession 69, TNA.
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other Parakuyo males had settled at Mgera, with 276 cattle and 399 sheep and goats
between them.50
To explain why so much time and energy was devoted to pursuing and punishing
this small group of Parakuyo migrants, we should remember that district and assistant
district officers walked a thin line between science and pseudoscience, crude racial
thinking and subtle knowledge of local contexts, confidence in their own authority and
anxieties about African respect for their authority. The flight of Mameo and Sakadege
represented a glaring, unacceptable rejection of the two fundamental projects
administrators had begun among Parakuyo, projects that the officers intended to continue
regardless of where Parakuyo settled: the incorporation of Parakuyo into clearly defined
political chains of command, and the assertion of “scientific” methods of ecological and
medical control. R. A. J. Maguire made frequent reference to both of these causes in
advocating for “severe” punishment of all Parakuyo involved in the illegal movement,
and warned other officers who had “not had experience of the Kwavi” that they should
resist the temptation to be “inclined to listen sympathetically” to Mameo’s and
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Sakadege’s own explanations for their actions.51 “Apart altogether from the
Administrative aspect of their guilt,” Maguire wrote, “from a veterinary standpoint their
offence was grave.”52 The offenders had moved hundreds of cattle a distance of about
150 miles, through an area infected with East Coast Fever, and through areas of heavy
tsetse fly infestation. Not only had the Parakuyo cattle picked up infections, but they also
had transmitted disease to Nguu cattle when they were “farmed out” to Nguu partners in
Handeni. After Mameo and Sakadege finally had settled in Handeni, Maguire barely
could conceal his satisfaction that many of the cattle at their kraal had succumbed to
disease.53
The uncontrolled movements of Mameo, Sakadege and other Parakuyo also
represented a threat to political order. Maguire believed that his guiding influence during
the previous three years in Kibaya had produced an incipient “sub-tribe” with a clearly
defined chain of command. He felt that Parakuyo headmen, particularly Masingisa,
slowly were asserting “tribal control” and becoming “more alive to their responsibilities.”
Maguire suggested, quite reasonably, that a desire to remain outside this process was
behind the decision of Mameo and Sakadege to leave the area. He also thought, quite
naively, that the group of boundary-breakers were seen by other Parakuyo as “a
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discredited section of the community.”54 As evidence Maguire cited improving relations
between Parakuyo and Maasai, as well as the fact that Parakuyo recently had sold cattle
at the Kibaya cattle market for the first time, a development he credited to the
“progressive attitude” and “ceaseless reiteration” of administrative officers. “The
administration has the interests of the Kwavi at heart,” he wrote, “and the Kwavi are
beginning to realize this.”55 Maguire must have been crestfallen, then, at the response by
Parakuyo in Kibaya to the Governor’s minute allowing them to chose their own
settlement sites: they all wanted to move away.
“Freedom from All Authority and Leave to Wander Where they Will”
By the end of 1926 every one of the more than three thousand Parakuyo
pastoralists who had been moved into the reserve elected to move away from it. Large
groups moved east to Handeni and south to Kilosa and Morogoro. Smaller groups moved
west to Kondoa, and a few individual families moved north to Lushoto. Technically
bound by the Governor’s minute to facilitate these choices, administrators did the best
they could to maintain control of Parakuyo movements. Maguire set up a system in
August by which Parakuyo men applying for permits to move were supposed to bring to
him the “chits” they had been issued by veterinary guards, recording the number of cattle
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owned by each individual.56 The moves would then be supervised by veterinary staff. As
it happened, though, this plan was too ambitious from the start. Maguire himself had
suffered a foot injury, leaving him immobile and unable to monitor the situation beyond
his office. A few of the veterinary guards were due to be discharged, and most likely did
not welcome this major new task. Even worse, the veterinary officer for Maasailand,
Calder, had recently handed over his position to a replacement named Highet, who was
now “engaged in rendering himself conversant with affairs in general.”57
Parakuyo, for their part, wasted no time in seizing the initiative. A large group led
by Seivano, the headman of Parakuyo in the Lossikitok area, moved without permission
in late August to Makingo, near Mgera in Handeni District, a distance of about thirty
miles. A smaller group moved at the same time from Mtambalo to the Handeni side of
Kiberashi, a distance of about 25 miles. Maguire admitted that he had no idea how many
cattle had been moved in total. At least one veterinary guard arrived at a Parakuyo kraal
in Lossikitok to deliver a moving permit applied for by its owners, only to find them
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already gone with all of their cattle.58 Maguire clearly felt a total loss of control; he
complained to the PC Northern Province that Parakuyo now simply ignored requests that
they come to the office at Kibaya. Some Parakuyo who moved into Handeni did keep
Maguire in the loop by following procedure, especially from September onwards, when
Maguire was healthy enough to travel along the border himself.59 Parakuyo moving from
the reserve south to Dodoma were not as considerate. When one delegation of Parakuyo
arrived at Maguire’s office to apply for permits for themselves and a large group of
colleagues to move to Dodoma, he granted their request, and sent them back to their
kraals in Kiteto with two veterinary guards. The guards were to count the cattle and
inspect them for disease before allowing the move to proceed. On their arrival, however,
they found that the entire settlement already had moved – in fact, the move had taken
place before the Parakuyo men had applied for the permit. “Comment is superfluous,”
Maguire concluded in his report on this incident.60
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Officials realized that Parakuyo would periodically re-enter the reserve when
seasonal grazing conditions made this desirable; based on the experiences of the past few
years, they also realized that while they could punish offenders to a certain extent, they
were quite powerless to stop Parakuyo from moving their cattle between districts.
Maguire noted with a sense of resignation that the same Parakuyo who applied to move
out of the reservation “will return subsequently to this District, with or without leave to
do so.”61 The PC Northern Province complained to the Chief Secretary that his
subordinate at Kibaya had “neither the Staff nor the time to waste on natives who do not
intend to obey the law and frankly propose to free themselves to return to Masailand
during the rainy season.”62 He was particularly unhappy that Parakuyo had begun to elect
their own “so called” headmen (the PC apparently failed to see the irony in that remark)
rather than accept the authorities of other tribes according to policy. “All this may be very
pleasant for the Kwavi themselves,” he added, “… but [it] is an exceedingly harmful
example to other and neighbouring pastoralists.”63 This latter point had plenty of support
from specific examples. Maguire was “inundated” during 1926 with requests from
Maasai to move cattle into Handeni, and from Nguu to move from Handeni into the
reserve. In at least one case, Maasai specifically used Parakuyo movements as the
justification for their own request, and when they were refused, imitated Parakuyo by
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moving several thousand sheep and goats into Handeni without permission. Maguire was
convinced that all of these uncontrolled movements were a direct result of the
administration’s weakness in controlling Parakuyo.64
Regardless of their own policies, recommendations and opinions, colonial
officials recognized that Parakuyo boundary-breaking was simply a strategy in support of
a larger goal, one that remained consistent during the years of the reservation policy:
Parakuyo would settle for nothing less the right to choose when and where they moved
their cattle and settlements, without having to answer to any European or African
authority figures. Early in the Mameo-Sakadege affair, Maguire reported that many
Parakuyo in the reserve expressed a desire to remain where they were, even when offered
a choice of settlement sites. With an impressive level of insight, Maguire explained that
this was merely a strategy on the part of Parakuyo for avoiding any public admission that
they would accept Zigua, Nguu, or Gogo headmen, a basic condition of the government’s
offer. “These Kwavi do not wish to come under any Headmen of any area,” he wrote. “It
is manifest that the Kwavi aim … is complete freedom from all authority and leave to
wander where they will. They desire to lead a more nomadic life than the nomad Masai
themselves.”65 Remarkably, and perhaps uniquely for this period of colonial rule,
Parakuyo got exactly what they wanted.
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By the end of 1929, officials had conceded that Parakuyo would elect their own
headmen, and had even conceded to a degree that Parakuyo could move from one area to
another as they wished. To illustrate this change of heart, we can end our discussion by
noting the arrangements that existed concerning two of the largest concentrations of
Parakuyo settlement, one in Kilosa south of the reserve and another in Handeni east of
the reserve. The Kilosa settlements were led by Masingisa, who now lived at Kibedya,
while those in Handeni were led by their own headman, Barabulis. There was no longer
any pretense that these people belonged to any other tribal group than “Kwavi”; in some
cases, officials already had begun to recognize them as Parakuyo (although it would be
several decades before this shift in terms became widely accepted by administrators).
Local European officials now accepted frequent movement as part of Parakuyo life, and
had built contingency plans into their administrative structure. If any Parakuyo from
Kilosa moved into Handeni, they would automatically come under the jurisdiction of
Barabulis, whose duty it was to report the move to European officials; Parakuyo moving
in the other direction likewise would become the responsibility of Masingisa.66 It is a fine
reminder of the complexities of the collision between African and European thought that
this seemingly common sense arrangement – which in effect retained the arrangements in
place long before the advent of British administration – came about only after four years
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66 Acting DO Kilosa [Eastern Province] to PC Eastern Province, 19 November 1929, File
354, Accession 61, TNA.
233





Parakuyo pastoralists took advantage of the opening left to them by the failure of
the colonial reservation policy in 1926. During the next three decades of British rule,
Parakuyo expanded their network of settlements far beyond northern Tanganyika.
Beginning in 1935, substantial numbers of Parakuyo moved with their cattle from
Handeni eastwards into Bagamoyo District, where officials actually welcomed them as an
economic resource in an otherwise livestock-poor area. Other Parakuyo moved in a
different direction, setting up new settlements around Iringa in central Tanganyika. By
the 1950s, these groups began to push further south into the Usangu Flats of Mbeya
Region, not far from the border with Zambia. This is not to say that Parakuyo had a free
pass from the government. Parakuyo living north of the Usambara Mountains, for
example, engaged in long-running disputes with conservationists who intended to create a
cattle-free wildlife reserve in the area. But Parakuyo did demonstrate an ability to
develop their society on their own terms, perhaps uniquely so in a colonial context.
During the years of independence in Tanzania, Parakuyo have continued to
expand their network of settlements and continued to wrestle with authoritarian rule.
Parakuyo pastoralists resisted the government’s villagization program of the 1970s,
refusing to settle in concentrated areas where they would have been forced to give up
transhumant pastoralism. In recent years, Parakuyo have started to filter into areas in
southeastern Tanzania, establishing new relations with diverse ethnic groups. In some
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ways this process continues as it has for the past 150 years, but in others it is strikingly
different. Parakuyo today send their children to schools in much larger numbers than
before, they increasingly participate in cash transactions, and more than a few of them
communicate with cell phones. Today’s Parakuyo continue to travel back and forth
across great distances, but many of them now include in their orbits temporary visits to
urban areas in search of work as askari (guards) for local businesses. There is now an
intimate connection between city and kraal, which Parakuyo use to solidify and expand
their pastoralist base.
•
Historians in our time know better than to pretend they possess certain
knowledge. We rarely have the opportunity to prove conclusively that conventional
wisdom is mistaken. Nonetheless, as certainly as our planet is not the motionless center
of the cosmos, Maasai are not the motionless center of pastoralist history in East Africa.
Loikop pastoralists once held the center, but that ended almost two centuries ago, and in
all likelihood, it ended not long after it had begun. Before that, there were others, and
others before them. The fact is that an unknown number of unique cattle-keeping
societies have come and gone from the plains of East Africa, and we know very little
about most of them. Scholars of this part of the world should resist the temptation to
cover up this absence of knowledge by adding the historical equivalent of epicycles to
their old Maasai-centered cosmos – and indeed, some of the visual models that have been
proposed to maintain this view do look like epicycles. This dissertation has demonstrated
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